Lucas v. Lake Cnty.

• Decision Date: 24 October 2012
• Docket Number: 070093CV; A144826.
• Citation: 253 Or.App. 39,289 P.3d 320
• Parties: Stephen A. LUCAS, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. LAKE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Oregon, Defendant–Respondent.
• Court: Oregon Court of Appeals

253 Or.App. 39

289 P.3d 320

Stephen A. LUCAS, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.LAKE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Oregon, Defendant–Respondent.

070093CV; A144826.

Court of Appeals of Oregon.

Argued and Submitted March 31, 2011.

Decided Oct. 24, 2012.

David C. Force, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Matthew J. Kalmanson, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs was Hoffman Hart & Wagner LLP.

HASELTON, C.J.

Plaintiff Stephen Lucas appeals a judgment in favor of defendant Lake County, contending that the trial court erred in (1) dismissing, on summary judgment, his blacklisting claim as being barred by claim preclusion arising from prior federal litigation between the parties and (2) granting judgment on the pleadings as to his wrongful discharge claim on the ground that the complaint did not sufficiently allege that plaintiff's termination contravened an “important public duty.” Defendant cross-assigns error, contending that, because plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim was also barred by claim preclusion principles, the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment as to that claim. As amplified below, we conclude that claim preclusion did not bar either of plaintiff's claims and, for that reason, the trial court erred in allowing summary judgment as to the blacklisting claim but properly denied it as to the wrongful discharge claim. We further conclude that, because plaintiff alleged that his termination contravened an “important public duty,” the trial court erred in allowing judgment on the pleadings as to the wrongful discharge claim. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

Because the circumstances of this case involve litigation between the parties in both federal and state courts, as well as extensive motion practice in the state court action from which this appeal originates, the operative procedural facts, although undisputed, are somewhat complicated. For that reason, our recitation of those facts is necessarily detailed.

On April 28, 2005, defendant terminated plaintiff, a deputy sheriff sergeant, from his position as the jail manager of the Lake County Jail. At that time, the Lake County Sheriff did not tell plaintiff the reason for his termination.

In July 2006, plaintiff filed an action against defendant in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon alleging, among other things, that defendant violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12112, by terminating his employment because of a permanent partial disability related to his former military service or a perceived disability. Plaintiff's complaint also alleged that the federal court had supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims for unlawful employment practices and defamation.^FN1 Specifically, plaintiff alleged that defendant had committed unlawful employment practices by (1) terminating plaintiff because of a disability or a perceived disability, in violation of ORS 659A.112; (2) terminating plaintiff because he had filed a workers' compensation claim during his employment, in violation of ORS 659A.040; and (3) fraudulently inducing plaintiff, in violation of ORS 659.815, to move to Oregon to work for defendant based on representations that he would be hired as a “Sergeant/Jail Manager” at a commensurate salary when, for the first few months of his employment, he held the position of corrections officer at a lower salary because of “dissension in a collective bargaining unit.”

As pertinent to the issues on appeal, plaintiff also alleged a claim for defamation. That claim was essentially predicated on an allegation that, “[o]n or about April 27, 200[5]”—the day before plaintiff's termination—defendant's Law Enforcement Data System (LEDS) representative sent an e-mail to the state-wide LEDS Training and Education Manager falsely indicating that “plaintiff had cheated on an examination required for access to [LEDS] and had encouraged another employee to do so as well.” Further, plaintiff alleged that the “false statements were defamatory, and were intended by defendant to injure plaintiff's reputation as a law enforcement officer and to interfere with his ability to obtain other employment in that field after his discharge by defendant.” Plaintiff sought $100,000 in damages for injury to his reputation and extreme emotional distress.

The federal court ordered the parties to complete discovery by March 9, 2007. Approximately a month before that deadline, defendant took plaintiff's deposition. During that deposition, plaintiff's attorney indicated that he anticipated that he would need to amend plaintiff's complaint based on information that he “ha[d] just received th[at] week.”

Although the record does not demonstrate that plaintiff filed a motion to amend his complaint in federal court, he filed a motion to extend the discovery deadline. In that motion, plaintiff's attorney explained that he sought to investigate a new theory about plaintiff's termination— viz., that defendant had wrongfully terminated plaintiff in retaliation for, and to conceal the results of, his investigation concerning an incident in which a deputy under his supervision had required a female inmate at the Lake County Jail to engage in oral sex. According to plaintiff's attorney, he needed additional discovery to ensure that filing a claim for, among other things, common-law wrongful discharge was “justified by the facts.”

On April 2, 2007, the federal court held a hearing concerning plaintiff's motion. During that hearing, the court confirmed that defendant's position was that it had fired plaintiff because he had cheated on the LEDS examination. The following colloquy then ensued between the court and plaintiff's counsel:

“THE COURT: All right. Let's go next to the plaintiff's motion to extend the deadlines. In the light of [defense counsel's] commitment that there's only one issue in this case, I don't see any reason to extend it. This case should be tried as scheduled. Any problem with that, [plaintiff's counsel]? I'm not inclined to allow you—

“[PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL]: If, in fact, two things turn out to be the case that we now are, my client and I, more strongly than ever are convinced they are, that, one, the reason being asserted by the defendant is entirely untrue * * * for the termination; and, two, that the actual motive here was to keep [plaintiff] away from both criminal and civil claims involved by this woman, [the inmate] who alleges that she was sodomized in the jail, then under those conditions, I want to bring another claim and—

“THE COURT: No, no. Wait a minute. No. I read your papers on that, your brief. I don't think that's your choice. You can file another lawsuit if you want to, but it's clear that the only claim they made for firing * * * him was as set forth as we've discussed.

“That's the issue. This case has been ready for closing of discovery, let me just look. We're not going to—and she knew about all these things before, or he did. So we're not going to go back and start over on this case.

“ * * * * *

“THE COURT: * * * And I don't know how long you've known about this other possibility, [plaintiff's counsel,] but we're not going to start this case all over for it.

“ So, we'll try this case on the pleadings that have been filed and the motions for summary judgment that have been filed.”

(Emphasis added.)

In sum, in denying plaintiff's motion to extend the discovery deadline, the federal court effectively refused to allow plaintiff to amend his complaint to allege a common-law wrongful discharge claim. The court then turned its attention to defendant's summary judgment motion. In that regard, as pertinent to the issues on appeal, defendant contended that plaintiff's defamation claim was barred under the doctrine of absolute privilege.

Then, on April 27, while the federal litigation was still pending and before the federal court ruled on the summary judgment motion, plaintiff filed this action in state court alleging claims for blacklisting, ORS 659.805, ^FN2 and common-law wrongful discharge. Unlike his defamation claim in federal court—which concerned a statement that was made before his termination—the allegations comprising plaintiff's blacklisting claim concerned statements and conduct that occurred after his termination. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that “[o]n April 28, 2005”—the day that plaintiff was terminated—the sheriff

“and others acting at his direction falsely reported to the Department of State Police of the State of Oregon that plaintiff had been caught cheating on an examination for certification to access [LEDS], and arranged that this allegation be furnished to the Oregon Department of Public Safety Standards and Training in order to disqualify plaintiff from certification as a police officer or corrections officer in the State of Oregon.”

Further, plaintiff alleged that,

“ [f]rom April 28, 2005 through the present time [ ( i.e., April 27, 2007) ], defendant has published and caused to be published; and has conspired or contrived by correspondence to communicate, false allegations of dishonesty and unfitness against plaintiff as an employee it has discharged, with the intent and for the purpose of preventing plaintiff from securing employment as a police officer or corrections officer in the State of Oregon. The said conduct of defendant is blacklisting within the meaning of ORS 659.805.”

(Emphasis added.)

Plaintiff sought (1) $100,000 in damages for “emotional distress, humiliation, and injury to his reputation” and (2) economic damages for lost wages, the amount of which plaintiff proposed to establish at the time of trial in the state action because they would continue to accrue over time.

Plaintiff's state court wrongful discharge claim was (and is) predicated on the same basic operative facts that he had described in his motion to extend the discovery deadline in the federal district court. In general terms, plaintiff...