Lum Chan Fee v. Dulles, Civ. No. 1174.

• Decision Date: 22 April 1954
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 1174.
• Citation: 121 F. Supp. 406
• Parties: LUM CHAN FEE v. DULLES, Secretary of State.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii

121 F. Supp. 406

LUM CHAN FEE v. DULLES, Secretary of State.

Civ. No. 1174.

United States District Court, D. Hawaii.

April 22, 1954.

N. W. Y. Char, Honolulu, Hawaii, for plaintiff.

A. William Barlow, U. S. Atty. Dist. of Hawaii, Louis B. Blissard, Asst. U. S. Atty. Dist. of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii, for defendant.

McLAUGHLIN, Chief Judge.

The only question presented for consideration at this time is whether Section 503 of the Nationality Act of 1940, 8 U.S.C. § 903,¹ afforded a remedy as a jurisdictional matter to persons who have never been in the United States as well as to expatriates and those in the United States. The cases giving rise to this common question of law are Lum Chan Fee v. Dulles, Civil No. 1174; Lee Dai v. Dulles, Civil No. 1180; and Lee Yuk Wan v. Dulles, Civil No. 1193. The facts in all three cases are similar and, in essence, show that petitioners were born in China and were the alleged children of an American father and a Chinese mother. They brought their actions under Section 503 of the Nationality Act, seeking judgments declaring them to be nationals of the United States.

In submitting its motion to dismiss, the Government's contention, which is supported by Judge Wiig's ruling in Lee Wai Tong (and Lee Wai Ping) v. Dulles, D.C.1953, and Judge Goodman's dictum in Ly Shew v. Acheson, D.C.N.D.Cal. 1953, 110 F.Supp. 50, is that Section 503 was intended to give a remedy only to expatriates and persons in the United States and not to those abroad who have never been in the United States or who have not been charged with expatriation. It is the opinion of this court that that contention is not sound but that Section 503, for the reasons to appear, did afford a remedy to any person claiming a denial of a right or privilege as a national of the United States.

At the outset, it should be mentioned that, apropos to Judge Wiig's ruling in this district, the rule of stare decisis is not applicable here because, in addition to the fact that Judge Wiig's earlier ruling was not a final judgment, there are cogent reasons for disregarding it. See United States v. Inter-Island Steam Nav. Co., D.C.D.Haw.1950, 87 F. Supp. 1010. The most cogent reason for this court's ruling is the statute itself. The language found in Section 503 is broad and unambiguous. It says "any person" and "such person, regardless of whether he is within the United States or abroad". There is nothing on the face of the statute to indicate that this remedy was given only to expatriates or those in the United States. Hence, the reasonable construction of the statute is to afford a day in court to any person claiming nationality in good faith and with a substantial basis. In this posture, where the statute is clear, it is questionable whether reference to Congressional proceedings should be made. See Pennsylvania R. Co. v. International Coal Mining Co., 1913, 230 U.S. 184, 33 S.Ct. 893, 57 L.Ed. 1446; United States Lines Co. v. Shaughnessy, D.C.S.D.N.Y.1951, 101 F.Supp. 61. But even if such reference should be made, this court agrees with Judge Erskine in Look Yun Lin v. Acheson, D.C.N.D.Cal.1949, 87 F.Supp. 463, that the discussion found in 86 Congressional Record 13247-48 (1940) does not support the Government's position limiting the remedy to expatriates and persons in the United States.

Also, the contention by the Government that the sequence of the subchapters...