Lucchetti v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 25 May 1916 |
| Citation | 233 F. 137 |
| Parties | LUCCHETTI v. PHILADELPHIA & R. RY. CO. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Francis J. Maneely, of Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.
Wm Clarke Mason, of Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.
Plaintiff filed a statement of claim March 18, 1914. The cause of action meant to be set forth was one under the acts of Congress relating to employes of railroad common carriers engaged in interstate commerce. It is essential to a case under the statutes of the United States, not only that the defendant was at the time engaged in interstate commerce, but also (as the fact might be the defendant was likewise engaged in transportation within the state) that the plaintiff was at the time the cause of action arose, employed in interstate commerce work. This is settled beyond the necessity of the citation of authorities laying down the ruling. The only objection interposed to the allowance of the motion is that by it a new cause of action is introduced. The practical value of the position asserted by the objection lies in this: That if the amendment is allowed the action was instituted in time. If the plaintiff is driven to a new action, the bar of the statute of limitations could be pleaded.
A party may have two causes of action, which, although grow out of the same fact occurrences, are distinct, separate, and different. One of them, for illustration, may arise out of the general principles of the law of negligence, and the other out of the provisions of a statute, state or federal. He may have the right to assert either or both. If he asserts one or both, and makes a slip in pleading his averments of fact, he may amend. If, however, he brings his action for the one cause, and wishes to change to the other, it is clear he is not amending the pleadings in the action brought, but is bringing in a new cause of action.
The statement of claim here with sufficient clearness indicates it to have been for a cause arising under the laws of the United States. This is further indicated by the fact that the action was brought in a court of the United States by a litigant who, for any other cause than one arising under the laws of the United States, could have brought no action. The action brought was therefore either for this cause or the court was without jurisdiction to entertain it. The statement of claim contains an averment of one of the essential facts...
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Shidloski v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co.
... ... [ Jarvis v. C. B. & Q. Railroad Co., 37 S.W.2d 602, ... 607, 327 Mo. 428; Lucchetti v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co ... (D. C.), 233 F. 137.] ... Recognizing ... this burden respondent relies on testimony of J. H ... ...
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...exclusively relied upon in the original petition, and it was held to be a departure from law to law. The same doctrine was stated in the Lucchetti case, but held not applicable the case made. The instant case is distinguishable from the foregoing in several respects. Looking first to the pl......
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