Lund v. Schrader, 3995

• Citation: 492 P.2d 202
• Decision Date: 29 December 1971
• Docket Number: No. 3995,3995
• Parties: Anita M. LUND et al., Appellants (Plaintiffs below), v. Robert G. SCHRADER, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, et al., Appellees (Defendants below).
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming

Page 202

492 P.2d 202

Anita M. LUND et al., Appellants (Plaintiffs below), v. Robert G. SCHRADER, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, et al., Appellees (Defendants below).

No. 3995.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Dec. 29, 1971.

Robert R. Rose, Jr., Casper, for appellants.

Donald L. Painter, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellees.

Before McINTYRE, C. J., and PARKER, McEWAN, and GRAY, JJ.

Chief Justice McINTYRE delivered the opinion of the court.

Pursuant to the Wyoming School District Organization Law of 1969, §§ 21.1-105 to 21.1-135, W.S.1957, 1971 Cum.Supp., the county committee of Johnson County submitted a plan for the unification of the entire county into a single school district. The plan was approved by the state committee and trustees were elected for the unified district.

Certain citizens and taxpayers of the territory involved appealed to the district court of Johnson County according to the provisions of § 21.1-128, W.S.1957, 1971 Cum.Supp. The court upheld the unification and the action of the state committee in approving the plan. Thereupon the complainants have appealed to our court from the decision of the district court.

Appellants are contending the unification is unconstitutional and void for these reasons:

1. Section 21.1-118(f) of the organization law, insofar as it authorizes a county committee to allocate equitably the assets and debts of the districts affected by a plan of organization, offends Art. 3, § 37, Wyoming Constitution, which prohibits the delegation of power to any special commissioner, private corporation or association to levy taxes.

2. By 'spreading' the bonded indebtedness of two of the elementary districts, the county committee and state committee have levied taxes and imposed a bonded indebtedness in violation of Art. 3, § 37, and Art. 16, § 4, Wyoming Constitution.

3. The establishment of trustee residence areas with unequal population violates the one man, one vote rule announced by the United States Supreme Court.

Aside from the constitutional questions raised by appellants, they also claim the order of the state committee is void for the reason that applicable provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act were not followed.

We find the county committee failed to properly perform its duty of allocating equitably the assets and debts of the districts affected by the plan of organization, as required by § 21.1-118(f). Except for that, we are unpersuaded by any of the arguments advanced on behalf of appellants. In order to make our position clear, we will discuss in some detail each of the four assignments made.

Delegation of Power

Art. 3, § 37, Wyoming Constitution, provides:

'The legislature shall not delegate to any special commissioner, private corporation or association, any power to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvements, moneys, property or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, to levy taxes, or to perform any municipal functions whatever.'

Counsel for appellants has misquoted and misread this constitutional provision by using the term 'special commission' instead of the term 'special commissioner.' He then relies on Stewart v. City of Cheyenne, 60 Wyo. 497, 154 P.2d 355, 364, for the proposition that no tax can be levied by officers who are only appointed and have not been elected by the people. Counsel states the membership of both the county committee and state committee is appointive, except for the State Superintendent of Public Instruction who is a statutory member of the state committee.

It must be kept in mind that it was the duty of the county committee and not the state committee to prepare the plan of organization for Johnson County; ¹ and in this instance such duty was actually performed by the county committee. As we pointed out in Board of Trustees of School District No. 3 (Natrona County) v. District Boundary Board, Wyo., 489 P.2d 413, 416, the state committee can reject a plan of organization submitted by the county committee only if it fails to comply with the provisions of the Wyoming School District Organization Law of 1969.

We are shown no authority for considering the county committee a 'special commissioner' or a 'private corporation' or an 'association.' However, as indicated in the Stewart case, it has been held by a number of authorities, without reference to the constitutional provision here in question, that no tax can be levied by officers who are appointed and not elected by the people.

But we do not agree any power has been delegated to either the county committee or state committee to levy taxes. The function of the county committee, which is the only committee we need to be concerned with at this point, is merely to prepare and submit a plan of organization for a unified school district or unified school districts within the county. After unification, operation of a unified district is under the control and management of its broad of trustees-not the county committee. Neither the county committee nor state committee has anything to do with levying taxes or fixing the amount of revenue to be derived from taxation.

It is true, as pointed out by appellants' attorney, that the decision and order of the state committee with respect to the county committee plan recited that Districts No. 1 and No. 17 and the Johnson County High School District have bonded indebtedness of $224,000, $5,000 and $80,000, respectively; and all of such indebtedness is allocated most equitably by causing all area embraced in the unified district to be levied upon equally to retire this indebtedness.

Under its conclusions of law, the state committee stated debts of pre-existing districts may be assumed by the newly created district and be retired by a districtwide levy. Also, the state committee purported to order that the unified district would assume all the existing indebtedness of the pre-existing districts and pay and discharge the same as it becomes due 'in the manner provided by law by an equal levy made throughout the district.'

Despite his reference to the foregoing statements, which are lifted out of the state committee's order, counsel for appellants argues the state committee's power is confined to adopting the county committee's plan if such plan adheres to certain statutory standards, or to rejecting the plan in case it does not conform to the guidelines.

We have already made it clear we agree the state committee's power is so limited, and we so held in the case of Board of Trustees of School District No. 3 (Natrona County) v. District Boundary Board, heretofore referred to. Moreover, not only is the state committee's power limited as counsel suggests, but the county committee's power with respect to debts is limited as provided in § 21.1-118(f), i. e., 'To allocate equitably the assets and debts of the districts affected by the plan of organization.'

Thus, regardless of any surplus or unnecessary language used by the state committee in its order, it remains a fact that it has not and cannot levy taxes. The levying of taxes for school purposes has been and still is a function of the board of county commissioners in each county. ² We know of nothing in the Wyoming School District Organization Law of 1969 which changes procedures for the levying of taxes.

Spreading of Debt

Appellants contend spreading of the debts of two elementary districts (No. 1 and No. 17) over the entire county or unified district violates Art. 16, § 4, Wyoming Constitution, which provides, insofar as here pertinent:

'No debt in excess of the taxes for the current year shall, in any manner, be created by any county or sub-division thereof * * * unless the proposition to create such debt shall have been submitted to as vote of the people thereof and by them approved.'

This constitutional provision calls into question the constitutionality of § 21.1-118 (f) heretofore referred to. The statute states each county shall have the power and it shall be its duty:

'To allocate equitably the assets and debts of the districts affected by the plan of organization.'

We commence our consideration of this statute on the premise that courts have the duty to uphold the constitutionality of statutes which the legislature has enacted if that is at all possible; and any doubt must be resolved in favor of constitutionality. Steffey v. City of Casper, Wyo.,358 P.2d 951, 954. See also In re Opinion of the Justices, 4 Storey 366, 54 Del. 366, 177 A.2d 205, 211.

It occurs to us that the consolidation of separate school districts is somewhat akin to the merger of corporations. An equitable allocation of assets and debts is to be expected in any corporation merger, and such an adjustment is equally important in the merging of school districts. We should not construe the constitution as preventing an adjustment unless the language clearly prohibits an allocation of assets and debts.

In Elementary School Districts 2, 3 and 10, of Campbell County v. District Boundary Board (Campbell County), Wyo., 454 P.2d 237, 240, it was contended Art. 16, § 4, of the Wyoming Constitution prohibited debt spreading similar to that involved in the case now before us. We dismissed the contention in that case by saying it was tangential and not supported by cogent argument. That is not to say the argument is tangential in the present controversy, or without some respectable authority.

We call attention also to Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Byron School Dist. No. 1, 37 Wyo. 259, 260 P. 537, 540, where additional territory was annexed to the Byron school district for the specific purpose of increasing its bonding capacity. The annexation of the additional territory was approved even though it resulted in a spreading of the bonded debt of the old district to the new territory.

Language used in In re Fremont and Big Horn Counties, 8 Wyo. 1, 54 P. 1073, 1079, is somewhat significant, although the case had to do with the creation of a new county. The court said:

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