Lucas v. United States, Nos. 15-CF-820

• Decision Date: 22 October 2020
• Docket Number: 15-CF-834,Nos. 15-CF-820,& 16-CO-1049
• Parties: Christopher LUCAS and Christina Lucas, Appellants, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

240 A.3d 328

Christopher LUCAS and Christina Lucas, Appellants,

v.UNITED STATES, Appellee.

Nos. 15-CF-820

15-CF-834

& 16-CO-1049

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued September 19, 2018

Decided October 22, 2020

Barbara E. Kittay for appellant Christopher Lucas.

Joshua Deahl, Public Defender Service at the time, with whom Samia Fam, Public Defender Service, Thomas D. Engle,^* and Sharon L. Burka, were on the briefs, for appellant Christina Lucas.

Lauren R. Bates, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Jessie K. Liu, United States Attorney at the time the reply brief was filed, Channing D. Phillips, United States Attorney at the time the initial brief was filed, and Elizabeth Trosman, Nicholas P. Coleman, and Veronica Jennings, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before Blackburne-Rigsby, Chief Judge, and Beckwith, Associate Judge, and Fisher, Senior Judge.^**

Concurring opinion by Senior Judge Fisher at page 353.

Dissenting opinion by Associate Judge Beckwith at page 353–54.

Blackburne-Rigsby, Chief Judge:

Following a joint jury trial, nineteen-year-old twins appellants Christopher and Christina Lucas were found guilty of aggravated assault while armed with a "[b]ias-related" penalty enhancement on the basis of sexual orientation in connection with an assault on victim Jaye Davis.¹ Christopher Lucas was also found guilty of simple assault on victim Ashley Coleman.² They appeal their convictions.

Appellants raise several issues on appeal, two of which – the trial court's response to a jury question and the sufficiency of the evidence – require this court to interpret the Bias-Related Crime Act of 1989, D.C. Code § 22-3701(1) (the "Bias-Related Crime Act"). The Act states, in relevant part, that a " ‘[b]ias-related crime’ means a designated act that demonstrates an accused's prejudice based on the actual or perceived ... sexual orientation ... of a victim of the" crime. Id . We are tasked with determining the role prejudice must play in motivating a crime before triggering the enhanced criminal penalties the Bias-Related Crime Act evokes.

Appellants contend that a proper reading of the statute, based on its plain language and applicable constitutional principles, requires but-for causation, meaning the jury must determine whether appellants would not have attacked Jaye Davis "but for" their prejudice against him based on his sexual orientation. See Burrage v. United States , 571 U.S. 204, 210-211, 134 S.Ct. 881, 187 L.Ed.2d 715 (2014). Analyzed pursuant to this standard, they contend, the evidence was insufficient for the jury to apply the bias enhancement because the evidence shows various motivations for appellants' attack on Jaye Davis, but does not show that they attacked him because of their prejudice against him based on his sexual orientation. The government maintains that any argument related to the correct interpretation of § 22-3701(1) of the statute is waived because appellants failed to request a jury instruction requiring but-for causation at any point during trial. Assuming the issue is appropriately preserved, however, the government argues that a lesser standard should apply. Further, the government contends, even if but-for causation is required, the trial court appropriately communicated that standard to the jury. The government urges us to affirm appellants' convictions because, it argues, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings under either standard.

We hold that the Bias-Related Crime Act requires but-for causation, such that the government must prove that the appellants assaulted Jaye Davis because of their prejudice against him based on his sexual orientation. The trial court appropriately instructed the jury on how to apply the Bias-Related Crime Act. Moreover, in applying but-for causation, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that appellants would not have attacked Jaye Davis absent their prejudice against him based on his sexual orientation. Appellants' arguments as to the causation standard under the Bias-Related Crime Act, however, do not affect their underlying simple and aggravated assault convictions. Finding no abuse of discretion on appellants' remaining challenges to the evidence supporting those assault convictions, discussed further below, we affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

During the evening of October 18 and early morning hours of October 19, 2013, appellants assaulted Jaye Davis after a family gathering hosted at the home of his uncle, Leo Davis, in Northwest Washington, D.C.³ That evening, Jaye arrived at Leo's home between 8:30 and 9:00 p.m. From the moment he arrived at the gathering until he left, Jaye was the subject of homophobic taunts, including "gay this and gay that" comments in tones of "anger and disgust" and being called "f[*]ggot a[*]s mother f[*]cker." When Jaye arrived at the party, appellants Christopher and Christina – who were at the gathering – stared, pointed at Jaye, and said, "Who is this gay motherf[*]cker?" Appellants both gave Jaye a disgusted look. Jaye openly identifies as gay, and his cousin Ashley Coleman, also present at Leo's house, testified that he "walks ... girly," "talks girly," and "acts" in a way that exhibits effeminate stereotypes of gay men.

At one point in the evening, Jaye became involved in an argument with some individuals, including appellants.⁴ Ashley could not remember with whom Jaye was arguing, but testified that Jaye "was going back and forth. He was cursing .... he was being loud, but he was saying things in defense of himself .... It was an argument of words. It was a fight with words." The situation escalated, causing another individual, Andre Holland, to intervene on Christina's behalf. Holland testified that Jaye and Leo were trying to push Christina, prompting Holland to fight back against both. The police arrived before the argument got out of hand and instructed the crowd to disperse.

Jaye, his cousin Ashley, and his mother Alicia Coleman left the party at around 12:20 a.m. and walked to the corner of Sherman Avenue and Harvard Street Northwest to find a cab; at that intersection, they noticed that a large group had followed them. Appellants led the group, saying, "[T]here go that f[*]ggot mother f[*]cker right there." Ashley and Alicia testified that the group, numbering approximately ten people and including appellants Christopher and Christina, attacked Jaye, as well as Ashley and Alicia. During the fight, Christopher hit Ashley in the head and knocked her to the ground. At one point, Jaye was grabbed by his throat, pulled onto the ground, and dragged along the sidewalk. Both Christopher and Christina targeted Jaye and stomped on his face, all while yelling remarks like "f[*]ggot mother[*]cker." Christina then took a razor-like object from her pocket, kneeled next to Jaye, and cut open his face along the left eye. Jaye was left bloodied and unconscious, and the group – including appellants – ran off. Police officers patrolling the area heard loud screaming, quickly arrived at the scene, and observed Jaye "bleeding in the face," in pain, and being cradled in Alicia's arms.

Jaye testified that he lost consciousness during the assault and did not regain consciousness until later in an ambulance. Upon arrival at the hospital, Jaye rated his pain as "severe" and testified that his pain was "like 100" on a scale of one to ten. Dr. Ashley Humphries, the trauma surgeon who treated Jaye, testified that he had "several obvious injuries to his face" upon his arrival. Jaye received stitches for two face lacerations next to and beneath his left eye, one of which was "fairly jagged in appearance." A CT scan

and X-rays revealed a sinus fracture and a cheekbone fracture. Jaye also suffered swelling to his wrist, lips, and eyes, and was left with an "ugly" black scar under his eye. Jaye could not recall who among the group attacked him first, but remembered hearing "[t]he same words" during the attack that he had heard when he first arrived at the party: "[t]his f[*]ggot a[*]s mother f[*]cker, f[*]ggot a[*]s mother f[*]cker."

At trial, appellants presented evidence that they were not present at the time of the assault. The jury did not credit their testimony, convicting them of aggravated assault while armed. As to the bias enhancement, appellants argued that any assault on Jaye occurred because of other motivations, such as the earlier altercation at Leo's house, rather than Jaye's sexual orientation. The jury returned separate verdicts finding that each appellant committed the crime because of Jaye's actual or perceived sexual orientation. Christopher was also convicted of simple assault on Ashley.

On appeal, appellants raise legal arguments involving the jury instruction under the Bias-Related Crime Act and a related jury note, arguing that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that the penalty enhancement requires but-for causation. Under a but-for causation standard, appellants argue that the evidence was insufficient to find that they attacked Jaye because of prejudice against him based on his sexual orientation. Appellants then raise three challenges related to the trial court's decisions to (1) limit cross-examination related to the defense's theory of the case; (2) permit Jaye's mother to testify about his condition after he was attacked, which, appellants argue, elicited an improper emotional response from the jury; and (3) excuse Jaye after he testified in the government's case-in-chief.

II. Causation and the Bias-Related Crime Act

In deciding this appeal, we must first determine the causation standard under the bias enhancement statute. We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Aboye v. United States , 121 A.3d 1245, 1249 (D.C. 2015). Questions of statutory interpretation begin with the plain language of the statute, and we construe words according to their ordinary meaning. See Clyburn v. United States , 48...