Luna v. N. Babylon Teacher's Org.
| Decision Date | 07 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 13–cv–6308 ADSWDW.,13–cv–6308 ADSWDW. |
| Citation | 11 F.Supp.3d 396 |
| Parties | Elizabeth LUNA, Plaintiff, v. NORTH BABYLON TEACHER'S ORGANIZATION and Selina Durio, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Eric S. Tilton, P.L.L.C., by: Eric S. Tilton, Esq., of Counsel, Babylon, NY, for the Plaintiff.
New York State United Teachers, Office of General Counsel, Richard E. Casagrande, New York, NY, by: Steven A. Friedman, Esq., of Counsel, for the Defendants.
On November 14, 2013, the Plaintiff Elizabeth Luna (the “Plaintiff”) commenced this action, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”) and New York State Human Rights Law, New York Executive Law § 290 et seq.
(“NYSHRL”) arising from the termination of her employment as Election Chair for the Defendant North Babylon Teachers Organization (the “Union”). Also named as a Defendant is the Union's President, Selina Durio (“Durio”).
On February 6, 2014, the Union and Durio (collectively the “Defendants”) moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ.P.”) 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons set forth, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Unless stated otherwise, the following facts are drawn from the complaint and construed in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff.
The Plaintiff is employed as a teacher in the North Babylon School District. As such, the Plaintiff is a member of the Union, the recognized exclusive bargaining agent for more than 650 district employees.
Beginning in 2006, the Plaintiff served as an Election Representative for the Union.
Beginning in 2009, the Plaintiff served, in an unpaid capacity, as the District-wide Election Chairperson for the Union. The Plaintiff's duties as the Election Chair were to coordinate and carry out the Union's internal elections which were held in the spring of each year.
Also, beginning in 2009, the Plaintiff served as the Union's Political Action Chair, along with her husband, Kenneth Luna. This position was a paid position that offered the Plaintiff and her husband a stipend of $800 per year.
In December 2011, the Plaintiff's husband, also a member of the Union, informed Durio that the Plaintiff was pregnant and that her delivery date was approximately May 18, 2012.
On January 10, 2012, Durio allegedly emailed the Plaintiff and removed the Plaintiff from her position as the Election Chairperson for the upcoming Union election to be held on May 16, 2012. Specifically, she stated as follows: “Since you will be out for part of the Spring, I have chosen a new Election Chair for this year so that the election will be covered.” (Compl. ¶ 15.)
After the Plaintiff emailed Durio, voicing an objection to her removal as the Election Chair, Durio sent a follow-up email to the Plaintiff that stated:
(Id. ¶ 16.)
The Plaintiff alleges that Durio's emails reflected a “stereotypical assumption” that the Plaintiff would need to take time off from her work due to her pregnancy. In addition, the Plaintiff asserts that Durio failed to provide the Plaintiff and her husband with information critical to their jobs as the Co–Chairs of the Political Action Committee.
The Plaintiff insists that any need for her to take maternity leave from her employment with the school district would not have hindered her ability to serve as Election Chair or Co–Chair of the Political Action Committee for the Union.
At some point, the Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).
On July 11, 2013, the EEOC issued a finding of probable cause with respect to the Plaintiff's Charge of Discrimination. On August 20, 2013, the EEOC mailed to the Plaintiff a Notice of Right to Sue with respect to the Charge of Discrimination.
As noted above, on November 14, 2013, the Plaintiff commenced this action, asserting gender discrimination on the basis that the “Defendants have discriminated against [her] in the terms, conditions, and privileges of her employment and her union membership in that she has been removed from the aforementioned positions within the Union in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and New York State Human Rights Law.” (Id. ¶ 25.) The Plaintiff brings her Title VII claims against the Union only, and in two different capacities, as an “employer” and a “labor organization.” The Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief, including reinstatement to her positions within the Union.
On February 6, 2014, the Defendants moved pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In particular, the Defendants submits documentary evidence tending to show that the Union is not an “employer” subject to Title VII. The Defendants also contend that the Plaintiff's Title VII claim against the Union as a “labor organization” fails as a matter of law because her allegations are centered upon her alleged status as an employee of the Union, not as a member of the Union.
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a party's complaint survives a motion to dismiss when it “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). This standard is met “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. If the factual allegations “raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” a court should not dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a pleading to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). While Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations'[,] it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). The court's function “is merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof.” Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 375 F.3d 168, 176 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir.1980) ). “[T]he issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir.2001) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court “must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir.2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entm't, 592 F.3d 314, 321 (2d Cir.2010). However, “[c]onclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Achtman v. Kirby, McInerney & Squire, LLP, 464 F.3d 328, 337 (2d Cir.2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
To assess whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief, the Supreme Court has suggested a “two-pronged approach.” Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 161 (2d Cir.2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ). First, a court should begin “by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. Second, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.
Finally, when reviewing a motion to dismiss, “the court limits its considerations to: (1) the factual allegations in the complaint; (2) documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated in it by reference; (3) matters of which judicial notice may be taken; and (4) documents that are ‘integral’ to the complaint.” Davis v. NYC Dep't of Educ., No. 10–CV–3812, 2012 WL 139255, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2012) ; Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir.2002) ().
Title VII defines “employer” as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Thus, liability under Title VII does not extend to employers with fewer than fifteen employees. See Arculeo v. On–Site Sales & Marketing, LLC, 425 F.3d 193, 202–03 (2d Cir.2005) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial