Luna v. Cerrillos Coal R. Co.

• Decision Date: 04 February 1911
• Citation: 113 P. 831,16 N.M. 71,1911 -NMSC- 011
• Parties: LUNA v. CERRILLOS COAL R. CO.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

113 P. 831

16 N.M. 71, 1911 -NMSC- 011

LUNA v. CERRILLOS COAL R. CO.

Supreme Court of New Mexico

February 4, 1911

Rehearing Denied March 4, 1911.

Syllabus by the Court.

If, at the trial of a cause without a jury in a district court, the party requests the court to make findings of fact as provided by section 2999, Comp. Laws 1897, and in any appropriate way before the rendition of the judgment, makes known to the court that he desires specific findings, and on what points he desires them, the court should make findings of the essential or determining facts on which its conclusion in the case was reached, specific enough to enable this court to review its decision on the same ground on which it was made.

Wright J., dissenting.

Action by Solomon Luna against the Cerrillos Coal Railroad Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed and remanded.

Frank W. Clancy, for plaintiff in error.

T. B Catron, for defendant in error.

ABBOTT J. (after stating the facts as above).

We have first to determine whether the attorney for the plaintiff duly and seasonably made known to the trial court his desire to have the court make specific findings of fact. His written request was for findings required by the statute (section 2999, Comp. Laws 1897), without stating in so many words that he desired them to be specific. We understand the practice of the district courts of the territory generally to be that in such cases the trial judge asks the attorney who has requested findings to make a draft of such findings as he desires, and submit it to the court and the opposing counsel. It does not appear that this course was followed in the present instance, but instead the court made the findings which have been cited from the record. To them the plaintiff's attorney filed objections so specific as fully to apprise the court of the findings he desired to have made, and when these objections were overruled, he excepted and moved to have the findings which had been made set aside, and for a new trial, on the ground, with others, that the findings were insufficient, which motions were overruled. All this was before judgment, and we think gave the trial court full opportunity to make specific findings, if it had thought proper to do so; and we think the plaintiff thereby became entitled to specific findings of fact, as he would have been upon a direct request for such findings. We are not unmindful of the many decisions from other jurisdictions brought forward in behalf of the defendant in support of its contention to the contrary. What we have to say on the subject, in discussing the other branch of the case, will apply in great measure on the question now under consideration.

Besides, the meaning of the provision in question has been twice considered by this court in recent cases. It was not necessary, in either case, to make a direct decision on the point now before us, but in Radcliffe v. Chavez (January, 1910) 110 P. 699, the court said: "We have recently held in Bank of Commerce v. Baird Mining Co., 13 N.M. 431 , that such failure (to file special findings of fact) where such findings are not specially requested, or the omission to make them called to the attention of the court by some appropriate motion, cannot be availed of as error." By fair inference the meaning is that, if the attention of the court is properly directed to the omission, special findings should be made.

We next inquire whether the findings made by the trial court satisfy the requirements of the statute when specific findings are requested. The material part of section 2999, supra, is as follows: "Upon the trial of any question of fact by the court, its decision must be given in writing, and in such decision the court shall find the facts and give its conclusions of law pertinent to the case, which must be stated separately, but the finding of facts and the giving of conclusions of law may be waived by the several parties to the issue, by suffering default or by failing to appear at the trial, or by consent in writing, or by oral consent in open court, entered in the record. And upon the trial of any cause by the court, without a jury in common-law cases, each party shall have the right to make all objections and take all exceptions that he might have made or taken, as if the trial had been before a jury; and upon a review, by a writ of error, in the Supreme Court, or by appeal, the said Supreme Court shall hear and determine the said cause in the same manner and with the same effect as if it had been tried before a jury."

The able and exhaustive brief for the defendant makes it clear that such findings have been held sufficient by some courts of last resort whose decisions are, in general, entitled to high respect. Indeed, we will not question that the weight of authority by decided cases is in favor of its sufficiency, and that the trial court, in view of that condition, was justified, in holding as it did on the question. But, by our decision in this case, we are to determine the practice for this jurisdiction on the point involved, as there has been no direct decision of the question by this court. Having a clean slate before us, what we are to write on it becomes of special importance. It should be dictated by reason, and not by precedent, if the two conflict. In the interest of uniformity and certainty, we must, of course, follow the decisions heretofore made by this court, until they are overruled, and the decisions of the United States courts, which have appellate jurisdiction of decisions of this court, are of controlling force for us. But the mere fact that some courts somewhere have decided a certain question a certain way should not coerce our judgment or blind our vision of the question itself. By this it is not meant that we should throw away or disregard the results of the researches of the many strong men, the fruits of whose labors as judges are the valued possession of all who use them, but only that we should not subject our own judgments to the spell of reverence for precedent simply because it is precedent.

In this case we have the statute before us. What does it mean? Doubt as to its construction would hardly have obtruded, unless invited. Once introduced in some one of the numerous appellate...