Lucas v. Hospital Authority of Dougherty County

• Decision Date: 09 November 1989
• Docket Number: No. A89A1649,A89A1649
• Citation: 193 Ga.App. 595,388 S.E.2d 871
• Parties: LUCAS v. HOSPITAL AUTHORITY OF DOUGHERTY COUNTY.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 871

388 S.E.2d 871

193 Ga.App. 595

LUCAS v. HOSPITAL AUTHORITY OF DOUGHERTY COUNTY.

No. A89A1649.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Nov. 9, 1989.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 20, 1989.

Certiorari Denied Jan. 19, 1990.

Reinhardt & Whitley, Robert C. Wilmot, Tifton, Glenn Whitley, for appellant.

Perry, Walters & Lippitt, C. Richard Langley, Albany, for appellee.

DEEN, Presiding Judge.

On October 14, 1985, Milton Lucas was admitted to Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital, where he underwent surgery to remove a growth from his right lung. Terri Rachals, a registered nurse, was assigned to care for him after his surgery in the surgical intensive care unit. Lucas subsequently suffered a heart attack of unknown cause on October 17, 1985. On October 18 and 19, Rachals gave him unauthorized injections of potassium chloride, which caused two episodes of sudden cardiovascular collapse. He died on October 19 shortly after receiving the second injection.

Rachals later confessed to giving lethal, unauthorized injections to Lucas as well as to four other patients at the hospital. She stated her reason for giving the injections to Lucas as wanting "to put him out of his misery."

Melva W. Lucas, the wife of the deceased, filed an action against the hospital and Rachals for the wrongful death of her husband. She contended that the hospital was liable for Rachals' actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior, and that it was negligent in the control, use, dispensation, and administration of potassium chloride, and in its failure to discover the cause of her husband's heart attacks. The trial court granted the hospital's motion for summary judgment and Melva Lucas appeals.

1. OCGA § 51-2-2 provides: "Every person shall be liable for torts committed by his wife, his child or his servant by his command or in the prosecution and within the scope of his business, whether the same are committed by negligence or voluntarily." "The true test [of voluntariness] is not whether the tort was committed by reason of anger, malice or ill will, but whether or not it was committed in the prosecution and within the scope of the master's business. If the tort be committed, not by reason of the employment, but because of matters disconnected therewith the master would not be liable." McCranie v. Langdale Ford Co., 176 Ga.App. 281, 282, 335 S.E.2d 667 [193 Ga.App. 596] (1985). " 'If the criminal act of the [employee] was done within the range of his employment [in order to accomplish] the authorized business of the master, the latter is liable.' [Cit.]" Pope v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 88 Ga.App. 557, 560, 77 S.E.2d 55 (1953). If, however, the tortious act were committed not by reason of the employment, but rather for purely personal reasons disconnected from the authorized business of the master, the master would not be liable. Frazier v. Sou. R. Co., 200 Ga. 590, 593, 37 S.E.2d 774 (1946); Odom v. Hubeny, Inc., 179 Ga.App. 250, 251, 345 S.E.2d 886 (1986).

In the instant case, the hospital and Rachals were both pledged to the proper care, supervision and treatment of the patients. It cannot be said that Rachals was advancing or benefiting the hospital in any way by injecting certain patients with lethal doses of potassium chloride in order to "put them out of their misery." While Rachals may have been advancing the hospital's interests in giving authorized injections of potassium chloride, she clearly abandoned the hospital's interest and pursued...