Luigi B. v. Saul
| Decision Date | 11 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 18 CV 7392,18 CV 7392 |
| Parties | LUIGI B., Claimant, v. ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Claimant Luigi B.1 ("Claimant") seeks review of the final decision of Respondent Andrew Saul,2 Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner"), denying Claimant's application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act ("Act"). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Local Rule 73.1, the parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge for all proceedings, including entry of final judgment. [ECF No. 6]. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment [ECF Nos. 17, 24] pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c). For the reasons discussed below, Claimant's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 17] is denied, and the Commissioner's Motion [ECF No. 24] is granted.
On November 16, 2010, Claimant filed a Title II application for DIB alleging disability beginning on August 25, 2008.3 (R. 120-23). His claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration, after which Claimant requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (R. 28-49). On August 21, 2012, Claimant appeared and testified at a hearing before ALJ Janice Bruning, who presided over the hearing by videoconference. (R. 35-70). ALJ Bruning also heard testimony on that date from vocational expert ("VE") Thomas Dunleavy. (R. 35-70). On November 2, 2012, ALJ Bruning denied Claimant's claim for DIB. (R. 17-34). Claimant petitioned the Northern District of Illinois for judicial review on May 12, 2014, (R. 602-03), and on January 26, 2015, Magistrate Judge Sheila Finnegan granted the parties' agreed motion for reversal with remand so that the ALJ may "update the medical record; further evaluate Plaintiff's residual functional capacity with specific consideration of the non-examining source opinion in Exhibit 4F; if necessary, obtain vocational expert testimony; offer Plaintiff the opportunity for a new hearing; and issue a new decision." (R. 607, 612). The Appeals Council subsequently vacated the November 2, 2012 decision and remanded the case with further instructions. (R. 615-617). Another hearing was conducted on September 16, 2015 before ALJ William Spalo, at which both Claimant and VE Dunleavy again testified (R. 549-600). On October 16, 2015, ALJ Spalo denied Claimant's claim for DIB after considering his limitations. (R. 526-542).
In finding Claimant not disabled, the ALJ followed the five-step evaluation process required by Social Security regulations for individuals over the age of 18. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). At step one, the ALJ found that Claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activityduring the relevant period from October 30, 2010 through his date last insured of December 31, 2013.4 (R. 532).
At step two, the ALJ found that Claimant had a severe impairment or combination of impairments as defined by 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c). (R. 532-34). Specifically, Claimant suffered from status post history of multiple abdominal surgeries, a left rotator cuff tear, right shoulder impingement, arthritis of the right thumb, status post history of reconstructive right wrist surgery with residual pain complaints, and status post right carpal tunnel syndrome surgery and deQuervain's release (20 CFR 404.1520(c)). (R. 532). The above-noted severe impairments, according to the ALJ, limit Claimant's ability to perform the full range of basic work activities. (R. 532). The ALJ also acknowledged several non-severe complaints - a medical history of diverticulitis, mild degenerative changes to Claimant's right knee, and depression - and concluded that although they did not rise to the level of severe impairments, he would nevertheless address or incorporate Claimant's limitations from each of these areas into the RFC, if appropriate. (R. 533-35).
At step three, the ALJ determined that Claimant did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. 535). The ALJ noted that Claimant did not meet or medically equal the criteria of listing 1.02, the applicable listing for major dysfunction of a joint, for several reasons. First, the ALJ noted that the results of a consultative exam showed that Claimant's joint-related impairments did not result in the inability to ambulate effectively. Second,Claimant was able to perform fine and gross manipulative maneuvers and had only mild difficulty with some tasks. (R. 534). Based on the diagnostic testing and clinical examination findings in the record, the ALJ concluded that there were insufficient objective findings to support a listing level condition. (R. 534). In particular, the ALJ noted that no treating or examining physician identified findings equivalent in severity to the criteria of any listed impairment, nor did the evidence, from the ALJ's perspective, show medical findings that were the same or equivalent to those of any listed impairment. (R. 535).
The ALJ then found Claimant had the RFC,5 through Claimant's date last insured, to:
"perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except the claimant was unable to climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; he was able to occasionally crawl and climb ramps and stairs; he was able to frequently kneel, crouch, stoop and balance; he was able to occasionally reach to the front and the side with the right dominant upper extremity; he was unable to reach overhead bilaterally; he was able to occasionally handle and finger with the right dominant upper extremity." (R. 535).
Based on this RFC, the ALJ found at step four that Claimant had past relevant work as a restaurant cook, but that he was unable to perform this work, as it was medium in exertional demand and Claimant was limited to light work with some additional restrictions. (R. 541). At step five, the ALJ concluded that, considering Claimant's age, education, past work experience, and residual functional capacity, he is capable of performing other work within the national economy and that those jobs exist in significant numbers. (R. 541-42). Specifically, the VE's testimony, on which the ALJ relied, identified jobs including usher, sales attendant, and cashier, as those that would be available to Claimant in significant numbers. (R. 542). The ALJ then found Claimant was not disabled under the Act. (R. 542). The Appeals Council declined to review the matter on September 18, 2018, (R. 509-12), making the ALJ's decision the final decision of theCommissioner and, therefore, reviewable by this Court. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see, e.g., Smith v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1765, 1775 (2019); Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005).
A decision by an ALJ becomes the Commissioner's final decision if the Appeals Council denies a request for review. Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07 (2000). Judicial review is limited to determining whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards in reaching his or her decision. See Nelms v. Astrue, 553 F.3d 1093, 1097 (7th Cir. 2009). The reviewing court may enter a judgment "affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Substantial evidence "means - and means only - such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (internal quotations omitted); see also, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A "mere scintilla" of evidence is not enough. Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154; Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 2002). Even where there is adequate evidence in the record to support the decision, the findings will not be upheld if the ALJ does not "build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to the conclusion." Berger v. Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted). In other words, if the Commissioner's decision lacks evidentiary support or adequate discussion of the issues, it cannot stand. See Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2009). Though the standard of review is deferential, a reviewing court must "conduct a critical review of the evidence" before affirming the Commissioner's decision. Eichstadt v. Astrue, 534 F.3d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted). The reviewing court may not, however,"displace the ALJ's judgment by reconsidering facts or evidence, or by making independent credibility determinations." Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008).
Claimant argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's conclusion that Claimant can perform other work because the ALJ's formulation of the RFC did not accurately portray or capture his physical and mental impairments. In particular, Claimant argues that the ALJ failed to consider two things. First, Claimant asserts that the ALJ did not adequately consider his mental limitations - namely, the symptoms of his depression - when formulating his RFC. [ECF No. 17] at 5-6. Second, Claimant argues that the ALJ did not properly evaluate whether Claimant's impairments, either individually or in combination, satisfied a severe listing-level impairment other than listing 1.02B, the only listing the ALJ specifically addressed and rejected in his opinion. [ECF No. 17] at 6-8. Because the ALJ specifically considered all the evidence Claimant now says was neglected and supported his decision with substantial...
To continue reading
Request your trial