Lucht v. Molalla River School Dist.

• Decision Date: 25 June 1999
• Docket Number: No. CV-98-1375-ST.,CV-98-1375-ST.
• Citation: 57 F.Supp.2d 1060
• Parties: Dale A. LUCHT and Terry E. Lucht, Plaintiffs, v. MOLALLA RIVER SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Oregon

57 F.Supp.2d 1060

Dale A. LUCHT and Terry E. Lucht, Plaintiffs, v. MOLALLA RIVER SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.

No. CV-98-1375-ST.

United States District Court, D. Oregon.

June 25, 1999.

Dana R. Taylor, Hagen Dye, Hirschy & Dilorenzo, PC, Portland, OR, for plaintiffs.

Nancy Hungerford, Andrea L. Hungerford, Hungerford Law Firm, West Linn, OR, for defendant.

ORDER

PANNER, District Judge.

Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart filed her Findings and Recommendation on April 23, 1999. The matter is now before me pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). When either party objects to any portion of the Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation, the district court must make a de novo determination of that portion of the Magistrate Judge's report. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Commodore Business Machines, Inc., 656 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 920 (1982).

Defendant filed timely objections. I have, therefore, given the file of this case a de novo review. I ADOPT Magistrate Judge Stewart's Findings and Recommendation. Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment (docket #6) is granted. Defendant's motion for summary judgment (docket #8) is denied. Judgment is entered in plaintiff's favor in the sum of $3,819.92.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

STEWART, United States Magistrate Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs are the parents of D.L., a child with a disability entitled to special education benefits under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 USC §§ 1400 et seq ("IDEA"). They bring this action against defendant, Molalla River School District ("District"), to recover attorney fees and costs in the sum of $3,819.92 incurred in connection with Individualized Education Plan meetings convened as a result of an Order issued by the Oregon State Superintendent of Public Instruction ("Superintendent"). Plaintiffs have moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of the District's liability (docket # 6) and, in response, the District has filed a cross-motion for summary judgment (docket # 8). For the reasons set forth below, this court recommends that plaintiff's motion be granted and the District's motion be denied.

STANDARDS

FRCP 56(c) authorizes summary judgment if no genuine issue exists regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The parties agree that the relevant material facts are undisputed and that summary judgment is an appropriate mechanism for resolving their legal dispute.

UNDISPUTED FACTS

D.L. is an autistic child who resides within the District and is entitled to special education benefits under the IDEA. Pursuant to OAR 581-001-0010, Oregon's Complaint Resolution Procedure ("CRP") under the IDEA, plaintiffs filed a complaint and an amended complaint with the Superintendent, alleging that the District failed to properly identify D.L.'s disability and failed to provide him with a free appropriate public education ("FAPE"). No attorney represented plaintiffs at that time.

The Superintendent conducted an investigation and issued a written decision ("Order") dated August 17, 1998, stating that substantial evidence supported many of plaintiffs' allegations. The Order included a Corrective Action Plan which, among other things, required the District to properly train its staff on reviewing and writing Individualized Education Plans ("IEP") and to submit a revised IEP for D.L.'s 1998-99 school year. An IEP is a written plan developed by the local education agency in conjunction with the parents and teachers to provide specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs of a disabled student. 20 USC § 1401(11). An IEP can be revised only at a meeting of an IEP Team, which includes the student's parents as members. 20 USC § 1414(d)(1)(B)(i) & (d)(4)(A)(ii).

Pursuant to the Order, the District convened an IEP meeting with plaintiffs on September 10, 1998, which was continued to September 17, September 25, and November 6, 1998. Plaintiffs were represented by their attorney at these four meetings and, as a result, incurred attorney fees of $3,819.92. Plaintiffs have demanded that the District reimburse them for these attorney fees, but the District has refused.

DISCUSSION

I. IDEA Statutory Framework

In 1970, Congress enacted the Education for All Handicapped Children Act ("EHA") to ensure that the states provide all disabled children with a FAPE. PUB L No 91-230, §§ 601-602, 84 Stat 175; 20 USC § 1400(c). Known since 1990 as the IDEA, see Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, PUB L No 101-476, § 901(a)(1), 104 Stat 1103, 1141-42 (1990) (revising short title), the statute conditions the granting of federal funds on compliance by the states with certain procedural requirements.¹ 20 USC §§ 1412-1413.

Congress reauthorized and substantially amended the IDEA in June 1997. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, PUB L No 105-17, 111 Stat 37. The 1997 amendments took effect July 1, 1998. Because all relevant action in this case occurred after July 1, 1998, the changes located at PUB L No 105-17, 111 Stat 37, 88-89, apply to this case.

Among its many provisions, the IDEA authorizes the court to award attorney fees to the parents of a child with a disability as follows:

In any action or proceeding brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party.

20 USC § 1415(i)(3)(B) ("subsection (B)").²

However, the IDEA expressly prohibits an award of attorney fees in two circumstances. One of those circumstances, added by amendment to the IDEA in 1997, underlies the dispute between the parties in this case. That circumstance prohibits an award of attorney fees "relating to any meeting of the IEP Team unless such meeting is convened as a result of an administrative proceeding or judicial action." 20 USC § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii) ("subsection (D)(ii)") (emphasis added).

Plaintiffs invoked Oregon's CRP and prevailed in part as set forth in the Order. As a result of the Order, the District convened IEP meetings. Plaintiffs contend that the IEP meetings were "convened as a result of an administrative proceeding," namely the CRP. Therefore, pursuant to subsection (D)(ii), plaintiffs assert that they may recover their attorney fees incurred at those IEP meetings. The District counters that the CRP is not an "administrative proceeding," and that even if it is, plaintiffs were not the prevailing party because the CRP was completed before they hired an attorney.

II. Is the CRP an "Administrative Proceeding"?

The parties dispute whether the CRP is an "administrative proceeding" as that term is used in the subsection (D)(ii) added by Congress in 1997 to the IDEA. If it is not, then plaintiffs are prohibited from recovering attorney fees relating to any IEP meeting convened as a result of the CRP.

The District interprets the term "administrative proceeding" in subsection (D)(ii) to mean only due process hearings held in accordance with § 1415(f) and not the resolution of a complaint pursuant to a CRP. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, interpret the term "administrative proceeding" to include a CRP.

Neither the IDEA nor the state Administrative Procedures Act contain a clear and unambiguous definition of "administrative proceeding" in subsection (D)(ii). Although the broader term "proceeding" is used in subsection (B), the IDEA also fails to define that term. Nevertheless, for the reasons discussed below, this court concludes that these terms include the CRP.

A. § 1415

Although the IDEA does not expressly reference any "proceeding" or "administrative proceeding," § 1415, entitled "Procedural Safeguards," requires states "to establish and maintain procedures ... to ensure that children with disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of [FAPE] by such agencies." § 1415(a). The types of procedures "required by this section shall include" those listed in § 1415(b). Those procedures are access to educational records and the opportunity to obtain an independent educational evaluation, § 1415(b)(1); protection of the rights of a child whose parents are unknown, § 1415(b)(2); prior written notice to the parents in their native language of any proposals or refusals to change an educational placement, § 1415(b)(3) & (4) (the contents of the notice are set forth in § 1415(c) & (d)); an opportunity for mediation, § 1415(b)(5); "an opportunity to present complaints," § 1415(b)(6); notice procedures for parents, § 1415(b)(7); and a model form for the complaint, § 1415(b)(8).

How states are to resolve such complaints presented pursuant to § 1415(b)(6) is not specified. However, the IDEA does require that "[w]henever a complaint has been received under subsection (b)(6)," the parents "shall have an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing." § 1415(f). The hearing is held by an impartial hearings officer and must result in a final decision within 45 days after filing the request for a hearing. § 1415(f)(3); 34 CFR § 300.512(a). Parents have the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel; to present evidence and confront, cross-examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses; to prohibit the introduction of any evidence at the hearing that has not been disclosed to that party at least five days before the hearing; to obtain a written or electronic verbatim record of the hearing; and to obtain written findings of fact and decisions. § 1415(h); 34 CFR § 300.508(a). Parents may appeal an adverse decision by a local educational agency to the state educational agency ("SEA") for an impartial review. § 1415(g). If they lose before the SEA, then they may file a civil action in state or federal court. § 1415(i)(1)(A) & (2)(A).

Although not specifically...