Lucena v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, Civ. No. 82-2325 (PG).

Decision Date26 September 1983
Docket NumberCiv. No. 82-2325 (PG).
Citation572 F. Supp. 130
PartiesOmegar Carlo LUCENA, Plaintiff, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

Fernando A. Diez, Mayaguez, P.R., for plaintiff.

Daniel F. Lopez Romo, U.S. Atty., Hato Rey, P.R., for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

PÉREZ-GIMÉNEZ, District Judge.

This is an action brought under Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, as amended, (the Act), for review of the final decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, (The Secretary), denying Plaintiff's application for disability insurance benefits.

Plaintiff is a 61 year old illiterate man with heavy work experience as janitor, watchman, handyman and car tire fixer and assistant mechanic for a government agency. (Tr. 48, 67, 77). Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits on March 6, 1981, claiming that he has been disabled to work since October 15, 1979, due to inguinal hernia. (Tr. 48). The Secretary found that Plaintiff did not establish the existence of a severe impairment by medical evidence; hence, he was not disabled. Plaintiff seeks judicial review of this decision.

Disability as defined in the Act is the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. To meet this definition, you must have a severe impairment, which makes you unable to do your previous work or any other substantial gainful activity which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 423 d; 20 CFR Sec. 404.1505 (1982); 20 CFR Sec. 416.905 (1982).

The definition of disability under the statute has a "medical" part concerning the nature and severity of a claimant's impairment, and a "vocational" part, concerning the availability of suitable work.

In evaluating a claim under the Act, the Secretary applies sequentially a series of tests embodied in the regulations, as follows:

1. Is the claimant currently employed? If he is, the claimant is automatically considered not disabled.
2. Does the claimant have a severe impairment? "Severe impairment" means an impairment which significantly limits his physical or mental capacity to perform basic work-related functions. If he does not have an impairment of at least this degree of severity, he is not disabled.
3. Does the claimant have an impairment equivalent to a specific list of impairments contained in the regulations' Appendix 1?

If the claimant's impairment equals the listing, he is automatically disabled. These first three tests are the "threshold" tests. If, however, Plaintiff's ability to perform basic work-related functions is impaired significantly, but there is no "Appendix 1" impairment, the Secretary goes to the fourth question.

4. Does the claimant's impairment prevent him from performing work of the sort he has done in the past?

The claimant still has the burden to prove his disability in this step. If he cannot return to his past work, then the burden shifts to the Secretary to answer the fifth question:

5. Does the claimant's impairment prevent him from performing other work of the sort found in the economy? If so, he is disabled; if not, he is not disabled. 20 CFR § 404.1520 (1982).

In this case the inquiry ended in the second step. The Secretary found that Plaintiff's impairments did not significantly limit his ability to perform basic work-related functions.

The issue is whether there is substantial evidence in support of the Secretary's decision. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971); Velez v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 593 F.2d 157 (1st Cir.1979).

At this stage only the medical evidence is considered. The Secretary must determine whether the medical evidence establishes the existence of impairments which significantly limit Plaintiff's capacity to perform basic work-related functions.

Basic work-related functions are defined as the abilities and aptitude necessary to do most jobs. 20 CFR Sec. 416.921(b). The regulations give the following examples of what are these work activities: physical functions such as — walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, handling, seeing, hearing and speaking; mental and emotional related functions such as understanding, carrying out and remembering simple instructions, use of judgment, responding appropriately to supervision, coworkers, usual work situations and dealing with changes in a routine work setting. 20 CFR Sec. 416.921(b).

The term "significantly limit" is not defined in the Act or regulations. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held in the case of Goodermote v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 690 F.2d 5 (1st Cir.1982) that the regulations do not "define `significant' in terms of a limitation of `any' basic work-related functions. Rather, it speaks of limitations of `basic work-related functions' generally and in the plural, thus suggesting that the Administrative Law Judge has some discretion in evaluating the significance of an impairment that affects some, but not...

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4 cases
  • Hundrieser v. Heckler, 83 C 4360.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • March 19, 1984
    ...claimant did not suffer from a severe impairment. See e.g., Clemente, supra, 564 F.Supp. at 272-73; Lucena v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 572 F.Supp. 130, 133 (D.P.R. 1983). In this case the Secretary relied upon an over-broad interpretation of the severe impairment requirement.......
  • Johnson v. Heckler, 83 C 4110.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • September 19, 1984
    ...a statutorily unwarranted increase in the burden of making a prima facie case of disability." Id. In Lucena v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 572 F.Supp. 130 (D.P.R. 1983), the Court ignored the severity regulation's focus on basic work activities and concluded that the claimant ha......
  • Lucena v. Secretary of Health and Human Services
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
    • January 21, 1985
    ...insurance benefits. Through Opinion and Order of September 26, 1983, this case was remanded to the Secretary for further proceedings. 572 F.Supp. 130. The claimant is a 61-year-old illiterate man with heavy work experience as janitor, watchman, handyman, car tire fixer and assistant mechani......
  • Strong v. Ponder
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • September 26, 1983
    ... ... Beverly PONDER, et al., Defendants ... Civ. A. No. C80-2130A ... United States District ... ...

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