Luchesi v. Capitol Loan & Finance Co., 9518

Decision Date13 May 1955
Docket NumberNo. 9518,9518
Citation113 A.2d 725,83 R.I. 151
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court
PartiesAlfred LUCHESI v. CAPITOL LOAN & FINANCE CO. et al. Ex.

Fred Brosco, Providence, William J. George, Pawtucket, for plaintiff.

Letts & Quinn, Frank Licht, A. Peter Quinn, Jr., Providence, for defendants.

CONDON, Justice.

This is an action of the case to recover money paid to the defendants under an alleged usurious agreement for a loan in violation of General Laws 1938, chapter 485, § 2. After a trial before a justice of the superior court without a jury, a decision was rendered in favor of the defendants. The case is here solely on the plaintiff's exception to such decision. There are several other exceptions in his bill of exceptions but they have not been briefed or argued and are, therefore, deemed to be waived.

The case arose out of plaintiff's purchase of an automobile from defendant Baker Auto Co., Inc. The sale was financed by defendant Capitol Loan & Finance Co. Each company is a Rhode Island corporation and Louis Baker is president of both companies. His son Benson Baker is a salesman for the auto company and the treasurer of the loan company. The auto company conducts a used car business on a lot at 560 Elmwood avenue in the city of Providence. Each company occupies a business office in a small wooden building on such lot.

The plaintiff is the father of Alfred Luchesi, Jr., a minor. On February 10, 1950 Alfred inspected a 1949 Cadillac on the lot and decided to buy it. He discussed the sale with Benson Baker and was told the cash price was $2,995. He did not have that sum and asked if the car could be bought on time. He was told such a sale could be arranged but that since he was a minor his father would have to sign the necessary papers. Later on the same day plaintiff came to the lot and after discussing the terms of the sale with Baker entered into a conditional sales agreement with the Baker Auto Co., Inc.

Under such agreement plaintiff made a down payment of $500, was allowed $295 for his 1941 Studebaker, and agreed to pay $2,200, the balance of the purchase price, in thirty-six equal monthly payments of $86.90. Those payments included a finance charge of $928.40 for the period and in the aggregate they amounted to $3,128.40. After completing the sale the auto company delivered the Cadillac to plaintiff, assigned the agreement to the loan company for $2,200, and marked the transaction on its books as closed.

On June 28, 1950, after making four monthly payments to the loan company, plaintiff told Benson Baker he wanted to anticipate the remaining payments and inquired what amount he would have to pay. Baker referred him to the person in charge of such matters in the office of the loan company. He was informed there that he would have to pay $2,700, but after some argument it was finally agreed by the loan company to close the account for $2,401.06. The plaintiff paid such amount and thereafter brought the instant action.

The plaintiff claims in substance that the loan company was merely a blind behind which the auto company in reality conducted a loan business; that his conditional sales agreement with it was in fact an agreement for a loan; that the interest charged therein was usurious; and that in any event the close-out transaction with the loan company represented a taking of interest at a usurious rate. The defendant contends that there is no basis in the evidence for any of such claims.

The trial justice found that the transaction was a bona fide conditional sale between the auto company and the plaintiff to which the usury statute did not apply. He further found that the close-out transaction did not involve a taking of interest within the meaning of the statute and that such a transaction did not come within its purview. The plaintiff contends that those findings are against the law and the evidence and the weight thereof. In that connection he argues that the evidence is like that in Nazarian v. Lincoln Finance Corp., 77 R.I. 497, 78 A.2d 7, where the trial justice found therefrom that the transaction though in appearance a conditional sale was in fact a loan.

The defendants contend that the case at bar...

To continue reading

Request your trial
6 cases
  • United Cable v. Burch
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • July 26, 1999
    ...which are illustrative are: Lincoln Loan Service, Inc. v. Motor Credit Co., Inc. (Mun.Ct.App. D.C.), 83 A.2d 230; Luchesi v. Capitol Loan & Finance Co. (R.I.), 113 A.2d 725; Steffenauer v. Mytelka & Rose, Inc. (N.J.Super.), 210 A.2d 88; Carolina Industrial Bank v. Merrimon (N.C.), 132 S.E.2......
  • Falcone v. Palmer Ford, Inc.
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • May 24, 1966
    ...are: Lincoln Loan Service, Inc. of Takoma Park v. Motor Credit Co., Inc. (Mun.Ct.App.D.C.), 83 A.2d 230; Luchesi v. Capitol Loan & Finance Co., 83 R.I. 151, 113 A.2d 725; Steffenauer v. Mytelka & Rose, Inc., 87 N.J.Super. 506, 210 A.2d 88; Carolina Industrial Bank v. Merrimon, 260 N.C. 335,......
  • Steffenauer v. Mytelka & Rose, Inc.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court
    • May 3, 1965
    ...(D.C.Mun.App.1953); Zazzaro v. Colonial Acceptance Corp., 117 Conn. 251, 167 A. 734 (Sup.Ct.Err.1933); Luchesi v. Capitol Loan & Finance Co., 83 R.I. 151, 113 A.2d 725 (Sup.Ct.1955); and cf. Nazarian v. Lincoln Finance Corp., 77 R.I. 497, 78 A.2d 7 Courts adopting the majority view usually ......
  • Reichwein v. Kirshenbaum
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • June 25, 1964
    ...67 S.E. 914, 28 L.R.A.,N.S., 113. Although we have not heretofore passed on the precise question, we did in Luchesi v. Capitol Loan & Finance Co., 83 R.I. 151, 155, 113 A.2d 725, 727, clearly indicate our approval of what we have here referred to as being the rule when we said: 'The law app......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT