Lucker v. Liske

• Decision Date: 10 March 1897
• Citation: 70 N.W. 421,111 Mich. 683
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: LUCKER v. LISKE ET AL.

70 N.W. 421

111 Mich. 683

LUCKER v. LISKE ET AL.

Supreme Court of Michigan

March 10, 1897

Error to circuit court, Berrien county; Orville W. Coolidge, Judge.

Action by Carrie Lucker against Richard Liske and others. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendants bring error. Affirmed.

Lawrence C. Fyfe, for appellants.

James O'Hara, for appellee.

HOOKER J.

The plaintiff brought an action to recover damages for the sale of intoxicating liquor to her husband, joining in one action as defendants, two saloon keepers (each of whom is alleged to have sold liquor to the husband upon the day in question) and the sureties upon their respective bonds. The action is the outgrowth of a row which occurred in the saloon of one of the defendants. Afterwards the husband of the plaintiff was arrested, and, upon his plea of guilty, was convicted of drunkenness. He appealed from the judgment of the justice and was allowed to make a defense at the trial in the circuit, which resulted in conviction. This action was commenced before the complaint for drunkenness was made. The alleged errors are: (1) The admission of the records of conviction before the justice and in the circuit court. (2) The admission of the stenographer's minutes of the testimony of defendant Johnson, given on the trial of Lucker in the circuit court. (3) The admission of two newspaper articles giving an account of the row and Lucker's participation in and connection with it, published immediately afterwards. (4) The statement in the charge that: "There are cases of this kind where a wife is entitled to recover as for the loss of a sober husband, where the sale of the saloon keeper has made, or contributed to make, the husband a drunkard. Then the saloon keepers are chargeable with that fact, and heavy damages may be recovered, perhaps, for making a sober husband a drunkard,"-and that: "If a man, for instance, under the influence of liquor thus sold to him, has committed a crime, resulting in her additional disgrace and mortification, then she is entitled to recover, although he may, at the same time, have been an habitual drunkard."

In support of his first point, counsel for the plaintiffs in error seems to rely on two propositions: (1) That no injury had resulted from the arrest and conviction before this action was commenced, inasmuch as the arrest was later. (2) That such arrest and conviction may have been collusive, or instigated by the plaintiff or her husband for the purpose of swelling a verdict. In Radley v. Seider, 99 Mich 431, 58 N.W. 366, we held that the words "or otherwise" so broadened the damages recoverable in these cases that damages for the feeling of shame, disgrace, and mortification were recoverable, although no injury to person or property or means of support was alleged or shown. It would seem obvious that this feeling would be increased in cases when the drunkenness was accompanied by unseemly conduct or public exhibition of his condition by the husband, and the greater the notoriety of the transaction the more keen would be the mortification. A public conviction of the offense of drunkenness would contribute to this feeling of disgrace. The law is apparently intended to permit a recovery for such injuries as can be traced directly to the condition produced by the sale of liquor, and this is not an unnatural result, but one which is to be expected. It is a proximate result, because without being drunk he could not be...