Luis Santiago v. Santiago

• Decision Date: 09 August 2010
• Docket Number: No. Civil 09-2111(JA),Civil 09-2111(JA)
• Citation: 731 F.Supp.2d 202
• Parties: Angel LUIS SANTIAGO, Plaintiff v. Iris M. SANTIAGO, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

731 F.Supp.2d 202

Angel LUIS SANTIAGO, Plaintiff

v.Iris M. SANTIAGO, Defendant.

No. Civil 09-2111(JA).

United States District Court,

D. Puerto Rico.

Aug. 9, 2010.

Gino Negretti-Lavergne, Miguez & Negretti Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Michelle Pirallo-Di Cristina, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

JUSTO ARENAS, United States Chief Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the court on "Urgent Motion to Dismiss Under Rule12(b)(6)" filed by the defendant, Iris M. Santiago. (Docket No. 37.) An "Opposition to Motion to Dismiss" was filed by plaintiff, Angel Luis Santiago. (Docket No. 44.) The defendant filed a "Reply to Opposition to Urgent Motion to Dismiss." (Docket No. 47.) For the reasons set forth below, the defendant's motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 29, 2009, plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant for breach of contract, collection of monies, and tort damages. (Docket No. 1.) In the complaint, plaintiff alleges that he and the defendant agreed to place a portion of his retirement savings in an investment account at Merrill Lynch in Puerto Rico. ( Id. at 2, ¶ 5.) The account, according to plaintiff, was opened in the defendant's name. ( Id.) Plaintiff claims that as part of the agreement, whenever he needed money, the defendant would prepare a request authorizing Merrill Lynch to withdraw the money and surrender the funds to him. ( Id.) Plaintiff claims that between 2008 and 2009, $105,000 was withdrawn from the investment account. ( Id.) In 2009 plaintiff allegedly requested the defendant to withdraw the remaining balance (approximately $100,021) because the account was losing money. ( Id. at 3, ¶ 6.) Plaintiff claims that to his surprise the funds were transferred to the defendant in North Carolina. ( Id.) Plaintiff claims that despite his countless requests the defendant has not complied with the agreement and has refused to return the funds. ( Id. ¶ 7.) Thus, plaintiff requests that the court order the defendant to return the moneys owed ($100,021) plus accrued interest. ( Id. at 4.) Plaintiff also alleges that he was defamed by the defendant. ( Id. at 3, ¶ 8.) According to the plaintiff, the defendant contacted a law firm that had previously defended him in a criminal case and told them that he was a violent person and that she would only pay his bill in exchange for information on the whereabouts of his parole officer. ( Id. & Docket No. 31, at 17-18.) Plaintiff claims that the same defamatory comments were made by the defendant to his parole officer. ( Id.) He alleges that as a result of the defendant's conduct, he suffered a great deal of emotional distress, mental anguish and loss off income. (Docket No. 1, at 3, ¶ 8.) Thus, plaintiff requests an award of $250,000 for mental suffering, $250,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in punitive damages. ( Id. at 4.)

On June 24, 2010, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Docket No. 37, at 1.) The defendant requests the court to dismiss the complaint because plaintiff does not have a legal right to request the reimbursement of monies and damages for the alleged breach of contract. ( Id. at 6, ¶ 14.) She claims that the alleged contract between the defendant and her is illegal because it was made with purpose of defrauding creditors. ( Id. at 1, ¶ 1.) Specifically, the defendant claims that in the "Proposed Pretrial Order" filed on June 23, 2010, (Docket No. 31), plaintiff stated that the purpose of the contract was to protect his assets from his creditors. (Docket No. 37, at 1, ¶ 1.) Thus, the defendant argues that because the object of the contract is illegal the court cannot validate it. ( Id. at 4, ¶ 7.)

On June 30, 2010, the defendant's motion to dismiss was opposed by plaintiff. (Docket No. 44.) Plaintiff argues that the defendant lacks standing to allege that the contract is illegal because she is not a creditor. ( Id. at 1, ¶ 1 & at 2, ¶ 2.) However, plaintiff claims that, assuming the defendant has standing, the contract would have to be rescinded and the money would have to be returned to him. ( Id. at 2, ¶ 2.) Plaintiff also argues that the defendant'stheory is not on point because she is requesting that the complaint, which contains another cause of action, be dismissed without any proof or a hearing. ( Id. at 3, ¶ 6.) Furthermore, according to plaintiff the defendant failed to provide any evidence that would prove that the contract was made to operate as a fraud against creditors. ( Id. ¶ 7.)

On July 8, 2010, the defendant filed a reply to plaintiff's opposition to the motion to dismiss. (Docket No. 47.) The defendant argues that she can attack the contract because its legality has been put in question. ( Id. at 2, ¶ 3.) Additionally, the defendant claims that she does not have to prove plaintiff's legal theory because he admitted that the contract was illegal since it was made with the purpose of defrauding his creditors. ( Id. at 3, ¶ 5.) Finally, the defendant argues that plaintiff has acted with obstinacy and temerity and requests that he be sanctioned and ordered to pay cost and attorney's fees. ( Id. at 4, ¶ 9.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The general rules of pleading require a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.... This short and plain statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Medina v. Toledo, 718 F.Supp.2d 194, 201, 2010 WL 2404448, at *5 (D.P.R. June 9, 2010) (quoting Gargano v. Liberty Int'l Underwriters, Inc., 572 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir.2009)).

"Under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss an action against him for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Benítez-Navarro v. González-Aponte, 660 F.Supp.2d 185, 188 (D.P.R.2009) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)). A motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(1) is subject to the same standard of review as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Cintrón-Luna v. Román-Bultrón, 668 F.Supp.2d 315, 316 (D.P.R.2009). "In Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544[, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929] (2007), the Supreme Court held that to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege 'a plausible entitlement to relief.' " Martínez-Díaz v. Doe, 683 F.Supp.2d 171, 173 (D.P.R.2010) (quoting Rodríguez-Ortiz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92, 95-96 (1st Cir.2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559, 127 S.Ct. 1955)). When ruling on a motion to dismiss the "court must accept the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true and indulge all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." S.E.C. v. Binette, 679 F.Supp.2d 153, 158 (D.Mass.2010) (citing Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir.2008)). Although " Twombly does not require heightened fact pleading of specifics ... it does require enough facts to 'nudge [plaintiffs'] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Quirós v. Muñoz, 670 F.Supp.2d 130, 131 (D.P.R.2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). "Accordingly, in order to avoid dismissal, the plaintiff must provide the grounds upon which his claim rests through factual allegations sufficient to 'raise a right to relief above the speculative level.' " Maldonado-Concepción v. Puerto Rico, 683 F.Supp.2d 174, 175-76 (D.P.R.2010) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

"In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009), the Supreme Court upheld Twombly and clarified that two underlying principles must guide this Court's assessment of the adequacy of a plaintiff's pleadings when evaluating whether a complaint can survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion."Camacho-Torres v. Betancourt-Vazquez, 722 F.Supp.2d 150, 154, 2010 WL 2756555, at *3 (D.P.R. July 13, 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50). "The First Circuit has recently relied on these two principles as outlined by the Court." Jimenez-Gonzalez v. Alvarez-Rubio, 683 F.Supp.2d 177, 181 (D.P.R.2010). "First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). "Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Id. at 1950 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). "Thus, any nonconclusory factual allegations in the complaint, accepted as true, must be sufficient to give the claim facial plausibility." Camacho-Torres v. Betancourt-Vazquez, 722 F.Supp.2d at 154, 2010 WL 2756555, at *3 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ortiz-Skerrett v. Rey Enter., Inc., 692 F.Supp.2d 201, 203 (D.P.R.2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Jaundoo v. Clarke, 690 F.Supp.2d 20, 33 (D.Mass.2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not 'show [n]'-'that the pleader is entitled to relief.' " Camacho-Torres v. Betancourt-Vazquez, 722 F.Supp.2d at 154, 2010 WL 2756555, at *3 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129...