Lumsden v. Erstine

CourtArkansas Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtMCFADDIN, J.
CitationLumsden v. Erstine, 172 S.W.2d 409, 205 Ark. 1004 (Ark. 1943)
Decision Date07 June 1943
Docket Number4-7077
PartiesLUMSDEN v. ERSTINE

Appeal from Arkansas Chancery Court, Southern District; Harry T Wooldridge, Chancellor; reversed.

Cause reversed and remanded.

John W Moncrief, for appellant.

W. A Leach, for appellee.

MCFADDIN J. SMITH, J., dissenting.

OPINION

MCFADDIN, J.

This cause involves an attack upon a tax sale and confirmation proceedings. The property (80 acres) was sold or forfeited to the state in 1930 for taxes of 1929 and was certified to the state in 1932. In 1936, this tract of 80 acres, along with other lands, was confirmed to the state in a confirmation proceeding under act 119 of 1935. In 1939, the appellees received their deed from the state.

The lands had forfeited in 1930 in the name of Missouri State Life Insurance Company as the owner; and in 1938 the appellant, Lumsden, obtained his deed by mesne conveyances from the said owner. In 1939, the appellant filed suit to cancel the appellee's deed, and made due tender, and alleged a number of defects in the tax sale of 1930, one of which was that the lands sold for an excessive amount of costs.

The appellees in answering, defended the tax sale and pleaded the confirmation decree of 1936, under act 119 of 1935, in bar of the appellant's suit. In the trial before the chancery court the appellees stipulated: "These defendants admit that the aggregate amount for which the lands here involved were sold for the taxes due for the year 1929 included costs which were five cents in excess of the total costs permitted to be charged."

From the decree for the defendants the plaintiff has appealed. Several questions are argued, but the matter of excessive costs is determinative of the case.

At the outset, we point out that act 423 of 1941 does not apply in this case because the confirmation decree herein was in 1936; and this court held in Schuman v. Walthour, 204 Ark. 634, 163 S.W.2d 517: "We hold, therefore, that act 423 was not intended to and does not apply to confirmation decrees rendered prior to its passage, but only to those subsequently rendered."

Act 119 of 1935 has been before this court over a score of times. Reference is made to Shepard's Arkansas Citations for all the cases citing this act. Act 284 of 1937 and act 318 of 1939 contained amendments not touching the case at bar.

At the time of the confirmation decree, or within one year thereafter, many grounds of attack existed against the tax sale. Some cases involving attack within one year are: Hirsch and Schuman v. Dabbs and Mivelaz, 197 Ark. 756, 126 S.W.2d 116; Billert v. Phillips, 198 Ark. 698, 130 S.W.2d 715; Holt v. Reagan, 201 Ark. 1101, 148 S.W.2d 155; Luebke v. Holtzendorff, 203 Ark. 141, 157 S.W.2d 770; Hollaway v. Jordan, 203 Ark. 216, 156 S.W.2d 205; Schuman v. Hughes, 203 Ark. 395, 156 S.W.2d 804; Wilson v. Fraps, 204 Ark. 444, 162 S.W.2d 561; Gottfried v. Johnson, 204 Ark. 552, 163 S.W.2d 162.

After the lapse of a year from the confirmation proceedings, all irregularities and defects are cured except those that go to the power to sell. Cases where irregularities and defects were so cured are: Ingram v. Blackmon, 202 Ark. 769, 152 S.W.2d 315; Kirk v. Ellis, 192 Ark. 587, 93 S.W.2d 139; Berry v. Davidson, 199 Ark. 276, 133 S.W.2d 442; Redfern v. Dalton, 201 Ark. 359, 144 S.W.2d 713; Faulkner v. Binns. Trustee, 202 Ark. 457, 151 S.W.2d 101.

In the case at bar we are considering an attack made more than one year after the confirmation decree and going to the power to sell. Some cases involving that situation are: Powell v. Coggins, 204 Ark. 739, 164 S.W.2d 891; Fuller v. Wilkinson, 198 Ark. 102, 128 S.W.2d 251; Dansby v. Weeks, 199 Ark. 497, 135 S.W.2d 62; Kaplan v. Scherer, ante, p. 554, 169 S.W.2d 660.

In Fuller v. Wilkinson, 198 Ark. 102, 128 S.W.2d 251, it was held that act 119 of 1935 was not a statute of limitations, but a curative statute intended to cure "any and all defects in the sale not related to the power to sell." In Faulkner v. Binns, Trustee, 202 Ark. 457, 151 S.W.2d 101, it was again held that a confirmation under act 119 of 1935, and a lapse of one year thereafter cuts off all defects in a tax sale "where the power to sell exists."

In both cases it was recognized and declared that after the confirmation and the lapse of a year (it might be two years for persons out of the jurisdiction of the United States by reason of the amendment of 1939) all defects in the tax sale are cut off except those defects that go to the "power to sell." So, in order to see what defects can successfully be urged after the confirmation and the lapse of a year, we have to see what defects defeat the power to sell; and this involves a study of (a) what is the power to sell; and (b) what defects defeat the power to sell.

The "power to sell" presupposes a valid statute, and a valid procedure thereunder. In Black on Tax Titles (2d Edition) § 152, in discussing "Foundations of the power to sell land," it is stated: "When we remember the character of inviolability which all just and enlightened governments impute to private property in land, and the sacred regard for such ownership which is manifested in the genius of the common law and the spirit and letter of our constitutions, it is evident that no other solution of the question will bear the test of searching inquiry. The state, therefore, lays a tax upon land, . . . and the same authority gives it power to collect the burden thus imposed. . . . Yet this right, like all others appertaining to the state, is not without checks and limitations. The seizure and sale must not be arbitrary or unwarranted. Sovereignty imports no power to deprive the citizen of his property except in pursuance of law and for a lawful demand. Where just and legal condemnation ends, confiscation begins. Hence the tax itself must be lawful, and be legally assessed and levied; the land must be such as is liable to contribute; and the owner must be fairly in default. Moreover, the statutes must prescribe regular and orderly processes, and these must be followed with scrupulous exactness by those who are charged with them, and every reasonable opportunity must be afforded to the taxpayer to protect himself from illegal exaction or to save himself from the consequences of his inadvertence or neglect. This being understood, we are entitled to say that laws providing for the sale of lands for nonpayment of taxes are not unconstitutional."

And to the same general effect, see Cooley on Taxation (4th Edition) §§ 1381 and 1382. From these authorities, it may reasonably be said that the "power to sell" requires the concurrent existence of certain essentials, such as (a) a valid law; (b) a lawful tax; (c) legally assessed and levied; (d) on land liable to tax; and (c) the owner fairly in default.

We proceed then to consideration of what specific defects defeat the power to sell; and Black on Tax Titles (2d Edition) lists at least five specific defects, any one of which defeats the power to sell. These are:

I. A void description of the property defeats the power to sell. As Mr. Black says in § 172: "When tax proceedings are taken against the land itself, with no personal notice to the owner, it is generally agreed that the collector's notice or petition for judgment must contain a reasonably certain description of the land, such as to admit of its identification. And this requirement is jurisdictional, and goes to the validity of the judgment."

This court has held that a void description defeats the power to sell, and confirmation proceedings cannot cure this defect. Dansby v. Weeks, 199 Ark. 497, 135 S.W.2d 62, and Powell v. Coggins, 204 Ark. 739, 164 S.W.2d 891.

II. A void tax defeats the power to sell; and if any part of the tax is illegal then the entire power to sell is defeated. Mr. Black, in § 230, of his work, says: "One of the most important principles announced by the authorities under the general rule above stated is this: If land is sold for taxes, a part of which are legal and a part illegal, the sale is void in toto. Thus it is said: 'Whenever a tax is invalid because of excess of authority or because the requisites in tax proceedings which the law has provided for the protection of the taxpayer are not complied with, any sale of the property based upon it will be void also. . . . And if property is sold for the satisfaction of several taxes anyone of which is unauthorized, or for any reason illegal, the sale is altogether void.' Cooley's Constitutional Limitation, 521. . . . It is also to be observed that it is entirely immaterial how small may be the illegal element that enters into the demand."

It will be observed that Mr. Black quotes Judge COOLEY as additional authority. This court has held that the inclusion of an illegal tax defeats the power to sell, and confirmation proceedings cannot cure the defect. Some such cases are: Fuller v. Wilkinson, 198 Ark. 102, 128 S.W.2d 251; Smart v. Alexander, 201 Ark. 211, 144 S.W.2d 25; Sherrill v. Faulkner, 200 Ark. 1006, 142 S.W.2d 229.

III. If the property is not subject to taxation, then there is no power to sell. In § 267 of Black on Taxation, it is stated that there is no power to sell public property and other property not subject to taxation. This court has so held. Kaplan v. Scherer, ante, p. 554, 169 S.W.2d 660; Winn v. Little Rock, 165 Ark. 11, 262 S.W. 988.

IV. Excessive charges defeat the power to sell. In § 232 of Black on Tax Titles, the author quotes Cooley on Taxation "'The statutory power is a power to sell for lawful taxes and lawful expenses, and if it is exceeded by including unlawful items of either class, the power is exceeded, and its exercise is invalid in toto, from the manifest impossibility of...

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36 cases
  • Burbridge v. Bradley Lumber Co., of Arkansas
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • November 22, 1948
    ... ... cases as Lambert v. Reaves, [214 Ark. 140] ... 194 Ark. 1109, 110 S.W.2d 503 and 112 S.W.2d 33; ... Lumsden v. Erstine, 205 Ark. 1004, 172 ... S.W.2d 409, 147 A. L. R. 1132; Carle v ... Gehl, 193 Ark. 1061, 104 S.W.2d 445, and cases ... following ... ...
  • Plant v. Johnson
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • February 26, 1945
    ...decree of November 10, 1942, in this case was nil, unless Act No. 423 of 1941 gives it some force. This act was not involved in Lumsden v. Erstine, as we there "At the outset, we point out that Act 423 of 1941 does not apply in this case because the confirmation decree herein was in 1936; a......
  • Terry v. Starks, 5-11
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • March 30, 1953
    ...and with the 'power to sell' defeated, the 1939 confirmation (under Act No. 119 of 1935) was of no force. See Lumsden v. Erstine, 205 Ark. 1004, 172 S.W.2d 409, 147 A.L.R. 1132. As regards delinquent State taxes and delinquent Improvement District benefits on the same land, the relative rig......
  • Wood v. Gordon
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • November 20, 1944
    ...his disapproval of that case, and calls upon this court to overrule it. The rule there announced is the law. Many times prior to the Lumsden-Erstine opinion, we had declared decrees of confirmation had in accordance with the provisions of Act 119 of 1935 barred all rights except those going......
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