Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore

• Decision Date: 12 January 1977
• Docket Number: No. 75 Civ. 6341.,75 Civ. 6341.
• Citation: 425 F. Supp. 123
• Parties: John Anthony LUCIDO, Plaintiff, v. CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

425 F. Supp. 123

John Anthony LUCIDO, Plaintiff, v. CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE, Defendant.

No. 75 Civ. 6341.

United States District Court, S. D. New York.

January 12, 1977.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Karpatkin, Pollet & LeMoult, New York City, for plaintiff; Michael N. Pollet, Alfred Siegel, New York City, of counsel.

Alan M. Dershowitz, Cambridge, Mass., for plaintiff.

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, New York City, for defendant; Simon Rifkind, Morris B. Abram, Doris Carroll, New York City, of counsel.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington, D. C., amicus curiae; Marian Halley, Washington, D. C., of counsel.

The Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights, New York City, amicus curiae; David R. Francescani, New York City, of counsel.

GAGLIARDI, District Judge.

The plaintiff, John Anthony Lucido, is a lawyer who was employed by the defendant law firm, Cravath, Swaine & Moore ("Cravath"), as an associate attorney. Plaintiff alleges that he was unlawfully discriminated against as an employee of the defendant and that his employment was unlawfully terminated because of his national origin or religion or both. His complaint asserts two causes of action. Count I charges the defendant with violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. ("Title VII" and "the Act"). Count II charges the defendant with breach of an employment contract with the plaintiff. Jurisdiction is asserted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(4) and 1332.

Cravath moves, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) Fed.R.Civ.P., to dismiss Count I of the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendant also moves, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) Fed.R.Civ.P., to dismiss Count II of the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.¹ For the reasons stated herein, the court denies defendant's motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff is a New Jersey resident of Italian ancestry and a Catholic. He was employed in the litigation department of the defendant from July 19, 1965 until March 13, 1973. Defendant is a law firm organized as a partnership under New York law, N. Y. Partnership Law §§ 1 et seq. (McKinney's 1948), with its principal place of business in New York City.²

Lucido commenced suit in this court on December 19, 1975. Prior to bringing this suit, he filed complaints with the New York City Commission on Human Rights and the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on June 14, 1973. On September 22, 1975, pursuant to plaintiff's request, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter, and this suit was timely commenced thereafter. Plaintiff therefore has complied with the exhaustion requirements of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.

In considering defendant's motions to dismiss, this court must accept the well-pleaded material allegations of the complaint as true. The court, of course, is not passing upon the merits of whether plaintiff was treated fairly in his employment, nor is it considering the matter of discovery or the nature of the remedy should plaintiff prevail in his suit on the merits.

Count I of the complaint, the cause of action brought under the Civil Rights Act, should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under any state of facts which could be proved in support of his claim. Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968); see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); 2A Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 12.08 at 2271-74 (2d ed. 1975).

The purpose of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act is to eliminate discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. House Judiciary Comm. Report, No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1963), as amended. The courts have accorded a liberal interpretation to Title VII in order to effectuate this Congressional purpose. See Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971); Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957, 92 S.Ct. 2058, 32 L.Ed.2d 343 (1972). Congress clearly included in the objectives of Title VII the elimination of job discrimination in professional fields including law and medicine.³ Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F.Supp. 175, 179-80 (N.D.Ill.1975); Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 59 F.R.D. 515 (S.D.N.Y.1973), appeal dismissed, 496 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1974).

The key provision of Title VII for the consideration of Cravath's motion to dismiss is Section 703(a) of the Act, which provides that:

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer —

(a) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or

(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)

This language indicates a Congressional intent to define discrimination in the broadest possible terms and to include the entire scope of the working environment within the Act's protective ambit. Rogers v. EEOC, supra at 238; see Weise v. Syracuse University, 552 F.2d 397, 409-410 (2d Cir. 1975); Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 14, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (1973); Puntolillo v. New Hampshire Racing Commission, 375 F.Supp. 1089, 1091-92 (D.N.H.1974).

Under the definitional provisions of Title VIII, Cravath concededly qualifies as an "employer" within the meaning of the Act. An employer under Section 701(b) of the Act means "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . ."⁴ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Under Section 701(a) of the Act, "the term `person' includes . . partnerships . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a). Cravath as a partnership with over 400 legal and non-legal employees which does business with both nationwide and international clients qualifies as an "employer" under Title VII.

Plaintiff qualifies as an "employee" within the meaning of the Act. Under Section 701(f) of the Act, "the term `employee' means an individual employed by an employer . . ."⁵ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). Plaintiff as an associate attorney at Cravath could not be considered anything but an employee of the firm. See EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella, supra at 179-181. All of the discriminatory acts that Lucido has alleged in his complaint occurred between 1965 and 1973 while he was an associate attorney employed by Cravath.

Thus the essential question in the court's consideration of defendant's motion to dismiss is whether the plaintiff has properly alleged that his employer, Cravath, unlawfully discriminated against him with respect to his "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" or limited, segregated or classified him in a way that "deprived or tended to deprive him of employment opportunities" because he was an Italian and/or Catholic.

Lucido in his complaint alleges that as an employee of Cravath he was discriminated against with respect to work assignments, training, rotation and outside work opportunities. These claims constitute allegations of discrimination with respect to "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" and "employment opportunities" under Title VII. While these allegations are general and indefinite, mere vagueness or lack of detail is not grounds for dismissal of the complaint. Ybarra v. City of San Jose, 503 F.2d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 1974); 2A Moore's Federal Practic ¶ 12.08 at 2274-85 (2d ed. 1975). Therefore, this aspect of the complaint withstands the motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

Another element of unlawful discrimination alleged in plaintiff's complaint is that the defendant failed to promote him to partner because of his national origin or religion or both. In this court's view, under the facts set forth in the complaint, the opportunity to become a partner at Cravath was a "term, condition or privilege of employment" and an "employment opportunity" within the meaning of the Act. Lucido has alleged he was deprived, from the beginning of his employment as an associate attorney at Cravath, of the opportunity to become a partner by reason of discrimination during that period of time. As a result, this element of the complaint also states a claim upon which relief can be granted and must survive the motion to dismiss.

Lucido, in his complaint, alleges that the defendant, which is comprised of 48 partners and employs 130 associate attorneys, employs those associates with the understanding that after a reasonable period of time they will be afforded the opportunity of being promoted to partnership if they perform their duties as associate attorneys satisfactorily, and if not promoted they will be required to seek employment elsewhere. Lucido claims that he was told of this "up or out" policy of Cravath at his employment interview, and, relying on the unimpeded opportunity for promotion to partnership, he accepted the position of employment offered by Cravath. At his interview, Lucido alleges, he was given other representations and assurances upon which he also relied, including: (1) the defendant only employed associate attorneys immediately upon graduation from law school or some short time thereafter; (2) defendant filled the partnership position exclusively by promoting associate attorneys from within defendant law firm; (3) promotion to...