Lucey v. Allen

• Decision Date: 29 June 1922
• Docket Number: Nos. 5598-5600.,s. 5598-5600.
• Parties: LUCEY v. ALLEN. PRENDERGAST v. SAME (two cases).
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

117 A. 539

LUCEY

v. ALLEN.

PRENDERGAST

v. SAME (two cases).

Nos. 5598-5600.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 29, 1922.

Exceptions from Superior Oourt, Providence and Bristol Counties; Arthur P. Sumner, Judge.

Three actions, one by Frances Lucey, one by John J. Prendergast, and one by Helen M. Prendergast, all against John F. Allen. Verdicts for defendant, motions for new trial denied, and plaintiffs bring exceptions. Exception of Lucey sustained, those of other plaintiffs overruled and cases remitted.

E. Raymond Walsh, of Providence, for plaintiffs.

Henry M. Boss, Jr., and Curtis, Mattison, Boss & Letts, all of Providence, for defendant.

SWEETLAND, C. J. Each of the above-entitled cases is an action of trespass on the case to recover damages for personal injury, and in the case of plaintiff Helen M. Prendergast also for injuries to an automobile. All of said injuries, it is alleged, were received in a collision between an automobile operated by the plaintiff John J. Prendergast and one operated by the defendant, Allen, which collision it is alleged was caused by the negligence of the defendant, Allen. The automobile operated by John J. Prendergast was owned by the plaintiff Helen M., wife of said John J.

These three cases were tried together before a justice of the superior court sitting with a jury, and at the same time there was tried before said justice and jury the action of trespass on the case of Allen against John J. Prendergast to recover damages for injury to the automobile of Allen arising from said collision, which Allen alleges was brought about by the negligence of Prendergast.

The trial resulted in a verdict for the defendant in each of said four cases. Each of the four plaintiffs duly filed a motion for new trial, all of which motions were denied by said justice. The plaintiff, Allen, has not sought to bring his action to this court for review. Each of the other three cases are before us upon the plaintiffs' exception to the action of said justice denying the motion for new trial and upon exceptions to the rulings of said justice made in the course of the trial.

The collision in question occurred at or near the intersection of River and Division streets in Pawtucket, Just before the collision the defendant, Allen, was proceeding westerly on Division street, and approaching River street, and John J. Prendergast, with whom were riding the plaintiffs Prances Lucey and Helen M. Prendergast, was proceeding southerly on River street, intending to turn easterly into Division street. On the northeast corner of Division and River streets there is a building situated on the lot line on each street, creating what has been called a "blind corner." The testimony of Allen is that, as he approached River street, he sounded his horn, and that just before he reached River street Prendergast came out of River street, cut diagonally across said "blind corner," and struck Allen's machine on its left front corner, while Allen was on his right side of Division street, and before Allen had reached the easterly line of River street. The testimony of Prendergast is that as he approached Division street he sounded his horn and proceeded along the extreme right side of River street until he reached the northwest corner of River and Division streets; that he then, with a broad turn to the left, proceeded easterly to his right side of Division street; that after he had reached the center of Division street, leaving ample space for Allen to pass to the rear of the Prendergast car on Allen's right side of Division street, Allen negligently drove his car into the left side of the Prendergast car. The question of the negligence of each of these drivers was submitted to the jury, with instructions by the court. Unquestionably in the collision the automobile of Allen was injured, and Prendergast received personal injuries; the verdict of the jury indicates, therefore,...