Luce v. Ash
Decision Date | 03 October 1911 |
Citation | 132 N.W. 708,28 S.D. 109 |
Parties | LUCE v. ASH. |
Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Beadle County; Chas. S. Whiting, Judge.
Action by O. A. Luce against James C. Ash. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Reversed, with directions.
Elrod & Dunham, for appellant.
Ede & Churchill, for respondent.
Action to recover commissions on a land sale. A jury was waived and the case submitted to the court upon an agreed statement of facts. The entire transaction between the parties was by correspondence, and the agreed statement of facts consists wholly of the letters constituting the correspondence, with the additional stipulated statement that "plaintiff has done and performed everything on his part to be done and performed." On August 30, 1906, defendant by separate written contracts listed for sale with plaintiff, a real estate agent at Des Moines, Iowa, two quarter sections of land in South Dakota, one in Clark county, at $19 per acre the other in Beadle county, at $18 per acre, terms of sale upon both tracts $1,200 cash, $640 in two years, balance in ten years, with interest at 6 1/2 per cent. on deferred payments, agent not given exclusive sale, but defendant to notify plaintiff within three days if sold by defendant, the prices named to be good for four months if not sold before. November 1, 1906, defendant wrote and mailed to plaintiff a letter notifying him that he had himself sold the quarter section in Clark county. It is conceded plaintiff never received this letter. On February 28, 1907, plaintiff wrote to defendant as follows: To which defendant replied: "Will cut that price $100.00 for all cash but $1400. to run five years, (an old line mortgage at 7% just being negotiated." March 14, 1907 plaintiff wrote defendant: March 18, 1907, defendant replied: March 22d defendant wired plaintiff: On the same day, in response to the last letter and telegram, plaintiff wrote defendant: "I offer $1200 cash, purchaser to assume mortgage for $1400 and give second mortgage for the balance of the purchase price at $18.00 per acre." March 26th defendant replied by telegram: "I accept offer twenty third inst., seven per cent. on balance." On the day this telegram was received plaintiff entered into a written contract with Gaines & Atkins, purchasers, for a sale of the quarter section in Clark county at $21 per acre, and sent defendant a check for $25 to apply on the purchase price. On April 4, 1907, defendant wrote plaintiff as follows: On April 7th plaintiff replied as follows: On the 8th of April defendant returned to plaintiff the $25 earnest money paid on the purchase price of the land, which the plaintiff returned to the bank who sent it, and on May 20th defendant notified plaintiff that this money was deposited in said bank subject to his order. It is conceded that defendant did not intend to authorize a sale of the Clark county land, but believed he was selling the quarter in Beadle county. It is also conceded that "plaintiff had no knowledge that defendant believed he was selling the Beadle county land."
Plaintiff claims to recover from defendant as commission the difference between $18 per acre, the price offered in plaintiff's letter of March 23d and accepted by defendant's telegram of March 23d, and $21 per acre, the price at which the land was sold to Gaines & Atkins. The trial court denied plaintiff's claim on the sole ground that he had fraudulently concealed that the land had been sold for $21 per acre instead of $18 named in the offer of March 23d. Appellant's counsel argue at length, both orally and in his brief, that defendant should not be permitted to repudiate the indebtedness for commissions by reason of his own mistake as to the land sold, for the reason that the mistake was not participated in by plaintiff or occasioned by plaintiff's act. The trial court did not base its conclusions and judgment upon the ground of mistake, but upon the ground of fraud in the concealment of the price at which the land was sold. It is conceded by counsel on both sides that the issues presented by the pleadings are immaterial; the whole facts and evidence being stipulated. Cable Co. v. Rathgeber, 21 S.D. 418, 113 N.W. 88; Sweet v. Myers, 3 S. D. 324, 53 N.W. 187.
Appellant contends that the stipulation "that plaintiff has done and performed everything on his part to be done and performed," should be construed as stating an ultimate conclusion of fact, while respondent contends it states a conclusion of law only, and is an invasion of the function of the court, and of no effect. It may be conceded that the stipulation is inoperative if it be an attempt to determine the law properly applicable to stipulated facts.
If this paragraph of the stipulation relates to acts to be done or performed by plaintiff, what are those acts? The solution of this question requires an examination of the record to ascertain the actual contract of employment....
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