Lum v. Sun

Decision Date28 February 1989
Docket NumberNo. 12952,12952
Citation769 P.2d 1091,70 Haw. 288
PartiesJoseph T. LUM, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Christianna Wai Ha SUN, Defendant-Appellant, and Gary D. Henig, Defendant.
CourtHawaii Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. The dispossessory proceeding provided under Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) chapter 666 is not for the trial of title to land; its primary purpose is the determination of the right to possession between the person claiming to be the landlord and one claiming to be his tenant. For the person entitled to the possession of the premises must bring and prosecute his action in the district court of the circuit wherein the lands and premises in question are situated, and the district courts cannot take cognizance of real actions, nor actions in which title to real estate comes in question.

2. The statutory proceeding described in HRS chapter 666 is meant to provide a remedy that enables the landlord to obtain possession of leased premises without suffering the delay, loss, and expense to which he might be subjected if he could only rely on the common law to remove a tenant who is wrongfully holding over his term. For the legislature has characterized the proceeding as a summary action to be brought in the district courts where all actions are tried and determined without a jury.

3. The Seventh Amendment guarantee of a jury trial in suits at common law applies only to proceedings in courts of the United States and does not in any manner whatever govern or regulate trials by jury in state courts.

4. HRS § 604-5, which defines the civil jurisdiction of the district courts, provides that whenever a civil matter is triable of right by a jury and trial by jury is demanded the case shall be transferred to the circuit court. The statute implements article I, section 13 of the State Constitution, which secures to litigants the right to a jury trial in suits at common law where the value in controversy exceeds five thousand dollars. Rule 38 of the District Court Rules of Civil Procedure (DCRCP) reinforces the constitutional provision in similar fashion.

5. By virtue of DCRCP 38 a party to an action brought in the district court may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a jury. He may specify the issues which he wishes tried by jury. And upon proper service and filing of such demand and the payment of the costs for jury trial as are payable in the circuit court, the case shall be transferred to the circuit court.

6. There is no constitutional barrier to the trial in different courts of separate issues arising from the same fact situation. The Supreme Court on several occasions has held that it is permissible to segregate an action for possession of property from other actions arising out of the same fact situation that may assert valid legal or equitable defenses or counterclaims.

7. In a legal sense, "case" is generally understood as meaning a judicial proceeding for the determination of a controversy between parties where rights are enforced or wrongs are prevented or redressed. Read narrowly a "case" is a question contested before a court of justice. But it may also be the lawsuit, the cause of action, or the matter as a whole.

8. Read in the context of DCRCP 38, "the case" can hardly be "the matter as a whole," for the litigant is allowed thereunder to specify the issues which he wishes tried by jury. The rule thus contemplates that the questions raised by the aggregate of facts furnishing occasion for the exercise of judicial authority are subject to segregation for bench or jury trial.

Frederick W. Rohlfing, III, (James M. Sattler with him on the brief), Honolulu, for defendant-appellant Sun.

Randolph F. Leong (Harold W. Goble with him on the brief), Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before LUM, C.J., and NAKAMURA, PADGETT, HAYASHI and WAKATSUKI, JJ.

NAKAMURA, Justice.

"Whenever any lessee or tenant of any lands or tenements ... holds possession ... without right, after the termination of the tenancy, either by passage of time or by reason of any forfeiture, under the conditions or covenants in a lease, ... the person entitled to the premises may be restored to the possession thereof [pursuant to the summary proceeding provided in Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) chapter 666]." HRS § 666-1. The proceeding must be brought and prosecuted by the person entitled to possession "in the district court of the circuit wherein the lands and premises in question are situated." HRS § 666-6. And any action prosecuted in a district court must be tried and determined "without a jury[.]" HRS § 604-5(b).

The question in this appeal is whether the District Court of the First Circuit lacked jurisdiction to try and determine the summary possession action brought by Joseph T. Lum against Gary Dwight Henig and Christianna Wai Ha Sun after Ms. Sun filed a multi-count counterclaim and demanded a trial by jury. We conclude as the district court did that the counterclaimant was entitled to a jury trial in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit on her claims, but the jury demand did not divest the district court of power to decide whether or not Joseph Lum should be restored to possession of the premises in question.

I.

Lum leased a single-family dwelling, which he and his wife owned, to Henig and Sun for a term of six years beginning on October 3, 1983. The "Rental Agreement" called for the payment of rent at the rate of $900 a month; it further provided that the lessees would not sublet the premises or make alterations to the property without the lessor's prior written consent. During their tenancy, however, the lessees enclosed the carport attached to the dwelling and covered with concrete a substantial portion of the yard without obtaining permission to do so.

Henig and Sun vacated the premises in or about March of 1986 without notice to Lum. They then sublet the property without permission and received monthly rent payments of $1,400. When the subtenant vacated the premises in or about July of 1987, they rented the dwelling to another, again without the lessor's permission. Lum brought his first summary possession action in the district court a month later. But by then Sun had filed a Chapter 11 petition in bankruptcy in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii.

Lum thus sought to be relieved of the automatic stay imposed on his action by the provisions of section 362 of title 11 of the United States Code. The stay was lifted by the bankruptcy court on September 29, 1987, and Lum brought another action seeking to recover possession of the premises and other relief 1 in the District Court of the First Circuit on October 30, 1987. Henig, however, was not personally served with the complaint since his whereabouts are unknown. Lum and Sun subsequently stipulated and agreed that the first action would be dismissed.

On November 9, 1987 the district court, pursuant to HRS § 521-78 and at Lum's request, ordered Sun to deposit the rent received from her subtenant in a court-administered trust fund pending the resolution of the dispute. On the same day, Sun filed a demand for a jury trial on "all issues [presented by Lum's complaint that were] so triable." She further purported to reserve the right to file an answer and counterclaim after the anticipated transfer of the case to the circuit court.

Lum countered with a motion to deny Sun a jury trial or, alternatively, to sever the issues raised by his claim of entitlement to possession of the premises from those posed by his claim for other relief. When the hearing on the competing requests to have the case transferred to the circuit court or kept in the district court was conducted, Sun maintained a severance of issues was out of order because she had acquired an option to purchase the property. 2 The court did not rule on the requests, but gave Sun additional time to file a responsive pleading. Sun then withdrew her demand for a jury trial without prejudice, and Lum withdrew his motion.

Sun filed her answer and counterclaim on November 24, 1987; she again demanded a trial by jury, and Lum again moved for an order denying Sun's request for jury trial. But this time the alternative relief he sought was an order severing Sun's claims as well as his claims in assumpsit from that seeking possession of the premises. The district court granted the alternative relief; the summary possession proceeding itself was kept in the district court, but the other issues raised by the pleadings of the parties were severed and transferred to the circuit court for trial by jury.

The summary possession proceeding was tried by the district court shortly thereafter. The court found, inter alia, that Sun and Henig, without seeking Lum's consent, made material alterations to his property and sublet it to two subtenants. The court also found that Lum had not given Sun or Henig an option to purchase the property. Thus it concluded Sun and Henig had breached their lease and entered a judgment giving Lum possession of the premises; it subsequently ordered the release to Lum of the rent being held in trust. Sun appealed, and she now avers the judgment must be vacated since her demand for a jury trial and the fact that "title was in issue" rendered the exercise of jurisdiction by the district court invalid. 3

II.

We begin our consideration of the appeal with the postulate that the "dispossessory proceeding [provided under HRS chapter 666] is not for the trial of title to land, but its [primary] purpose is the determination of the right to possession between the person claiming to be the landlord and one claiming to be his tenant." 3A G. Thompson, Commentaries on The Modern Law of Real Property § 1370, at 722 (J. Grimes Repl.1981) (footnote omitted). 4 For "the person entitled to the possession of the premises [must] bring and prosecute the person's action in the district court of the circuit wherein the lands and premises in question are...

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