Lund v. Hall

• Decision Date: 02 May 1997
• Docket Number: No. 950248,950248
• Parties: 316 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 Rallet C. LUND, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Elton W. HALL, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

Page 285

938 P.2d 285

316 Utah Adv. Rep. 22

Rallet C. LUND, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Elton W. HALL, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 950248.

Supreme Court of Utah.

May 2, 1997.

Jackson Howard and Leslie W. Slaugh, Provo, for plaintiff and appellant. ¹

Ray Phillips Ivie, Jeffery C. Peatross, and David N. Mortensen, Provo, for defendant and appellee.

RUSSON, Justice:

Plaintiff Rallet C. Lund appeals from a trial court order denying her motion for relief from summary judgment under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In denying her motion for relief, the trial court held that Lund's complaint was filed after the statute of limitations had run on her action and further concluded that the tolling provision of section 78-12-35 of the Utah Code did not apply. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

On January 12, 1989, plaintiff Rallet C. Lund and defendant Elton W. Hall were allegedly involved in an automobile collision, whereby Hall hit a vehicle from behind, which in turn hit Lund's vehicle from behind causing her physical injuries. Lund and Hall are covered by the same automobile insurance company, State Farm Insurance Company ("State Farm"). Subsequently, she received two letters from State Farm, both dated October 14, 1992. One letter described her "Personal Injury Protection" benefits, and the other stated: "Your State Farm policy and Utah law allow for the payment of reasonable and necessary treatment and expenses caused by this accident."

On January 18, 1994, Lund filed a complaint against Hall for her injuries, alleging that at all times Hall was a resident of Utah. The complaint was filed more than four years after the accrual of the cause of action alleged in her complaint and after the statute of limitations for a negligence cause of action had run. ²

On April 20, 1994, Hall moved for summary judgment, arguing that Lund's complaint should be dismissed for failure to file her claim within the applicable four-year statute of limitations. On May 20, 1994, Lund filed a memorandum in opposition to Hall's motion for summary judgment, asserting that a genuine issue of fact existed as to the running of the statute of limitations given that section 78-12-35 of the Utah Code allows for the tolling of the statute of limitation where the defendant leaves the state after the cause of action arises. Section 78-12-35 of the Utah Code provides:

Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out of the state, the action may be commenced within the term as limited by this chapter after his return to the state. If after a cause of action accrues he departs from the state, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.

(Emphasis added.) Lund asserted:

It is Plaintiff's belief that defendant has been out of the state of Utah during the four years prior to the filing of this action. When this action was initially filed, the statute of limitations was not pled as an affirmative defense, and was not raised by motion to dismiss. Plaintiff therefore has not had reason to investigate or conduct discovery regarding periods of time the defendant may have been out of state during the four years prior to the filing of the action. Before summary judgment is granted, plaintiff needs the opportunity to conduct discovery on this issue.

Lund further argued that the statute of limitations defense was not properly pled and therefore waived. She also argued that she had entered into settlement negotiations with Hall's insurer, State Farm, and thus Hall's asserting a statute of limitations defense was in bad faith.

On May 24, 1994, prior to requesting a decision on his motion for summary judgment, Hall, on May 24, 1994, moved to amend his answer to plead the statute of limitations defense. On June 14, 1994, the trial court granted Hall's motion to amend, and Hall amended his answer accordingly. On June 29, Hall submitted a request for a ruling on his motion for summary judgment. On September 30, 1994, the trial court granted Hall's motion for summary judgment. In its memorandum decision, the trial court stated:

The trial court finds that summary judgment should be granted because plaintiff's cause of action must fail as a matter of law. Plaintiff's complaint alleges that an automobile accident occurred on January 12, 1989, and that she sustained physical injuries as a result of that accident. Plaintiff's Complaint was filed on January 18, 1994; therefore the statute of limitations in this matter precludes the cause of action.

On October 11, 1994, Lund filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Lund On March 30, 1995, the trial court denied Lund's motion to reconsider, concluding that section 78-12-35 did not apply. The trial court stated in its memorandum decision:

                argued that she was "involved in on-going settlement negotiations" with State Farm "immediately prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations" and that State Farm had not provided her with notice of the running of the statute of limitations as required by law.  Lund further asserted that section 78-12-35 of the Utah Code requires that the statute of limitations be tolled for periods during which defendant was absent or departed from the state and that it was her "belief that defendant has been out of the state of Utah during the four years prior to the filing of this action."   She further stated:  "Relating back to the time when the first complaint was filed on January 22, 1993, Plaintiff filed her complaint approximately ten days after the applicable statute had run."   Accordingly, Lund asked the court for relief from the summary judgment to conduct discovery to determine whether defendant was in fact out of state during the four years prior to the running of the statute
                

As it appears that defendant was in the state at the time the cause of action in this matter accrued, the time of any absence from the state would not be tolled for the commencement of the action.

Lund subsequently filed her notice of appeal with this court.

On appeal, Lund argues that her motion to reconsider should have been granted on the grounds that (1) the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the State Farm letters supported her argument that defendant was estopped from raising the statute of limitations defense; and (2) the trial court's denial of her rule 60(b) motion was based on a mistaken interpretation of section 78-12-35 of the Utah Code. Accordingly, she asserts, summary judgment was inappropriate, and she should have been allowed more time to conduct discovery. ³

Hall responds that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment and thereby did not abuse its discretion in denying Lund's motion to reconsider. He asserts that the issue of estoppel was not properly raised below, and even if it had been, there is no evidence that Lund had entered into "third-party" negotiations with State Farm regarding a liability claim against Hall, but only two letters from State Farm to Lund regarding her own "first-party" claim for benefits under her own policy. Hall also asserts that this court has already held in Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P.2d 915 (Utah 1964), that the tolling provision of section 78-12-35 of the Utah Code does not apply where a defendant leaves the state after a motor vehicle accident but is still amenable to service of process. Furthermore, Hall argues, there was no evidence that he was out of state, nor did Lund file an affidavit stating additional discovery was needed as required by rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. ⁴

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the trial court's denial of a motion to reconsider summary judgment under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for abuse of discretion. Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1386 (Utah 1996). In reviewing such a motion, we accord no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law but review them for correctness.

ANALYSIS

In appealing the trial court's denial of her motion to reconsider summary judgment, Lund first argues that Hall should be estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense because the evidence gives rise to a Lund cites the case of Rice v. Granite School District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969), as support for her argument. In Rice, a woman allegedly fell off the bleachers while viewing a high school football game and suffered severe injuries. The woman notified the high school of the accident and was subsequently contacted by the school's insurance company. 23 Utah 2d at 24, 456 P.2d 159. The insurance company accepted responsibility for her injuries and assured her that she would be compensated for her expenses. The insurance company reassured her of this in two additional instances. Id. at 24-25, 456 P.2d 159. The fourth time plaintiff contacted the insurer, she was told her claim had been denied. Id. at 25, 456 P.2d 159. The plaintiff then contacted an attorney, who filed an action although the statute of limitations had expired. Id. We stated in Rice:

reasonable inference that she had begun settlement negotiations with Hall's insurer, State Farm. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Lund regarding two letters to Lund from State Farm, we cannot conclude that Lund and State Farm had entered into settlement negotiations with respect to a third-party claim Lund might have against Hall. At best, the two letters are evidence of State Farm's negotiations with Lund regarding her first-party claim for benefits against State Farm as her own insurer.

The question of whether negotiations for the compromise of a claim or debt will give rise to an estoppel against pleading the statute of limitations depends upon the character of the negotiations and the circumstances surrounding the parties. In the instant action, the facts, as asserted in plaintiff's affidavit, indicate that the adjuster for the insurance carrier admitted liability and...