Lundeen v. Colvin
| Decision Date | 27 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:12-cv-04061-SLD |
| Parties | LOUANNA F. LUNDEEN, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
An administrative law judge denied Plaintiff Louanna Lundeen's application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. She appealed that denial to this Court. At issue are Lundeen's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 9, and the Commissioner's Motion for Summary Affirmance, ECF No. 10. For the reasons set forth below, Lundeen's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED, and the Commissioner's Motion for Summary Affirmance is GRANTED.
Lundeen filed a claim for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income on July 31, 2008, alleging disability beginning on February 8, 2008. Her claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration. Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") David Thompson held a hearing on October 22, 2010. ALJ Thompson found that Lundeen had three severe impairments—hydradenitis suppurativa (a skin disease), diabetes, and obesity—but determined that she has the Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC") to lift ten pounds frequently and twenty pounds occasionally, and stand for at least two hours during an 8-hour work day. ALJ Thompson also found that there were a significant number of jobs in the national economy thatLundeen could perform. On April 23, 2012, the Appeals Council denied Lundeen's request for review, making ALJ Thompson's decision final unless Lundeen filed a civil action in United States District Court. Lundeen has filed a civil action and seeks review of the ALJ's decision. Lundeen's arguments and all relevant medical evidence will be discussed below as needed.
The Court's function on review is not to try the case de novo or to supplant the ALJ's findings with the Court's own assessment of the evidence. See Schmidt v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 970, 972 (7th Cir. 2000); Pugh v. Bowen, 870 F.2d 1271, 1274 (7th Cir. 1989). Instead, the Court's role is to determine whether the ALJ's findings were supported by substantial evidence and whether the proper legal standards were applied. See Cannon v. Apfel, 213 F.3d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 2000). To determine whether substantial evidence exists, the court reviews the record as a whole but does not consider facts, reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts in evidence, or decide questions of credibility. See id. (citing Williams v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 1066, 1072 (7th Cir. 1999)). Substantial evidence is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Henderson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 507, 512 (7th Cir. 1999). Even if reasonable minds could differ concerning a disability determination, the ALJ's decision must be affirmed if it is adequately supported. See Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008). Indeed, "[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Although great deference is afforded to the determination made by the ALJ, the Court does not "merely rubber stamp the ALJ's decision." Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 593 (7thCir. 2002) (citations omitted). Rather, the ALJ's decision must "sufficiently articulate their assessment of the evidence to assure us that they considered the important evidence and to enable us to trace the path of their reasoning." Id. at 595 (quoting Hickman v. Apfel, 187 F.3d 683, 689 (7th Cir. 1999)). Further, the ALJ's decision must build an accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the ultimate conclusions. Id. "Although the ALJ need not discuss every piece of evidence in the record, he must confront the evidence that does not support his conclusion and explain why it was rejected." Indoranto v. Barnhart, 374 F.3d 470, 474 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Kasarsky v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 539, 543 (7th Cir. 2002)).
In order to be entitled to Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") and/or Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"), a plaintiff must show that her inability to work is medical in nature and that she is totally disabled. Economic conditions, personal factors, financial considerations, and attitudes of employers are irrelevant in determining whether a plaintiff is eligible for disability benefits. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566, 416.966. The establishment of disability under the Social Security Act is a two-step process.
First, the plaintiff must be suffering from a medically determinable physical or mental impairment, or combination of impairments, which can be expected to result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).
Second, there must be a factual determination that the impairment renders the plaintiff unable to engage in any substantial gainful employment. See McNeil v. Califano, 614 F.2d 142, 143 (7th Cir. 1980). This factual determination is made by using a five-step test. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.
The five-step test requires the ALJ to evaluate whether the plaintiff:
An affirmative answer at steps 1, 2, or 4 leads to the next step of the test. An affirmative answer at steps 3 or 5 leads to a finding that the plaintiff is disabled. Conversely, a negative answer at any point, other than at step 3, stops the inquiry and leads to a determination that the plaintiff is not disabled. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001). A negative answer at step 3 will require the ALJ to make a finding about the plaintiff's RFC based on all relevant medical and other evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). The RFC is then used at steps 4 and 5 to determine whether the plaintiff can perform past relevant work or can adjust to other work, respectively. Id.
The plaintiff has the burden of production and persuasion at steps 1 through 4. But once the plaintiff shows an inability to perform past work (step 4), the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the plaintiff is able to engage in some other type of substantial gainful employment (step 5). Tom v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 1250, 1252-53 (7th Cir. 1985).
Lundeen claims that the ALJ erred in several ways: by ignoring evidence of her hidradenitis suppurativa, chronic headaches, abdominal pain, and morbid obesity; and by failingto pose certain hypotheticals to the vocational expert ("VE"). Before discussing whether the ALJ erred, however, the Court addresses Lundeen's compliance with the local rules.
Local Rule 8.1(D) requires that a plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and memorandum of law "identify the statute, regulation or case law under which the Commissioner allegedly erred." CDIL-LR 8.1(D). Although Lundeen, through her counsel, purports to make this motion "under Local Rule 8.1(D)," she does not to satisfy it. The one-page motion and three-page brief—page counts that reflect generous rounding up—contain no citation to authority to support Lundeen's assertion that the ALJ erred. All they contain are citations to the record evidence and assertions that the ALJ failed to consider particular evidence and pose certain hypotheticals to the VE. Although these alleged errors may provide a basis for granting Lundeen's Motion for Summary Judgment, they were not presented within the legal framework required by Local Rule 8.1(D). Since the Government made no objection to Lundeen's memorandum, however, and was apparently able to infer her legal argument to the extent necessary to respond to it, the Court will not require Lundeen to rebrief her Motion for Summary Judgment.
RFC is an administrative assessment of what work-related activities an individual can perform despite her limitations. Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1178 (7th Cir. 2001). When determining a claimant's RFC, the ALJ must consider all of the claimant's impairments, including impairments that are not severe, to the extent that they are supported by the medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2). The ALJ must explain his RFC determination through a narrative discussion of the evidence by showing how the evidence supports each of hisconclusions. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 352 (7th Cir. 2005). But when the ALJ fails to explain his conclusions, reversal and remand are warranted. Id.
The ALJ found that Lundeen has the RFC to "lift up to ten pounds frequently and twenty pounds occasionally," "stand or walk at least two hours in an eight hour workday," and engage in "occasional postural activities," but that she must avoid "concentrated exposure to hazards in excess of those found in a typical residence." R. 18. The ALJ also found that there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that Lundeen could perform given her RFC. For example, she has the RFC to work as a ticket checker, telephone quote clerk, and order clerk for food and beverages. R. 24. Although Lundeen's brief provides only a skeletal outline of her claims, it is clear that she argues the ALJ erred in two ways. First, Lundeen claims that the ALJ erred by failing to consider certain evidence when assessing her RFC. By making this claim, Lundeen implicitly argues that the ALJ also erred by failing to support...
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