Luera v. Alberta

• Decision Date: 07 March 2011
• Docket Number: No. 10–20002.,10–20002.
• Citation: 635 F.3d 181
• Parties: Melinda LUERA, Plaintiff–Appellee,v.M/V ALBERTA, Its engines, tackle, apparel, equipment, furniture, accessories, appurtenances, etc., in rem, Samos Shipping Co. Ltd., In Personam, White Dolphin Enterprises, Inc., Defendants–Appellants.Melinda Luera, Plaintiff–Appellee,v.Samos Shipping Co. Ltd., In Personam, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

635 F.3d 181

Melinda LUERA, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.M/V ALBERTA, Its engines, tackle, apparel, equipment, furniture, accessories, appurtenances, etc., in rem, Samos Shipping Co. Ltd., In Personam, White Dolphin Enterprises, Inc., Defendants–Appellants.Melinda Luera, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Samos Shipping Co. Ltd., In Personam, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 10–20002.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 7, 2011.

Dennis L. Brown (argued), Houston, TX, for Luera.Derek A. Walker, Douglas L. Grundmeyer, Jessica Kesler Woodruff, Chaffe McCall, L.L.P., New Orleans, LA, Ivan Mauricio Rodriguez (argued), Chaffe McCall, L.L.P., Houston, TX, for Defendants–Appellants.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.Before KING, STEWART and OWEN, Circuit Judges.KING, Circuit Judge:

Melinda Luera, a longshore worker, was injured while performing her job duties in the Port of Houston. Luera brought claims against two vessels, in rem, asserting admiralty jurisdiction. In the same complaint, Luera also brought claims against the owners and managers of those vessels, in personam, asserting diversity jurisdiction and demanding a jury trial. The district court, over the defendants' objection, ordered that all of Luera's claims, including her in rem admiralty claims, be tried together before a jury. The defendants appeal, arguing that Luera is not entitled to a jury trial because she has elected to proceed under the admiralty rules by virtue of the in rem claims in her complaint. We affirm the order of the district court.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Melinda Luera was injured while working for Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Co., Inc. (“Cooper/T. Smith”) in the Port of Houston. According to her complaint, Luera was working as a cargo checker on City Dock No. 23 on December 26, 2006, and performing stevedoring activities for the M/V VOC ROSE, which was moored to the dock. Luera alleges that the M/V ALBERTA passed the VOC ROSE in close proximity and at an excessive rate of speed, causing the VOC ROSE to surge. The surge in turn caused one of the mooring lines to rupture. The ruptured line struck Luera, and she suffered severe leg injuries.

Luera and Cooper/T. Smith sought to pursue claims for her injuries against both vessels¹ and their owners. First, Luera and Cooper/T. Smith obtained a Letter of Undertaking for the VOC ROSE on December 29, 2006 in the amount of $2.5 million.² The same day, Cooper/T. Smith and its insurer, The American Equity Underwriters, Inc. on behalf of American Longshore Mutual Association (“American Equity”), filed a complaint in the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana (“Suit 1”) against the ALBERTA, in rem; Samos Shipping Company, the alleged owner of the ALBERTA, in personam; and their unnamed liability insurers. The complaint requested seizure of the ALBERTA, which was then located in the Port of New Orleans, and the sole alleged basis for the court's jurisdiction over all of the claims was admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333. In lieu of seizure, a Letter of Undertaking was issued on behalf of the ALBERTA in the amount of $2.5 million.

Luera immediately sought to intervene in Suit 1. Her intervention complaint alleged no basis for subject matter jurisdiction for her claims against the defendants; Luera simply adopted Cooper/T. Smith's allegations, including the assertion of admiralty jurisdiction, in full. No activity occurred in Suit 1 for several months, and on August 7, 2007, the parties filed a joint motion to transfer venue for Suit 1 to the Southern District of Texas.

On August 6, 2007, Luera filed a second complaint in the District Court for the Southern District of Texas (“Suit 2”) against Samos Shipping, in personam, and Reese Development, Inc., the alleged owner of the VOC ROSE, in personam. Luera asserted diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 as the sole basis of subject matter jurisdiction. She also demanded a jury trial. On November 2, 2007, Luera initiated a third action in the District Court for the Southern District of Texas against the VOC ROSE, in rem (“Suit 3”), and, although Luera alleged no basis for jurisdiction, the case necessarily rested in the district court's admiralty jurisdiction because the only claim was against a vessel. Luera then filed a motion to consolidate the three pending cases, and on November 12, 2007, the district court granted the motion and consolidated the three suits into the first-filed case.

Thereafter, the parties discovered that the ALBERTA was owned by White Dolphin Enterprises, Inc. (“White Dolphin”), and that Samos Shipping was merely the manager. They also discovered that while Reese Development owned the VOC ROSE, it was managed by J.P. Samartzis Marine Enterprises Co., S.A. (“J.P. Samartzis”). White Dolphin was added to Suit 1 as owner of the ALBERTA, and White Dolphin, Samos Shipping, and the ALBERTA then used Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(c) to file a third-party complaint tendering J.P. Samartzis to Luera as a third-party defendant in Suit 1.³

Luera then filed a motion to amend her complaint in Suit 2 to add White Dolphin and J.P. Samartzis as in personam defendants, which the district court granted. In response to Luera's motion to amend, Reese Development suggested that the district court should simplify the three consolidated cases by realigning the parties and unifying the pleadings under the court's admiralty jurisdiction. In its motion Reese Development also requested that the district court strike Luera's jury demand in Suit 2. The district court initially granted Reese Development's motion in full. Relying on our prior decisions in T.N.T. Marine Service, Inc. v. Weaver Shipyards & Dry Docks, Inc., 702 F.2d 585 (5th Cir.1983) (per curiam), and Durden v. Exxon Corp., 803 F.2d 845 (5th Cir.1986), the district court held that Luera was not entitled to a jury trial because she had elected to proceed in admiralty by asserting both admiralty and diversity as bases for the court's subject matter jurisdiction.

Luera moved the district court for reconsideration of its order denying her a jury trial. Following a hearing on the matter, the district court issued a new opinion, in which it concluded that Luera had preserved her Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial by pleading diversity as the sole basis, rather than an alternate basis, for the court's jurisdiction over her claims against the in personam defendants in Suit 2. The district court reasoned that Luera's single allegation regarding subject matter jurisdiction for her in personam claims distinguished this case from our prior decisions in T.N.T. Marine and Durden. The court unified the pleadings in the three suits and granted Luera leave to amend her complaint to clarify that the sole asserted basis for the court's subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against all the in personam defendants was diversity jurisdiction.

As a result of the district court's order, the parties were realigned as follows: Luera as the sole plaintiff; Cooper/T. Smith and American Equity as intervenors with subrogation rights; Samos Shipping, in personam; White Dolphin, in personam; the M/V ALBERTA, in rem with White Dolphin appearing as registered owner under Rule E(8) of the Supplemental Rules for Federal Admiralty or Maritime Claims; Reese Development, in personam; J.P. Samartzis, in personam; and the M/V VOC ROSE, in rem with Reese Development appearing as registered owner under Rule E(8).

Luera then filed an amended complaint against all six defendants. In a separate “Jurisdiction” section, she asserted that the district court “has jurisdiction over the in personam Defendants based solely upon diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332” and that the court “has jurisdiction over the in rem Defendants based solely upon admiralty jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1333.”⁴ She claimed damages “due to the negligence of each of the Defendants.”

The defendants requested that the district court certify its order for appeal. Finding that its order granting Luera a jury trial on all of her claims involved a controlling question of law as to which there was substantial ground for difference of opinion, the district court certified its order for appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). After we granted all defendants permission to appeal, Luera settled her claims with Reese Development and J.P. Samartzis, the owner and manager, respectively, of the VOC ROSE. The remaining appellants are White Dolphin, Samos Shipping, and the ALBERTA (collectively, “Appellants”).⁵

II. LEAVE TO AMEND

We first address whether the district court erred in permitting Luera to amend her complaint. Prior to the unification of the pleadings, Luera had pleaded claims against Samos Shipping in Suit 1 under admiralty jurisdiction by intervening in that suit. In addition, J.P. Samartzis was brought into Suit 1 under admiralty jurisdiction. But Luera's claims against all of the in personam defendants in Suit 2 were premised on diversity jurisdiction. Therefore, following unification of the pleadings, but before she amended her complaint, Luera had asserted claims against some of the defendants based on both admiralty jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction. As we explain below, the import of the dual bases for the district court's jurisdiction over these claims was that Luera may have elected under Rule 9(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to proceed with all of her claims in admiralty, waiving her right to a jury trial. See T.N.T. Marine Serv., Inc. v. Weaver Shipyards & Dry Docks, Inc., 702 F.2d 585, 587–88 (5th Cir.1983). The district court conditioned its order granting Luera a jury trial on the filing of an amended complaint clarifying that Luera was asserting subject matter jurisdiction for all of her in personam claims on diversity only. Appellants argue that the district court erred in permitting Luera to amend her complaint. We review a...