Luck v. State
| Decision Date | 29 May 1884 |
| Docket Number | 11,527 |
| Citation | 96 Ind. 16 |
| Parties | Luck v. The State |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Floyd Circuit Court.
The judgment is affirmed.
J. V Kelso and D. C. Anthony, for appellant.
F. T Hord, Attorney General, F. B. Burke, Prosecuting Attorney and W. B. Hord, for the State.
The appellant and one John Roarke were charged in the indictment with murder in the first degree for killing Philip Oberhouser, on July 14th, 1883, in Floyd county. The appellant's separate trial terminated in his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, and his sentence to the State prison for fifteen years. His motion for a new trial was made at the proper time, and the overruling of that motion is assigned for error. The causes set out in the motion for a new trial were certain alleged misconduct of the jurors, and the insufficiency of evidence to sustain the verdict.
Affidavits, filed in support of the appellant's motion for a new trial, were to the effect that during the trial the jury were to be kept together, under the charge of a bailiff, and under his charge were to take their meals at a hotel convenient to the court-house; that at the hotel named they could have their meals in a room by themselves, and removed from all danger of outside influence; that on the second day of the trial, and thereafter until the return of their verdict, the jury, without the knowledge or consent of the appellant, took their meals at a boarding-house, more distant from the court-house than the hotel; that the keeper of the boarding-house was hostile to the appellant and his defence, and, with others of the community, was anxious for his conviction; and that at the boarding-house there were no conveniences for the jurors to take their meals by themselves, so as not to be brought in contact with improper influences; that the jury, after retiring for deliberation, left their room and were seen walking upon the streets of New Albany; that they passed by the place where the homicide, for which the appellant was on trial, was committed; that one of their number made inquiry of a boy and received from him information of the surroundings of the place; and that the jurors were not kept together when upon the streets, but were permitted to talk with persons not on the jury.
Counter affidavits of the bailiff and eleven of the jurors were filed, showing, substantially, that the court instructed that the jury should, during the trial, be taken by the bailiff to some convenient place for their meals; that they were at first taken to the hotel in question, but, becoming dissatisfied with the board there, were, during the balance of the trial, taken to the boarding-house referred to; that the boarding-house was only about twenty-five yards further than the hotel from the court-house; that at the boarding-house the jury were furnished their meals in a room by themselves, and had no conversation or communication at any time with any person or persons not connected with the jury, and did not at any time hear any conversation between other persons relating to the case on trial, and did not come in contact with persons hostile to the appellant or his defence; that at no time during the progress of the trial, before or after their retirement to deliberate upon their verdict, was any juror separated from the others unless attended by the proper officer; that, under the instructions of the court, the jury were taken out to walk for exercise on one occasion; that on such walk they passed the place of the homicide, but had no conversation with any person concerning such place or its surroundings; that they made no examination of such place, and asked for no information respecting it; that during such walk the jury were attended by their bailiff; that they did not separate; and that nothing occurred at any time to prejudice the rights of the appellant.
The affidavits filed by the prosecution negatived the allegations of the affidavits filed in support of the appellant's motion for a new trial so far as to show that the jury were subjected to no influences whatever by others, and that they were in no respect attempted to be tampered with.
The affidavits filed in behalf of the appellant were not made by any person who pretended to have conversed or communicated with the jury, nor to have been present at any such alleged conversation or communication, nor is the name given of any person alleged to have had any conversation or...
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...Carter v. Ford, 85 Ind. 180; Whitchell v. State, 23 Ind. 89.) It must clearly appear that the complaining party was prejudiced. (Luck v. State, 96 Ind. 16; Messenger v. State, 152 Ind. 227.) In the absence a showing of prejudice courts will not interfere with the verdict. (State v. Spears, ......
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Shultz v. State
...Id. 330 N.E.2d at 91. Gann and Conrad are consistent with a long line of Indiana case law addressing jury misconduct. In Luck v. State (1884), 96 Ind. 16, the fact the bailiff and the jury, during deliberations, went for a walk to the location where the crime had occurred was held to provid......
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