Lucas v. Hahn

• Decision Date: 15 July 1994
• Docket Number: No. 94-015,94-015
• Citation: 648 A.2d 839,162 Vt. 456
• Parties: , 94 Ed. Law Rep. 1383 John LUCAS v. Dr. Robert HAHN, Dr. Vincent Crockenberg, Stanley Carpenter, All of Johnson State College, Johnson, Vermont.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Page 839

648 A.2d 839

162 Vt. 456, 94 Ed. Law Rep. 1383

John LUCAS v. Dr. Robert HAHN, Dr. Vincent Crockenberg, Stanley Carpenter,

All of Johnson State College, Johnson, Vermont.

No. 94-015.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

July 15, 1994.

Motion for Reargument Denied Aug. 23, 1994.

John Lucas, pro se, plaintiff-appellant.

Michael J. Harris and Paul K. Sutherland of Sutherland & Collins, Inc., Burlington, for defendants-appellees.

Before ALLEN, C.J., and GIBSON, DOOLEY, MORSE and JOHNSON, JJ.

ALLEN, Chief Justice.

Plaintiff John Lucas appeals the summary judgment granted to defendants on claims arising from a decision by Johnson State College (JSC) not to recommend him for licensure as a teacher. We affirm.

Until the Spring of 1992, plaintiff was a graduate student enrolled in the education program at JSC, pursuing certification as a high school teacher. As part of the program, he was teaching a history class at Spaulding High School in Barre. A dispute over grades arose between plaintiff and his supervising teacher, and plaintiff, believing that the supervisor had wrongfully lowered many of his students' tentative grades, sent letters to that effect to the supervising teacher and the students involved.

On April 9, 1992, plaintiff met with three professors from the JSC education department to discuss the incident. Following this meeting, the department representatives informed him by letter of their finding that he had not adhered to policies outlined in JSC's Student Teaching Handbook 1991-92, which pertained to confidentiality and compliance with host-school regulations. They decided that plaintiff would not return to Spaulding, would not have further student teaching placements, and would not be recommended for licensure by JSC. The letter also notified plaintiff of the availability of an appeal to the Dean of Academic Affairs. Plaintiff appealed the decision to the education department, the graduate committee, the academic dean, and JSC's president, all of whom affirmed the decision to remove plaintiff from his position at Spaulding and the licensure aspect of the master's program. However, plaintiff was allowed to remain in the program to earn a master's degree in education.

In the course of his JSC appeals, plaintiff filed numerous requests for documents with the school, and JSC responded either with the requested documents, a request for clarification, or notification that the requested documents did not exist or were otherwise unavailable. Plaintiff continued to file requests, many of which JSC considered reformulations of earlier requests.

In March 1993, plaintiff commenced an action alleging violation of §§ 316 and 318 of Vermont's Access to Public Records Act, 1 V.S.A. §§ 315-320, requesting attorney fees and litigation costs pursuant to § 319(d), and penalties pursuant to § 320. Plaintiff further alleged that JSC failed to afford him due process in removing him from the teaching licensure program. Defendants successfully moved for summary judgment on both claims, and plaintiff appeals.

To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate both the absence of genuine issues of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. V.R.C.P. 56(c); Murray v. White, 155 Vt. 621, 628, 587 A.2d 975, 979 (1991). In determining whether an issue of material fact exists, the party opposing the motion receives the benefit of any reasonable doubts and inferences, Pierce v. Riggs, 149 Vt. 136, 139, 540 A.2d 655, 657 (1987), but allegations alone do not create issues of material fact. Gore v. Green Mountain Lakes, Inc., 140 Vt. 262, 266, 438 A.2d 373, 375 (1981).

I.

Plaintiff first claims that he was denied due process in JSC's decision to remove him from the teacher licensure program. For the claim to be viable under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, plaintiff must demonstrate that removal from the licensing and student-teaching aspects of the masters program deprived him of a constitutionally protected "liberty" or "property" interest. Board of Curators of Univ. of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 82, 98 S.Ct. 948, 951, 55 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978). "[P]roperty interests are creatures of state law," id. at 82, 98 S.Ct. at 951; plaintiff's bare allegations of a contractual relationship between JSC and him do not suffice to establish such a property interest. Furthermore, we need not resolve whether he suffered harm to a liberty interest of constitutional dimension, because we conclude that plaintiff was afforded "at least as much due process as the Fourteenth Amendment requires." Id. at 85, 98 S.Ct. at 952.

As a preliminary matter, plaintiff challenges the trial court's conclusion that the decision was based on academic performance. The record shows that plaintiff's handling of the grading disagreement prompted JSC's action, which was based on doubt about plaintiff's ability to adhere to ethical standards and to cooperate with superiors in the school setting. In the context of the licensure program these concerns are valid academic matters, because they rank as important measures of an individual's ability to perform as a teacher. See Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 637 F.Supp. 789, 808 (D.P.R.1986) (decision to cancel third-year surgery residency, based on conclusion that plaintiff would not make a good surgeon because of inability to follow program's line of authority and desire to do things her own way, was academic decision), rev'd on other grounds, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir.1988); cf. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 91 n. 6, 98 S.Ct. at 955-56 n. 6 (in determining whether to dismiss a medical student on an academic basis, nonacademic factors such as personal hygiene and timeliness may be as important in determining whether a student will make a good medical doctor). In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we agree with the trial court that plaintiff's removal from the licensure program was an academic decision.

The procedures afforded plaintiff before and after the original decision conformed to due process requirements. By its nature, due process comprehends a wide range of procedural protections tailored to myriad situations of state action affecting protected interests. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 1748-49, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961). At a minimum, due process mandates that any...