Lucas v. Dist. of Columbia
| Decision Date | 17 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 13-00143 (TFH) |
| Parties | SHARON LUCAS, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Pending before the Court are Plaintiff Sharon Lucas' Partial Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 113] and Defendant District of Columbia's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 114]. Plaintiff Sharon Lucas, as personal representative of her late husband Allan Earl Lucas' estate, seeks to recover financial damages stemming from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department's (“MPD”) alleged failures to treat Mr. Lucas' induction into the United States Marine Corps as a military furlough, to reemploy him upon his discharge from military service, and to properly maintain his employment records after he was separated from MPD employment in 1973. Mrs Lucas alleges violations of the Veteran's Reemployment Rights Act (“VRRA”), 38 U.S.C. § 2021 (Count II); Breach of Contract (Count III); and Negligence (Count IV). Id. She also contends that these violations are unwarranted personnel actions, and thus entitle her to compensation under the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596 (Count I). Id.
The Plaintiff argues that there are no genuine material facts to dispute her claims, and she is entitled to summary judgment as to liability on all counts. See generally Pl. MSJ [ECF No. 114].
The Defendant argues that that it is entitled to summary judgment on all counts because the undisputed material facts demonstrate that Count II is time-barred under the doctrine of laches, Counts III and IV are time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations, and Count I rises and falls with Counts II-IV. See generally Def. MSJ [ECF No. 115].
On October 3, 2022, the Court heard argument on the competing Motions for Summary Judgment. For the reasons described below, the Court will grant the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on all counts.
The original plaintiff in this case, Allan Earl Lucas, filed his Complaint on February 4, 2013, against the District of Columbia, the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, the District of Columbia Police and Firefighter Retirement Relief Board, and the District of Columbia Department of Human Resources. Complaint [ECF No. 1]. On December 17, 2013, Plaintiff amended his complaint to only include the District of Columbia as the Defendant. First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) [ECF No. 34].
On September 20, 2015, the Court dismissed Mr. Lucas' lawsuit without prejudice because all claims asserted in the FAC were preempted by the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (“CMPA”), and the plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies pursuant to that Act. Mem. Op., Sep. 20, 2015 [ECF. No. 39].
On February 21, 2018, the Court granted Mr. Lucas's Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint [ECF No. 50] over the Defendant's opposition. Order (Feb. 21, 2018) [ECF No. 53]. Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on February 21, 2018. [ECF No. 55]. The District then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint [ECF No. 56], which this Court denied on September 30, 2019. Order (Sept. 30, 2019) [ECF No. 56]. In its October 2, 2019 Memorandum Opinion, this Court concluded that: (1) the plaintiff stated a claim under the VRRA; (2) dismissal of the plaintiff's Back Pay Act claim would be premature; (3) judicial review of the plaintiff's common law claims was not preempted by the CMPA; (4) the Statute of Limitations did not conclusively bar the plaintiff's common law claims; and (5) the plaintiff had stated a claim for breach of contract. Lucas v. District of Columbia, No. 13-cv-143 (TFH), 2019 WL 4860730 (D.D.C. Oct. 2, 2019). The Court subsequently entered a scheduling order dictating that summary judgment was to be fully briefed by August 2020. Scheduling Order, Oct. 31, 2019 [ECF No. 64]. However, due to COVID-19 and various other reasons, that schedule was extended numerous times. Sadly, Mr. Lucas passed away during this litigation on April 6, 2021.[1]Status Report, Apr. 13, 2021 [ECF No. 100].
On May 7, 2021, the Court held a status conference to discuss the possibility of referring this case for mediation. On May 19, 2021, the Court referred the matter to the District Court Mediation Program for forty-five (45) days. On September 15, 2021, the District filed a Status Report [ECF No. 103], informing the Court that although they were unable to reach a full settlement with the mediator, the parties had made progress with respect to their discovery issues. In response, the Court issued a Minute Order on September 22, 2021 temporarily staying discovery and setting a summary judgment briefing schedule. Minute Order (September 22, 2021). At the parties' request, the Court also deemed the pending discovery motions withdrawn without prejudice. Id. After further delays caused by a probate issue with Mr. Lucas's estate were finally resolved, the Court granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Substitution [ECF No. 104], appointed Sharon Lucas (Mr. Lucas' widow) as substitute Plaintiff, and set a summary judgment briefing schedule. Order (July 20, 2022) [ECF No. 112].
The plaintiff filed her Partial Motion for Summary Judgment on August 18, 2022, and the Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on August 19, 2022. The parties filed competing Memoranda in Opposition on September 1, see Pl. Mem. Opp. [ECF No. 117], and September 2, 2022, see Def. Mem. Opp. [ECF No. 119]. Both parties filed their Replies on September 9, 2022. See Pl. Reply [ECF No. 120]; Def. Reply [ECF No. 121].
The Court heard arguments on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment on October 3, 2022, and took them under advisement. Minute Entry (Oct. 3, 2022).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 mandates that “[t]he Court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute over a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. At the summary judgment stage, however, “the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 249.
Although “[t]he evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,” Talavera v. Shah, 638 F.3d 303, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2011), “[i]f the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted,” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (internal citations omitted). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. The ultimate inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id.
The evidence the Court may consider when passing on a summary judgment motion consists of “materials specified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) as well as any material that would be admissible or usable at trial.” Estate of Parsons v. Palestinian Auth., 651 F.3d 118, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Pursuant to Rule 56(c), the Court is not limited to the evidence cited by the parties but also “may consider other materials in the record.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3).
The parties both filed Statements of Undisputed Material Facts as well as Responses. See Pl. SOF [ECF No. 116]; Def. SOF [ECF No. 115 at 2]; Pl. Resp. SOF [ECF No. 118]; Def. Resp. SOF [ECF No. 119-1]. After reviewing both parties' submissions, and consistent with its finding during the hearing on October 3, 2022, the Court is satisfied that there are no material facts genuinely at issue. The relevant factual background is summarized below.
In May 1972, Allan Earl Lucas began his employment with the MPD as a Police Cadet. Pl. SOF ¶ 21. In connection with this employment, he was included in the federal Civil Service Retirement System (“CSRS”). Id. ¶ 23. In December 1972, Mr. Lucas received a draft notice from the government and gave the notice to the MPD, who instructed him to meet with human resources to fill out the paperwork for his separation. Id. ¶¶ 24-27. MPD did not provide Lucas with any counseling on his right to the restoration of his employment upon his return from military service despite knowing that he was resigning to join the military. Id. ¶¶ 32-33. After resigning from the MPD on January 20, 1973, he began his military service in February 1973. Id. ¶¶ 29-30; Def. SOF ¶¶ 11, 15.
Mr Lucas was honorably discharged from the Marine Corps on February 3, 1978. Pl. SOF ¶ 35. On February 15, 1978, he went to the office of MPD's recruiting division with proof of his honorable discharge, informed them of his previous employment, and asked them if he could get his job back. Def. SOF ¶ 19; Pl. Resp. SOF ¶ 19. There, he spoke with Sergeant Donald Christian, who gave him a writing pad and told him to a write a letter to Addison Davis, the Commander of the MPD's recruiting division, informing him of his previous employment, that he had been honorably discharged from the military, and that he...
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