Lumber Co v. Northern Pac Ry Co
| Decision Date | 05 January 1925 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 152 and 179,FULLERTON-KRUEGER,s. 152 and 179 |
| Parties | LUMBER CO. v. NORTHERN PAC. RY. CO. et al. (two cases) |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. P. L. Solether and John Junell, both of Minneapolis, Minn., for plaintiff in error and petitioner.
Mr. Charles W. Bunn, of St. Paul, Minn., for defendants in error and respondents.
After suing out the writ of error, No. 152, the Lumber Company obtained a certiorari, No. 179, to review the same judgment. The record plainly discloses that a right under an act of Congress was claimed below and denied. The cause is properly here by certiorari, and upon it the issue can be decided. That adequate ground for the writ of error was specially set up below is not clear. It will be dismissed.
On January 24, 1921, the original action was brought in the district court, Hennepin county, to recover excess freight charges demanded by respondent between November 25, 1912, and September 16, 1913, in violation of section 4347, Minnesota General Statutes. Admitting original liability, the railway company relied upon the local statute of limitation, fixing six years as the time within which such actions must be begun. To this the reply was that the prescribed period of limitation had been extended by paragraph (f), § 206, Federal Transportation Act 1920, 41 Stat. 456, 462 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 10071 1/4 cc), which provides:
'The period of federal control shall not be computed as a part of the periods of limitation in actions against carriers or in claims for reparation to the Commission for causes of action arising prior to federal control.'
And upon the sole point of law thus raised the cause is before us.
The petitioner maintains that Congress intended to revive actions against carriers when the period designated by the state statute for bringing them had expired during federal control, and asserts that the mischief to be remedied indicates such purpose and the ordinary meaning of the words employed discloses it. The respondent insists that a statute should never be given retroactive effect where another construction is fairly permissible, as here; that if in the circumstances the act of Congress be so construed it would create new causes of action and thus permit the taking of property without due process of law.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota held, rightly, we think, that the Transportation Act was not intended to...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Lakota Oil & Gas Co. v. City of Casper
... ... 162 ... Statutes are to be construed prospectively. Brewster v ... Gage, 280 U.S. 329; Fullerton-Krueger Lbr. Co. v ... Northern Pacific Railway Co., 266 U.S. 435. Exhibit ... "B" did not as a matter of law nullify prior ... proceedings by the city in the exercise of its ... ...
-
Coolidge v. Comm'r of Corp. & Taxation (In re Coolidge's Estate)
...Gas Light Co., 220 Mass. 1, 107 N. E. 426, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 145, where cases are reviewed; Fullerton-Krueger Lumber Co. v. Northern Pacific Railway, 266 U. S. 435, 437, 45 S. Ct. 143, 69 L. Ed. 367. That principle is not here applicable because the succession, which is the subject of the ex......
-
National Labor Relations Board v. Carlisle Lumber Co.
...I refer to a statement of the rule in some of the more recent decisions of the Supreme Court. In Fullerton-Krueger Lumber Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry., 266 U.S. 435, 45 S.Ct. 143, 144, 69 L.Ed. 367, Justice McReynolds, speaking for the court, quoting from Harvey v. Tyler, 2 Wall. 328, 347, 17 L......
-
Mulligan v. Hilton
...v. David, Mass., 11 N.E.2d 461;Decker v. Pouvailsmith Corp., 252 N.Y. 1, 6, 168 N.E. 442;Fullerton-Krueger Lumber Co. v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 226 U.S. 435, 45 S.Ct. 143, 69 L.Ed. 367. Note,67 A.L.R. 297. That may have been the adequate ground of the sustaining of the demurrer. But ......