Luckenbach v. Sciple

• Decision Date: 05 March 1906
• Citation: 72 N.J.L. 476,63 A. 244
• Parties: LUCKENBACH v. SCIPLE et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

63 A. 244

72 N.J.L. 476

LUCKENBACH

v. SCIPLE et al.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

March 5, 1906.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error to Circuit Court, Hudson County.

Bill by William I. Luckenbach against Henry M. Sciple and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

Norman Grey, for plaintiff in error. R. V. Lindabury, for defendants in error.

GARRISON, J. The only assignment of error in this case that is supported by a bill of exceptions challenges the legality of a ruling of the circuit court striking out a question put to the plaintiff below after such question had been answered without objection.

At the trial the plaintiff, William I. Luckenbach, testified in chief that one William E. Goechenor "had never represented him in any way, and had no relations with him at all."

After cross-examination the plaintiff was asked by his counsel, and permitted, without objection by opposing counsel, to answer the following question:

"Q. I call your attention to the fact that there is appended to the lien claim filed in this case an affidavit, which says: 'W. C. Goechenor, being duly sworn, on his oath says that he is the agent of William I. Luckenbach, in this behalf, the claimant named in the foregoing claim and bill of particulars,' and so on; now, having that affidavit before you, what have you to say as to whether or not Mr. Goechenor was your agent?"

"A. Yes; for the purpose of making that affidavit."

Counsel for the defendant then objected to the question and answer but without stating any ground. After hearing argument the trial court over the objection of counsel for the plaintiff struck out this question giving as his reasons: "I strike it out because it seems to me that it was put in such a way as to suggest the answer to the witness on a crucial point, and because I do not see how it can be proper to show the witness an affidavit of a third party with a view to refresh his recollection."

To this ruling an exception was allowed to the plaintiff upon which the assignment, now under consideration, is based.

The argument mainly relied upon for the reversal of the judgment against the plaintiff is that this objection of the defendant came too late, viz., after the question had been answered; and further that the ground of the objection was not stated. The rules upon which this argument rests are well-established practice regulations, failure to observe which militates against the offending party by debarring him from reviewing upon error the legality of a question to which he had not objected until after it was answered; or from successfully sustaining an objection to testimony upon grounds that were not stated by him to the trial court The former of these rules prevents a party from speculating upon the chance of a favorable answer before interposing his objection. Clark v. State, 47 N. J. Law, 558, 4 Atl. 327; Fath v. Thompson, 58 N. J. Law, 181-187, 33 Atl. 391.

The latter rule is an application of the doctrine that every ruling upon an objection is a decision only of the concrete proposition stated to the trial court by the objecting counsel. These rules, it will be observed, while they relate to the conduct of the trial, have their substantial office in appellate procedure where they operate as practical estoppels. Nothing, however, either in the reasons upon which these rules are based, or in the offices they subserve, tends to make them in any way wise limitations upon judicial authority, original or appellate.

The infirmity, therefore, of the argument addressed to us is that it seeks to measure the limits of judicial discretion, which is a part of judicial authority, by rules that apply only to the conduct of parties and their counsel.

In this state the rulings of trial courts upon matters that are committed to their discretion do not as a class constitute grounds for reversal upon error. West v. State, 22 N. J. Law, 212; Donnelly v. State, 26 N. J. Law, C01; Haase v. State, 53 N. J. Law, 34, 20 Atl. 751.

Such rulings are sometimes spoken of by text-writers as "not constituting a ground for error," or as "not reversible upon error," or are even described as the "infallible discretion of trial courts." Powell on Ap. Proc. 405.

The only contrariety of judicial decision upon this point is whether abuses of discretion termed variously "palpable," "flagrant," or "oppressive" do not constitute exceptions to this rule. 8 Ency. Pl. & Pr. 84; 8 Ency. Pl....