LUNARDINI v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 3:09-cv-00461 (CSH).
Decision Date | 01 March 2010 |
Docket Number | No. 3:09-cv-00461 (CSH).,3:09-cv-00461 (CSH). |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Parties | Stephen M. LUNARDINI, Plaintiff, v. MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. |
Stephen M. Lunardini, Wilbraham, MA, pro se.
David B. Crevier, Katherine R. Parsons, Crevier & Ryan, LLP, Springfield, MA, for Defendant.
Plaintiff Stephen M. Lunardini, appearing pro se, has filed an employment discrimination complaint alleging "discrimination based on gender (male)." Compl. doc. # 3 at 2. His administrative grievance filed with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities ("CCHRO"), which is implicitly incorporated into his complaint by reference,1 also alleges a retaliation claim—although it is unclear whether Lunardini continues to press that claim.
To the extent that Lunardini's complaint alleges any state-law claims, defendant Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company ("MassMutual") has moved to dismiss those claims on jurisdictional grounds. MassMutual also moves to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, arguing that the federal claims are time-barred for two reasons, and that he fails to state a claim for constructive discharge. In the alternative, MassMutual argues that the form of Lunardini's complaint does not comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 10, and moves to dismiss the complaint without prejudice to refiling in a more conventional format.
For the reasons that follow, MassMutual's motion to dismiss is DENIED in part, as to Lunardini's timely federal claims for sex discrimination, and GRANTED in part, as to his untimely federal claims, and as to his state-law claims, to the extent he raises any. Lunardini is instructed that if he wishes to assert claims for discrimination or retaliation under Connecticut law, or if he wishes to plead facts that are sufficient in law to state a claim for a continuing violation, he must refile an amended complaint to that effect within thirty days of this Opinion and Order.
Taken in the light most favorable to him, Lunardini's complaint alleges the following:
Lunardini worked at MassMutual for more than eleven years. In the year 2000 he assumed management responsibility for a 24-person team, and three years later he assumed responsibility for a team of more sophisticated "New Business Case Managers." Compl. ex. "D" at 1 doc. # 3 at 7.
There came a time when Lunardini began working with Patricia O'Donnell, Assistant Vice-President of Life New Business. Prior to working with O'Donnell, Lunardini was "consistently rated average and above average in every performance objective and never received a below average rating." Id.
On May 15, 2006, O'Donnell delivered a written warning to Lunardini, to which he objected on the grounds that it had not been preceded by a proper verbal warning. O'Donnell claimed that she had delivered such a warning during Lunardini's 2005 year-end review, which had occurred two months earlier, in March 2006. Id. at 2.
In late May of 2006, following a staff meeting on May 25th, Lunardini and other peer managers were asked to resolve a delay in "policy output." Id. at 13. Lunardini claims that in a conversation with O'Donnell, she accused him of failing to "have the sense of urgency" in addressing the delay, even though he had done more work than two of his peers, and when he pointed this out, O'Donnell could not "stand being questioned or challenged." Id. at 13-14. Lunardini claims that Id. at 14.
At some point in June of 2006, Lunardini hired two male interns, which prompted O'Donnell to say to him, "So, you hired all guys huh?" Id. at 9. Lunardini felt this was a "sexist statement" that was inappropriate, because "it felt as though she expected me to hire women, like she was surprised that I would hire men and that was extremely offensive to me." Id.
After June 8, 2006, when Lunardini received his written warning, he and O'Donnell met on two occasions specifically to discuss his performance. At the first meeting, O'Donnell instructed Lunardini "to make a development grid for himself." Id. At the second meeting, Lunardini expected to review the development grid, but instead was met by a representative from Human Resources who gave him a probation letter. Id.2
Around August of 2006, Lunardini had conveyed his concerns regarding O'Donnell to MassMutual's Human Resources department. "Deadrick Baker, Vice President of Human Resources, was supposedly launching an investigation into my concerns about Patricia O'Donnell and the unfair treatment that I was receiving." Id. at 15.
At some point in September of 2006, Lunardini took a short-term disability leave from his position at MassMutual.3 He received a letter in early March saying that he "needed to return to work by March 14th." Id. at 11. When O'Donnell received news of his imminent return, she expressed disgust at a meeting "in front of the entire management team." Id. at 12. Lunardini claims that after learning of this reaction, "combined with the knowledge that she was trying to force another male manager out ... I was afraid and embarrassed to return to work knowing that my manager did not want me there and was just going to fire me shortly after my return." Id.
Lunardini believes that he conducted himself in a Id. at 6 doc. #3 at 12. By contrast, O'Donnell particularly favored another female employee, who was "able to get away with things that others would not." Id. at 10. And he alleges that while he was employed at MassMutual, O'Donnell Id. at 11. Furthermore, over a period of one and one-half years, three male managers (one of which was Lunardini himself), and one vice-president on O'Donnell's level, were "replaced by females that Tricia O'Donnell selected." Id. at 11.
Indeed, Lunardini alleges that O'Donnell favored three female Associate Directors, "all of whom she hired or promoted into management during 2005/2006." Id. at 14. She showed this favoritism in a variety of ways, such as by calling them by nicknames. When one of the Associate Directors was hired, O'Donnell said, "Isn't she adorable?", a comment that Lunardini found "inappropriate." Id.
MassMutual moves to dismiss this action under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that Lunardini's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for several reasons.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) must be decided on "facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken." Leonard F. v. Israel Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir.1999) (citation omitted); see also Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 509 (2d Cir.2007) . Facing a 12(b)(6) motion, all complaints must be construed liberally. See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir.2009). But pro se litigants are afforded much wider latitude: their complaints should be interpreted "to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir.1994); cf. also Triestman v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir.2006) ( ). The Second Circuit is particularly "mindful... to avoid hastily dismissing complaints of civil rights violations," including Title VII violations. Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 691 (2d Cir.2001).
In deciding a motion to dismiss, well-pleaded facts must be accepted as true and considered in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir.2007). The factual allegations made in the complaint "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint's allegations are true." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). This requires the complaint to contain "enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence" of the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ( ). The Supreme Court distinguishes between factual content and conclusory allegations, stating that when "bare assertions ... amount to...
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