Ludloff v. Hanson

Decision Date09 June 1959
Docket NumberNo. 252,252
Citation220 Md. 218,151 A.2d 753
PartiesIrvin LUDLOFF, T/A, etc. v. Frank HANSON.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

R. Roger Drechsler, Baltimore, for appellant.

Ronald H. Goodman, Baltimore (Alvin E. Friedman, Friedman & Goodman, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Before BRUNE, C. J., and HENDERSON, HAMMOND, PRESCOTT and HORNEY, JJ.

HORNEY, Judge.

This is an action for personal injuries. Frank Hanson (Hanson or customer) sued Irvin Ludloff trading as Irvin Ludloff & Company (Ludloff or storekeeper) in the Superior Court of Baltimore City for damages he sustained when he fell from the second floor down the rear stairway of a furniture store. A jury awarded damages to Hanson for his injuries, and when the trial court denied a motion for judgment n. o. v., Ludloff appealed.

The parties, who owned business a few doors from each other on West Pratt Street, had been acquainted for years. Hanson had been in Ludloff's store a number of times, but he did not know of the existence of the rear stairway which had been built several years before when the first and second floors of the four-story building had been extended.

Hanson had gone to the furniture store to purchase a small table lamp. Ladloff met him as he entered and when his customer could not find what he wanted on the first floor both ascended to the second floor by means of the front stairway. When the second floor was reached they were in the center of the store. A narrow aisleway--created by leaving an open space between the displays of furniture and other merchandise on both sides of the store--extended toward the south or rear of the second floor.

Facing the rear, the stairway, which began at the right, was protected by a low partition about three feet high, except for a four-foot opening at the head of the stairway. This opening was flush with the west wall so that a person desiring to use the stairway from the second floor had to step down one step to a small landing, turn left and descend to the first floor. The floor was covered with a blotched beige-colored linoleum. The landing and the steps were covered with the same material except for a one-inch band of stainless steel on the edge of each step. The rear wall above the stairway contained a four-by-four-foot window covered by a green curtain to protect the furniture from the rays of the sun.

The storekeeper and his customer proceeded down the center aisle toward the rear viewing the displayed lamps until the aisle ended at the stairway partition, in front of which two tables were on display. At this point Hanson turned to his right, moved past Ludloff, and walked several feet to a small lamp on a table or a chest of drawers. This piece of furniture was described by the storekeeper as being forty-eight inches high and twenty inches deep. It was against the west wall and partially in front of the opening to the rear stairway so that the four-foot opening was reduced to about twenty-eight inches. The partition was of the same color as the walls and the customer did not notice the open area above the stairway or the opening leading to it which was to his left. There was furniture on all sides of the aisle leading to the stairway entrance from the center aisle, but there were no signs, warning of the existence of the stairway, nor a guard rail across the entrance.

The customer looked at the lamp for a few seconds, and in turning to go or in reaching for the lamp--it is not clear which he did--he fell on to the landing. At any rate he was suddenly precipitated down the stairway to the bottom thereof and was injured.

At the time of the accident the store was well lighted at the center, but there was less light at the rear. Such as there was came from the center of the building, from the several lamps on display, including the one the customer had been inspecting, and that which came through the green-curtained rear window. A flourescent light over the head of the stairway was unlighted, although there was a light as the bottom of the stairway on the first floor.

At the close of the evidence offered by the customer, and again at the close of all the evidence, the storekeeper moved for a directed verdict in his favor which was refused both times. We think that whether there was primary negligence on the part of one and contributory negligence on the part of the other under the facts and circumstances in this case were clearly questions for the jury to decide under proper instructions on the law.

In the course of its lengthy and somewhat repetitious instruction, the trial court informed the jury, with respect to the alleged unsafe and dangerous condition, substantially as follows:

'[I]f you should find * * * that the * * * [storekeeper] maintained a stairway obscured and surrounded with displays of merchandise * * * [which created an unsafe and dangerous condition] * * * and * * * left said stairway unguarded and unprotected and failed [to warn by word of mouth or] to have any sign or warning posted to * * * notify * * * [a prospective customer] of the existence of said stairway; * * * that the * * * [customer] had no knowledge of the existence of said stairway until he fell down the same; and [that] * * * while the * * * [customer] was examining the merchandise * * *, and [while] his attention was * * * [thereby] diverted, * * * [although] exercising ordinary care for his own safety, * * * [the customer] fell down said stairway, then you may [also] find that the * * * [storekeeper] failed to use due care * * * [under the circumstances].'

The storekeeper seasonably objected to this portion of the instruction on the grounds that there was no legally sufficient evidence of a dangerous condition, or of an obstruction, or of a covering-up of the stairway, and that there was no duty on the storekeeper to maintain a 'guard rail or protection' for the stairway in question. We think the instruction as given--for the reasons hereinafter stated--was basically proper, and that the objections are without merit, nevertheless, such objections effectively raised a question which is the only point at issue in this controversy--whether or not the evidence was such as justified the court's instruction on the law. We think it was.

The general rule is that a storekeeper who invites the public into his place of business, either to inspect his goods, wares and merchandise, or to trade with him, is bound to exercise ordinary care to keep his premises in a reasonably safe condition and to give appropriate warning of any latent or concealed dangers. Furthermore, one who enters a store or other public place is entitled to expect that the keeper thereof has made greater preparation to secure his safety than is required of a householder...

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7 cases
  • Honolulu Limited v. Cain
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • 8 December 1966
    ...Crawford v. Soennichsen, 175 Neb. 87, 120 N.W.2d 578 (1963). See Evans v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 223 Md. 235, 164 A.2d 273; Ludloff v. Hanson, 220 Md. 218, 151 A.2d 753; Dickey v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co., 157 Md. 448, 146 A. 282. Shopping center parking lots are generally unprotected from the we......
  • Hewitt v. Safeway Stores, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • 6 February 1968
    ...Md. 525, 529, 180 A.2d 677, 679 (1962); Evans v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 223 Md. 235, 239, 164 A.2d 273, 276 (1960); Ludloff v. Hanson, 220 Md. 218, 223-224, 151 A.2d 753, 755 (1959). 14 Morrison v. Suburban Trust Co., supra note 12, 213 Md. at 68, 130 A.2d at 917; Bohlen v. Glenn L. Martin Co.,......
  • Six Flags Am., L.P. v. Gonzalez-Perdomo
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • 16 December 2020
    ...is based on a presumption that he has greater knowledge concerning the dangerous condition than the invitee. Ludloff v. Hanson , 220 Md. 218, 224, 151 A.2d 753 (1959).")The trial court declined to give the four non-pattern jury instructions requested by Six Flags.6 Instead, the trial court ......
  • Tie Bar, Inc. v. Shartzer, 218
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • 9 May 1968
    ...754, 40 A.L.R. 495 (1925). The basis of liability is the presumed superior knowledge of the dangerous condition, Ludloff v. Hanson, 220 Md. 218, 224, 151 A.2d 753, 755 (1959), but if the injured person knew or should have known of the dangerous situation there is no right of recovery. Finze......
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