Lucchetti v. Lucchetti

• Decision Date: 24 March 1980
• Docket Number: No. 79-637,79-637
• Citation: 37 Ill.Dec. 852,402 N.E.2d 854,82 Ill.App.3d 630
• Parties: , 37 Ill.Dec. 852 Nancee M. LUCCHETTI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis A. LUCCHETTI and Dorothy Petermann, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 854

402 N.E.2d 854

82 Ill.App.3d 630, 37 Ill.Dec. 852

Nancee M. LUCCHETTI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis A. LUCCHETTI and Dorothy Petermann, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 79-637.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division.

March 24, 1980.

William M. Doty, Jr., Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.

William Pellicore, Chicago, for defendants-appellees.

CAMPBELL, Justice:

Plaintiff, Nancee M. Lucchetti, filed an action requesting an accounting and the imposition of a constructive trust on the joint tenancies established in the names of Louis J. Lucchetti, the plaintiff's deceased husband and Dorothy Petermann and Louis A. Lucchetti, the defendants, who are the daughter and son of Louis J. Lucchetti by a previous marriage. The defendants, pursuant to section 45 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 110, par. 45), filed a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The court sustained the defendants' motion and dismissed the action, and the plaintiff appeals. The plaintiff also appeals the order suspending discovery.

The plaintiff commenced the proceedings on September 12, 1977, and on October 11, 1977, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's first complaint. The plaintiff then filed a request for production of documents which was denied, and the court entered an order on October 25, 1977 suspending discovery until the case was at issue.

Subsequently, in a second amended complaint the plaintiff alleged that Louis J. Lucchetti died in 1977, and that in 1974, while the plaintiff was married to the decedent, various joint tenancies were established by the decedent with the defendants on various bonds, bank accounts, certificates of deposit, and stock certificates previously held solely in the name of the decedent.

The plaintiff alleged the joint tenancies were a "sham" and a mere testamentary device, and in support of this allegation claimed that: (1) the purpose of the joint tenancies was to avoid probate; (2) that the decedent had no present donative intent at the time the said accounts were created; (3) that the defendants did not use or enjoy the said accounts until the decedent's death; (4) that the necessary unities were not present; and (5) that the decedent declared the plaintiff would receive one-third of his estate and executed a will which purported to convey the same to the plaintiff. The pleadings further claimed that the decedent maintained full control over the said accounts, and declared the interest and profits accrued from the accounts on his state and federal income tax returns.

The plaintiff also alleged that the decedent's actions in creating the joint tenancies operated as a fraud in law upon her rights as the surviving spouse and requested the accounts be declared illusory and a "sham" and further, that the defendants' be made constructive trustees of the said accounts.

The defendants in the motion to dismiss the second amended complaint argued that the decedent could dispose of his property as he chose and that there was a presumption of a gift since the decedent created the joint tenancies with his children. In accordance with said motion, the court entered an order dismissing the second amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

On appeal the plaintiff argues the second amended complaint reasonably informed the defendants of the nature of the cause of action, and the court abused its discretion in denying discovery until the case was at issue.

The Civil Practice Act provides that no pleading is bad in substance which contains information as reasonably informs the opposite party of the nature of the claim or defense which he is called upon to meet (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 110, par. 42(2)); and that all pleadings are to be liberally construed with a view toward doing substantial justice between the parties. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 110, par. 33(3)). A section 45 motion to dismiss a cause of action admits all facts well-pleaded (Johnson v. Nationwide Business Forms, Inc. (1976), 41 Ill.App.3d 128, 3 Ill.Dec. 761, 359 N.E.2d 171, together with all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from the facts. Pierce v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago (1976), 44 Ill.App.3d 234, 3 Ill.Dec. 67, 358 N.E.2d 67.

The plaintiff and defendants agreed that the case of Johnson v. LaGrange State Bank (1978), 73 Ill.2d 342, 22 Ill.Dec. 709, 383 N.E.2d 185 was applicable in determining if the second amended complaint stated a cause of action for fraud. Johnson was the consolidation of two cases reviewed by the Illinois Supreme Court, Johnson v. LaGrange State Bank (1977), 50 Ill.App.3d 830, 8 Ill.Dec. 670, 365 N.E.2d 1056, and Havey v. Patton (1977), 52 Ill.App.3d 897, 11 Ill.Dec. 177, 368 N.E.2d 728. Havey is particularly applicable in that it involves a factual situation similar to the case at bar. In Havey, the decedent, made the sister-in-law a joint tenant on a savings account and a certificate of deposit. It should also be noted that unlike the plaintiff, the parties in Johnson and Havey had a trial on the merits of their complaint and that the surviving spouse in those cases argued, as the plaintiff, that the inter vivos transfer of property by the decedent spouse fraudulently deprived the surviving spouse of marital rights in the property.

In discussing the factors that constitute fraud upon the surviving spouses' marital rights, the court in Johnson stated:

"When the cases discuss fraud on the marital rights of the surviving spouse, they are not considering fraud in the traditional sense. 73 Ill.2d 342, 358, 22 Ill.Dec. 709, 716, 383...