Luctama v. Knickerbocker
| Decision Date | 30 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | 19 CV 8717 (VB) |
| Parties | LAWDY LUCTAMA and ASHNEY LUCTAMA, Plaintiffs, v. JEFFREY MARKS KNICKERBOCKER, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Plaintiffs Lawdy and Ashney Luctama bring this negligence action against defendant Jeffrey Marks Knickerbocker, arising out of a car accident in Connecticut.
Now pending is defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction and under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (Doc. #7).
For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED.
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(1).
For the purpose of ruling on the motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs' favor, as summarized below.
Plaintiffs are citizens of New York, and defendant is a citizen of Connecticut.1 On September 20, 2016, plaintiffs were travelling by car on Route 15 in Norwalk, Connecticut,when they were rear-ended by defendant. According to plaintiffs, the accident was caused by defendant's failure to operate his vehicle in a reasonably safe manner.
Plaintiffs commenced the instant action on September 19, 2019. They allege serious and permanent physical injuries, and each seeks damages of $1,000,000.
"Where a defendant moves for dismissal under Rules 12(b)(2) . . . and (6), the Court must first address the preliminary [question] of . . . personal jurisdiction." Hertzner v. U.S. Postal Serv., 2007 WL 869585, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2007)2; see also Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 234 (2d Cir. 1963) ().
On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), the "plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant." In re Magnetic Audiotape Antitrust Litig., 334 F.3d 204, 206 (2d Cir. 2003). "Where, as here, a court relies on pleadings and affidavits, rather than conducting a full-blown evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing that the court possesses personal jurisdiction over the defendant." DiStefano v. Carozzi N. Am., Inc., 286 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2001). "This prima facie showing must include an averment of facts that, if credited by the ultimate trier of fact, would suffice to establish jurisdiction over the defendant." Newmont Mining Corp. v. AngloGold Ashanti Ltd., 344 F. Supp. 3d 724, 735 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting Metro. Life Ins.Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 567 (2d Cir. 1996)). "[A]ll pleadings and affidavits must be construed in the light most favorable to [plaintiff] and all doubts must be resolved in . . . plaintiff's favor." Landoil Res. Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir. 1990).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court evaluates the sufficiency of the operative complaint under the "two-pronged approach" articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). First, a plaintiff's legal conclusions and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements," are not entitled to the assumption of truth and are thus not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Id. at 678; Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 161 (2d Cir. 2010). Second, "[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
A motion to dismiss based on the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations "generally is treated as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)." Adams v. Crystal City Marriott Hotel, 2004 WL 744489, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2004) (citing Ghartey v. St. John's Queens Hosp., 869 F.2d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 1989)). Indeed, "Rule (12)(b)(6) provides the most appropriate legal basis for a motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds, because expiration of the statute of limitations presents an affirmative defense." Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c); Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 361 F.3d 696, 701 (2d Cir. 2004)).
"[T]he defendants bear the burden of establishing the expiration of the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense, [because] a pre-answer motion to dismiss on this groundmay be granted only if it is clear on the face of the complaint that the statute of limitations has run." Mosdos Chofetz Chaim, Inc. v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 14 F. Supp. 3d 191, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
Defendant argues plaintiffs have not made a prima facie showing that this Court possesses personal jurisdiction over defendant.
The Court agrees.
To determine whether personal jurisdiction exists over a non-domiciliary defendant in a diversity action brought in federal court, the Court engages in a two-step inquiry. Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2010). First, the Court determines whether the forum state's law permits the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. If the exercise of personal jurisdiction is deemed appropriate under the forum state's long-arm statute, "the second step is to analyze whether personal jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution." Id. at 164. The second step is required only if the forum state's jurisdictional requirements are satisfied. Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 244 (2d Cir. 2007).
"CPLR § 302 is New York's long-arm statute permitting jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant." Bidonthecity.com LLC v. Halverston Holdings Ltd., 2014 WL 1331046, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014). The statute allows a court within this forum to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who:
(1) transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state; or (2) commits a tortious act within the state; or (3) commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state; or (4) owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state.
Wohlbach v. Ziady, 2018 WL 3611928, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2018) (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)).
Plaintiffs argue, without citation to any legal authority, that the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant "by virtue of the issuance of the summons by this Court and thereafter by service of this Court's initiating documents upon defendant at his residence" in Connecticut. (Doc. #12 ("Pl. Mem.") ¶ 34).
This argument fails. "[A] plaintiff's unilateral activities cannot support a finding of personal jurisdiction over a defendant." Gordian Grp., LLC v. Syringa Expl., Inc., 168 F. Supp. 3d 575, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). Rather, as noted above, the forum state's long-arm statute must permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant, and such exercise also must comport with constitutional due process.
Plaintiffs cannot manufacture a basis for personal jurisdiction merely by filing suit in a forum of their choosing. Accordingly, the Clerk of Court's issuance of a summons and plaintiffs' subsequent service of process on defendant outside the forum state are plainly insufficient to establish a prima facie showing that this Court possesses personal jurisdiction over defendant.
Plaintiffs also argue the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant because he retained a New York attorney to represent him in this action and provided information and documents to his attorney, and because his attorney communicated with plaintiffs' attorney about this action and the possibility of settlement.
This argument, too, is meritless. Section 302(a)(1), which allows a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who, either himself or through an agent, transacts business within the state, requires such "business within the forum state [to] have beensubstantially related to the plaintiff's cause of action." Mercer v. Rampart Hotel Ventures, LLC, 2020 WL 882007, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2020). Indeed, a plaintiff must show his "claim arises from a particular transaction when there is some articulable nexus between the business transacted and the cause of action sued upon, or when there is a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted." Sole Resort, S.A. de C.V. v. Allure Resorts Mgmt., LLC, 450 F.3d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 2006).
Moreover, "it is well established that a defendant does not waive its right to contest jurisdiction simply by moving to dismiss for lack thereof." Swindell v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 42 F. Supp. 2d 320, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
Here, defense counsel's representation in this matter forms no part of plaintiffs' claims, which arise solely from a car accident in Connecticut. That defendant retained a New York attorney to defend against plaintiffs' claims does not amount to business transacted in New York that is substantially related to plaintiffs' claims. Defense counsel's representation therefore does not satisfy New York's long-arm statute. To hold otherwise would run afoul of the prodigious body of case law respecting Section 302(a)(1). See, e.g., Swindell v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 42 F. Supp. 2d at 324 ().
Finally, plaintiffs argue that because defendant submitted with his motion an affidavit and a copy of his driver's license, and because the motion does not specify the provisions of Rule 12(b) under which defendant moves to dismiss, defendant's motion "can arguably be described as a...
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