LuGrain v. State, s. 90-1725

• Decision Date: 24 December 1991
• Docket Number: Nos. 90-1725,90-1853,s. 90-1725
• Citation: 479 N.W.2d 312
• Parties: Carl F. LuGRAIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee. Loren Jay ROSS, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 312

479 N.W.2d 312

Carl F. LuGRAIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.

Loren Jay ROSS, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.

Nos. 90-1725, 90-1853.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 24, 1991.

Mary K. Hoefer of Mears Law Office, Iowa City, for appellant LuGrain.

Philip B. Mears of Mears Law Office, Iowa City, for appellant Ross.

Bonnie J. Campbell, Atty. Gen. and William A. Hill, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and LARSON, CARTER, LAVORATO, and SNELL, JJ.

LAVORATO, Justice.

In this consolidated appeal, two prison inmates raise two common issues. First, they challenge the constitutionality of a prison rule. Second, they contend the evidence was not sufficient to support their convictions for allegedly violating this rule. Under the rule a prisoner may be punished for possession of drugs if the inmate fails to provide a urine sample within two hours of a request to do so. Both inmates had allegedly failed to provide such samples and were found guilty of violating the rule. After exhausting their administrative remedies, each inmate filed an application in the district court, seeking postconviction relief. See Iowa Code §§ 663A.2(6) and 663A.3 (1989). The district court denied both applications, and both inmates appealed. We affirm.

I. Background Facts.

During the fall of 1989, in two unrelated incidents, Carl F. LuGrain and Loren Jay Ross--inmates at the Iowa Men's Reformatory--were ordered to provide urine samples to prison officials for drug testing. The urine samples were to be tested for the presence of the substance tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the active ingredient in marijuana.

Both inmates were being considered for "out custody status" (eligibility to work outside the prison walls, or "outs"). An institutional rule provides that inmates being considered for out custody status must undergo random drug testing beforehand. In addition, prison rule 20 states that an "[i]nmate must provide a urine sample within two hours of [a] request." The rule goes on to state that "[f]ailure to do so will constitute [a] violation" of the rule prohibiting possession of drugs.

LuGrain and Ross were told that failure to provide a urine sample within the two hour time limit would result in (1) the issuance of a disciplinary report and (2) a probable determination at a disciplinary hearing that each had violated rule 20. Neither LuGrain nor Ross provided a urine sample within the two hour time limit.

The prison disciplinary committee found that both inmates had violated rule 20. As a result, both inmates suffered, among other things, a loss of good conduct time credits. See Iowa Code § 903A.2.

II. Background Proceedings.

After exhausting their administrative remedies, both inmates filed applications for postconviction relief. See Iowa Code §§ 903A.3, 663A.3. Both challenged rule 20 on federal due process grounds. They contended that the rule created an irrebuttable presumption of drug possession based on an inability to produce a urine sample. In addition, both inmates challenged the committee's decisions on the grounds that the decisions were not supported by the evidence.

The district court denied both applications, and both inmates appealed. Because both inmates raised similar issues, we consolidated their appeals.

III. The State's Motion to Dismiss.

Before July 1, 1990, postconviction applicants had a direct right of appeal from adverse prison disciplinary rulings. See Iowa Code § 663A.9 (1989). On July 1, 1990, an amendment to this section went into effect. The amendment abrogates this direct right of appeal and now permits instead an appeal by writ of certiorari. See 1990 Iowa Acts ch. 1043. The amendment, now codified at Iowa Code section 663A.9 (1991), added the italicized language below:

An appeal from a final judgment entered under this chapter may be taken, perfected, and prosecuted either by the applicant or by the state in the manner and within the time after judgment as provided in the rules of appellate procedure for appeals from final judgments in criminal cases. However, if the applicant is seeking an appeal under section 663A.2, subsection 6 [loss of good conduct time credits], the appeal shall be by writ of certiorari.

(Emphasis added.)

The State has filed a motion to dismiss Ross' appeal. The State contends Ross no longer has a direct right to appeal from his adverse prison disciplinary ruling. The reason, the State argues, is because Ross filed his notice of appeal after the amendment went into effect.

Ross' discipline took place in October 1989. His postconviction relief action was filed in December 1989. The district court heard the case in September 1990, and rendered its decision on October 31, 1990. Ross appealed to this court on November 13, 1990, more than four months after the amendment went into effect.

Today we hold that the amendment does not apply to judgments in disciplinary proceedings rendered before the effective date of the amendment. James v. State, 479 N.W.2d 287, 290 (Iowa 1991). Our holding in James is based on the general rule that statutes controlling appeals are those that were in effect at the time the judgment or order appealed from was rendered. Id. Under this rule the amendment applies to Ross' case because the amendment was in effect at the time the district court rendered its decision.

However, today we also hold that the amendment is invalid because the right of direct appeal is not reciprocal between the State and the postconviction relief applicant. Shortridge v. State, 478 N.W.2d 613, 615 (Iowa 1991). In short, the State has the right of direct appeal under the statute as amended but the applicant does not. This is an inequality, we said, that cannot be permitted. Id.

Our decision in Shortridge leaves intact the right of direct appeal for postconviction relief applicants who appeal from adverse prison disciplinary rulings.

Ross' challenge to the amendment is based on the same reasoning we used in Shortridge to rule the amendment invalid. That leaves us no option but to overrule the State's motion to dismiss and proceed to the merits of both appeals.

IV. The Federal Due Process Challenge to Rule 20.

The two inmates here raise identical federal due process challenges to rule 20. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV ("nor shall any State deprive any person of ... liberty, ... without due process of law ..."). They claim that the rule creates an irrebuttable presumption of drug possession when an inmate is unable to provide a urine sample for drug testing. This, they say, violates fundamental due process.

Iowa law permits an inmate to earn good conduct time credits. See Iowa Code § 903A.2. That being the case, the inmate has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in those credits. So the State may not deprive the inmate of such credits without observing minimum federal due process requirements. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 2773, 86 L.Ed.2d 356, 364 (1985) (revocation of good time must comport with fourteenth amendment minimal procedural due process requirements); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 951 (1974) (prisoner's interest in good time entitles the prisoner to minimum procedures required by due process under the fourteenth amendment).

Because constitutional rights are involved, our review is de novo "in light of the totality of the circumstances and record upon which the postconviction court ruling was made." Rushing v. State, 382 N.W.2d 141, 143 (Iowa 1986).

A presumption is a deduction that the law expressly directs to be made from particular facts. Bridges v. Welzien, 231 Iowa 6, 10, 300 N.W. 659, 662 (1941). One treatise writer distinguishes between a rebuttable and an irrebuttable presumption this way:

The term presumption as used above always denotes a rebuttable presumption, i.e., the party against whom the presumption operates can always introduce proof in contradiction. In the case of what is commonly called a conclusive or irrebuttable presumption, when fact B is proven, fact A must be taken as true, and the adversary is not allowed to dispute this at all. For example, if it is proven that a child is under seven years of age, the courts have stated that it is conclusively presumed that he could not have committed a felony. In so doing, the courts are not stating a presumption at all, but simply expressing the rule of law that someone under seven years old cannot legally be convicted of a felony.

McCormick on Evidence § 342, at 804 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972) (emphasis added); accord Farnsworth v. Hazelett, 197 Iowa 1367, 1370-71, 199 N.W. 410, 411-12 (1924). The italicized language says three things. First, in the case of a rebuttable presumption, the party against whom the presumption operates can always introduce evidence to rebut the presumption. Second, in the case of an irrebuttable presumption, no such evidence is permitted. Third, an irrebuttable presumption is not a rule of evidence at all; it is a substantive rule of law.

We agree with LuGrain and Ross that the United States Supreme Court has "uniformly condemned irrebuttable presumptions" as violations of federal due process. See, e.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446, 93 S.Ct. 2230, 2233, 37 L.Ed.2d 63, 68 (1973) ("permanent irrebuttable presumptions have long been disfavored under the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments"); see also, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647-48, 94 S.Ct. 791, 799-800, 39 L.Ed.2d 52, 64 (1974) (irrebuttable presumption that pregnant women are incapacitated from teaching is invalid under due process clause of the fourteenth amendment); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 654-58, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1214-16, 31 L.Ed.2d 551, 560-62 (1972) (statute containing irrebuttable presumption that unmarried fathers are incompetent to raise their children violates due process under...