Ludlow v. Nw. Univ.

Decision Date28 August 2015
Docket NumberNo. 14 C 4614,14 C 4614
Citation125 F.Supp.3d 783
Parties Peter Ludlow, Plaintiff, v. Northwestern University, Alan Cubbage, individually, Lauren Leydon–hardy, individually, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

Kristin Meridith Case, Kathleen O. Sedey, Kendra Larissa Kutko, The Case Law Firm, LLC, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Scott L. Warner, Ellen M. Babbitt, Ellen Frances Wetmore, Katelan Elizabeth Little, Franczek Radelet P.C., Alisa Beth Arnoff, Gregg J. Simon, Scalambrino & Arnoff, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

SARA L. ELLIS, United States District Judge

Northwestern University professor Peter Ludlow brings this suit against Defendants Northwestern University ("Northwestern"), Alan Cubbage, and Lauren Leydon–Hardy (collectively, "Defendants"). On February 5, 2015, the Court dismissed Ludlow's initial complaint. Ludlow has filed an Amended Complaint alleging that Northwestern's investigation of sexual harassment allegations against him violated Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq ., and that Defendants' comments associated with the investigation defamed him and placed him in a false light. Defendants move to dismiss all claims [53, 55]. Defendants' motions are granted in part. Because Ludlow's Title IX claim is preempted by Title VII, and in any event Ludlow has not sufficiently pleaded that the alleged discrimination had any connection to his gender, the Title IX claim against Northwestern is dismissed with prejudice. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Ludlow's remaining state law claims. Therefore Counts II, III, IV, and V are dismissed without prejudice.

BACKGROUND1

Peter Ludlow is a professor in the Philosophy Department at Northwestern. In February 2012, an undergraduate student at Northwestern made an internal complaint against Ludlow accusing him of inappropriate sexual advances and sexual assault. Northwestern's investigation concluded that the student's claim of sexual assault lacked credibility, but that Ludlow had violated the university's sexual harassment policy. Northwestern issued minor sanctions against Ludlow, but did not terminate his employment or bar him from teaching.

Ludlow and Leydon–Hardy had a consensual, romantic relationship from approximately October 2011 to January 2012.

Leydon–Hardy was a graduate student during the relationship. But because Ludlow did not supervise her work, assess her grades, or have evaluative authority over her, Northwestern's policies did not prohibit the relationship. Ludlow states that Leydon–Hardy regularly sent him emails and text messages during the relationship expressing her affections for him.

On February 10, 2014, the initial complaining student filed a federal lawsuit against Northwestern alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title IX related to her complaint against Ludlow. Ludlow contends that the undergraduate student used the threat of the lawsuit to gain academic advantages and when Northwestern would not pay her money or give her free tuition, she sued. On February 26, 2014, the student filed a state lawsuit against Ludlow for violation of the Gender Violence Act. Ludlow filed an answer to the student's lawsuit, adamantly denying the allegations.

These lawsuits received local and national media coverage. "Additionally, radical feminist and women's groups planned and held protests on campus and widely distributed calls for [Ludlow's] termination." Am. Compl. ¶ 10. A national Title IX-focused women's group met with Northwestern community members "and assisted in planning actions against" Ludlow. Id. "Many of these protestors accused Defendant Northwestern of supporting a culture of rape and failing to support its female students by failing to ‘believe the victims.’ " Id.

On March 4, 2012, one of the groups protesting Ludlow's employment planned a disruption of Ludlow's classes. In consultation with Northwestern, Ludlow cancelled the class and it was decided that, due to further protests and planned disruptions, another professor would give the final course lectures while Ludlow continued with his grading and supervising responsibilities.

On or about March 11, 2014, Stephanie Graham, Northwestern's legal counsel, asked Ludlow's attorney if Ludlow would agree not to teach any classes during the spring quarter. Graham stated that Northwestern would not remove Ludlow from teaching without his consent and that Ludlow would continue his research, writing, and advising—the bulk of his professional responsibilities—and be paid. As part of this agreement and to avoid further media attention, Ludlow's attorney asked Northwestern to agree not to comment on the decision other than to say, "Professor Ludlow is not teaching spring quarter." Id. ¶ 13. Graham agreed. Based on these representations, Ludlow agreed not to teach in the spring quarter.

However, around March 12, Northwestern and Cubbage, Vice President of University Relations for Northwestern, made statements to students and the media that Ludlow alleges were motivated by the desire for positive public relations and that falsely represented that Ludlow was removed from teaching in the spring quarter "at the behest of the protestors and to punish" him. Id. ¶ 15. Ludlow further alleges that Northwestern and Cubbage intended that these statements, in the context of the protest and media coverage of the undergraduate's complaints, suggest that Northwestern was punishing Ludlow in response to the protests when in fact Northwestern had taken no punitive action against him.

On March 12, 2014, Cubbage told NBC Chicago reporters that Northwestern had placed Ludlow on a "leave of absence." Id. ¶ 17. NBC Chicago published that information in an article titled "Accused NU Prof Won't Teach Next Quarter." Id. Cubbage later corrected his statement about the leave of absence, explaining, "It turns out Prof. Ludlow is not on a leave of absence ..." Id. Ludlow alleges that statement "lacks any substantial truth" because he was still researching and writing. Id. ¶ 18. Ludlow pleads that Northwestern's Faculty Manual states:

A leave of absence releases a faculty member from on-campus teaching and service responsibilities for a specified period of time.... A faculty member is not considered to be on leave during a term in which he/she happens not to have any scheduled classroom responsibilities but maintains all educational and service responsibilities, such as advising, departmental administration, committee assignments, and other forms of service. Such a faculty member is considered to be "in residence."

Id. ¶ 19.

Several days after the undergraduate filed suit against Northwestern, Leydon–Hardy told her academic advisor that Ludlow had non-consensual sex with her on one occasion while they were dating. Ludlow pleads that Leydon–Hardy knew this statement was not true.

In March 2014, Leydon–Hardy's academic advisor told Northwestern of Leydon–Hardy's allegation against Ludlow. After this, Leydon–Hardy told Northwestern officials, including Joan Slavin and Graham, that Ludlow had non-consensual sex with her. Ludlow pleads that this statement was false.

Upon receiving this complaint, Northwestern retained a third-party, Patricia Bobb, to investigate the claims. Ludlow provided Bobb evidence about his whereabouts on the night in question and positive communications between Leydon–Hardy and himself after that. Ludlow states that Leydon–Hardy repeated the false allegation of non-consensual sex to Bobb but when asked about the positive text messages the day after the alleged encounter, agreed that she continued her sexual relationship with Ludlow after that night. Ludlow pleads that during the investigation, Bobb gave Leydon–Hardy "many advantages that she did not extend" to Ludlow. Id. ¶ 28. "[Bobb] did this because Ms. Leydon–Hardy is a woman, and following the ‘believe the victims' mantra, entitled to more opportunities to construct her case." Id. As an example, Bobb forwarded to Leydon–Hardy, without Ludlow's permission, confidential emails and allowed Leydon–Hardy to refute those emails. Bobb did not do the same for Ludlow and refused to tell Ludlow the details of Leydon–Hardy's specific allegations against him, depriving Ludlow of the ability to fully respond. When Bobb did not have evidence of non-consensual sex, she investigated other charges without notifying Ludlow of the nature of the new charges. These new charges included that Ludlow had a supervisory role in respect to Leydon–Hardy and that he had sexually harassed Leydon–Hardy.

Bobb ultimately found insufficient evidence to support the claim of non-consensual sex. Because Ludlow did not have evaluative authority over Leydon–Hardy, Bobb found Ludlow did not violate Northwestern's policy prohibiting professors from dating students. However, Bobb did find that Ludlow violated Northwestern's policy against sexual harassment because he had unequal power in the relationship based on his purchase of expensive dinners for Leydon–Hardy and the exercise of his "charm." Id. ¶ 32.

Although Ludlow alerted Northwestern that Bobb's conclusions were flawed and unsupported, the report was distributed to "a number of people," including Dean Mangelsdorf, and Provost Linzer.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint, not its merits. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) ; Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir.1990). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff's complaint and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in the plaintiff's favor. AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir.2011). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must not only provide the defendant with fair notice of a claim's basis but must also be facially plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)...

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