Lucas v. Craft
| Decision Date | 21 September 1933 |
| Citation | 161 Va. 228 |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | H. M. LUCAS v. IOLA F. CRAFT. |
1. AUTOMOBILES — Negligence — Running Down Woman Standing in the Middle of an Open Street. — For a truck to run down a woman standing in the middle of an open street is almost necessarily negligence.
2. AUTOMOBILES — Judicial Notice — Automobile Swinging out — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action for injuries when plaintiff was struck by an automobile, plaintiff had passed the bus from which she had alighted at an intersection and looked to the left and saw that the way was clear, but she did not see an automobile approaching and swinging to the right from the intersecting street into the street upon which she was. Plaintiff did what any other prudent person would have done, "kind of halted" to see just how far this approaching car would swing out, for it is matter of common knowledge that cars in executing this movement do sometimes swing farther than they should.
3. AUTOMOBILES — Action by Plaintiff for Injuries Sustained When Struck by an Automobile at a Street Intersection. — In the instant case, an action for injuries sustained when plaintiff was struck by an automobile, the evidence was sufficient to support a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. It could not be said as a matter of law that the defendant was not guilty of negligence, nor could it be said as a matter of law that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.
4. AUTOMOBILES — Right of Way — Plaintiff Struck and Injured at Intersection When Attempting to Cross the Street — Instructions — Case at Bar. — In the instant case plaintiff was struck by defendant's truck while attempting to cross a street at an intersection. There was no traffic officer on duty at the intersection. The court instructed the jury that if plaintiff started across the street at the intersection before the truck of defendant reached the intersection, that she had the right of way over the truck, and it was the duty of the driver of the truck to either change his course, slow down, or come to a complete stop if necessary to permit the plaintiff to safely and expeditiously make the crossing, and that if plaintiff was exercising due care for her own safety and the driver of defendant's truck disregarded this duty, and the same was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury, the jury must find for the plaintiff.
Held: That this instruction was not erroneous in that it assumed the driver saw the plaintiff before or at the time she was leaving the sidewalk.
5. AUTOMOBILES — Crossing Street at Intersection Where There Is No Traffic Officer at the Intersection — Right of Way. — Under section 2145(73), subdivision (c), Code of 1930, at a street intersection where no traffic officer is on duty, pedestrians have the right of way over vehicles.
6. AUTOMOBILES — Street Intersection — Section 2145(73), Code of 1930 — Construction of Statute. — The language and intent of the General Assembly is so plainly expressed in the statute, section 2145(73), Code of 1930, that it needs no interpretation or construction. It means what is said. At intersecting streets where there are neither traffic lights nor traffic officers, the pedestrian has a superior right — that is, the right to cross from one side of the street to the other in preference or priority over vehicles — and drivers of vehicles must respect this right and yield the right of way to the pedestrian. The pedestrian's right of way extends from one side of the street to the other. It does not begin at any particular point in the intersection nor does it end at any particular point. It begins on one side of the street and extends until the pedestrian has negotiated the crossing. It is impossible, without nullifying the statute, to divide this right of way into different stages in the intersection, yielding the right of way to the pedestrian at one point in the intersection and denying it at another, all at the time of negotiating the one crossing.
7. AUTOMOBILES — Street Intersection — Section 2145(73), Code of 1930 — Instructions — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action by plaintiff for injuries sustained when she was struck by an automobile at a street intersection, an instruction properly told the jury how to apply section 2145(73), Code of 1930, to the evidence in the case. It was plain, and no doubt the jury followed it, and upon it found against the defendant. The Supreme Court of Appeals, therefore, had no power to disturb that finding upon the point in question. Any other conclusion would make the statute of little value.
8. AUTOMOBILES — Street Intersection — Duty of Pedestrian to Continuously Look and Listen — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action by plaintiff for injuries sustained when she was struck by an automobile at a street intersection, an instruction given for plaintiff told the jury that a person lawfully on a public street may rely on the exercise of reasonable care by the drivers of automobiles and trucks to avoid injury, until the contrary appears or in the exercise of ordinary care should appear, and that a pedestrian in crossing a street was not required as a matter of law to continuously look or listen for approach of automobiles thereon, but was under the duty of using reasonable care for her safety, was excepted to on the grounds that it was the duty of plaintiff to continuously look and listen where looking and listening would be effective, and that the instruction assumed and charged too high a degree of care on the operator of an automobile.
Held: That it was not the duty of the plaintiff to continuously look and listen, and that the instruction did not require of the driver of an automobile an extraordinary degree of care.
9. INSTRUCTIONS — Read in the Light of the Evidence. — All instructions should be read in the light of the evidence to which they apply.
10. AUTOMOBILES — Streets and Sidewalks — Negligence. — The middle of the street is a zone of comparative safety; ordinarily cars may be expected to pass to its right and left.
11. AUTOMOBILES — Street Intersection — Duty of Pedestrian to Look Down Both Streets — Case at Bar. — The instant case was an action by plaintiff for injuries sustained when she was struck by an automobile at a street intersection. It was the duty of the plaintiff crossing the street at the intersection to look in one direction as well as in the other. A car was swinging towards her upon one street and prudence required that she look to it as well as down the street which had appeared to her just a moment before to be clear. In such circumstances she was not required as a matter of law to look continuously to the left.
12. AUTOMOBILES — Last Clear Chance — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action by plaintiff for injuries sustained when she was struck by defendant's automobile at a street intersection, defendant objected to an instruction on the ground that it injected the doctrine of the last clear chance into the case.
Held: That the injection of the doctrine of the last clear chance into the case was not error, as there was evidence from which the jury might have believed that there was still time for the driver of the truck to have avoided the accident, even though plaintiff had in fact been negligent.
13. AUTOMOBILES — Last Clear Chance — Driver's Failure to Stop Due to Defective Brakes — Case at Bar. — The instant case was an action by plaintiff for injuries sustained when she was struck by an automobile at a street intersection. If the driver's failure to stop was due to defective brakes, then the driver had no last clear chance to avoid the accident, but such a defect would be evidence of primary negligence of defendant.
Error to a judgment of the Law and Chancery Court of the city of Norfolk, in a proceeding by motion for a judgment for damages. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant assigns error.
The opinion states the case.
W. Shepherd Drewry, for the plaintiff in error.
Donald W. Shriver, for the defendant in error.
Under review is a judgment for the plaintiff who was run down and hurt by defendant's automobile.
That accident occurred at the intersection of Boush and York streets in the City of Norfolk. They cross each other at right angles. Boush street runs north and south and York street east and west. On the afternoon of July 27, 1931, Miss Iola F. Craft, a teacher by profession, boarded a bus coming south on Boush street. That bus was followed by another passenger bus which in turn was followed by a truck loaded with brick owned by the defendant, H. M. Lucas, and driven by his servant. Miss Craft's bus stopped by the bus stop station at said intersection, which station is on the west side of Boush street. Its south end is flush with the north side of York street. After getting off she walked around the front end of the bus and started across Boush street, intending to go to the Medical Arts building, which is on the northeast corner of these streets. As she passed her bus she looked to her left, which was north on Boush street, and saw nothing to indicate that it was not clear of approaching traffic. There was, however, a car coming east on York street — "there was an automobile coming from York street into Boush and I kind of halted myself for the car to pass and as I did the car struck me." Mr. Brackett said: "I saw Miss Craft standing in the middle of the street and the truck bearing down on her." Estimates as to how far she had gone past her bus vary, but we think it may fairly be said that she was about the middle of Boush street when the accident occurred. The truck horn was out of repair and so was not sounded and she says that she was unaware of its approach until the moment of impact.
We have seen that when her bus came down Boush street it was followed by another bus. When the first bus stopped at the bus...
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