Lunders v. Estate of Snyder

Decision Date01 July 1998
Docket NumberNo. 23422,23422
PartiesDelbert LUNDERS and Lexie Lunders, doing business as United National Real Estate, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. The ESTATE OF Ellis R. SNYDER, deceased, Bessie A. Snyder, personal representative, and Bessie A. Snyder, in her individual capacity, Defendants-Appellants. Boise, April 1998 Term
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

John H. Bradbury, Lewiston, for Defendants-Appellants.

Dennis L. Albers, Grangeville, for Plaintiffs-Respondents.

TROUT, Chief Justice.

This case involves a commission due under a real estate listing agreement.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1990, Bessie and Ellis Snyder (Bessie, Ellis, or collectively, the Snyders) 1 sold a house and 200 acres in Weippe, Idaho. Delbert Lunders (Delbert) was the broker for the sale through the local United National Real Estate office. The sale was to Delbert's sister and her husband. Apparently there were no problems with this transaction. In 1993, the Snyders decided to sell an additional 320 acres of timber and pasture in Weippe. They again contacted Delbert. The Snyders signed an "Exclusive Authrization [sic] to Sell" agreement. The agreement stated that "United National representative is employed on an exclusive right to sell basis ..." The agreement also provided: "I agree to pay United National forthwith as commission 8 (eight)% percent of the selling price accepted by me." Delbert signed the agreement on the line marked "representative". Finally, the listing agreement indicated a selling price of $260,000.

Delbert and his wife, Lexie (the Lunders), began advertising the property in the local newspaper under the United National Real Estate logo. They also told Lexie's brother, Robert Blewett, also a real estate broker, about the property. Robert Blewett showed the property to his brother, Ron Blewett. On June 23 or 24, Robert Blewett walked the property with a timber cruiser to get an estimate of the value of the timber. Both Robert Blewett and the cruiser testified that they met and talked to Ellis during the timber cruise.

On June 24, Robert Blewett faxed an offer of $200,000 for the property from Ron Blewett to the Lunders. While there is some dispute as to whether that offer was ever conveyed to the Snyders, there is no question that it was not accepted and that Delbert did not make a record of the rejection of the offer.

The next activity took place two days later, when an earnest money agreement for the sale of the property to Ron Blewett at $240,000 was prepared and taken to the Snyders by Delbert and Lexie. There is again a dispute between the parties as to how that new sales price came to be set, with Lunders claiming that Ellis had called the night before and advised Lexie that he wanted an earnest money agreement prepared for $240,000 with $140,000 down. Bessie testified that the Lunders spent about five hours at their house going over the terms of the earnest money agreement. She also testified that at the time she signed the agreement she was aware that the buyer, Ron Blewett, was Lexie's brother. Ron Blewett accepted the $240,000 offer.

A few days later, the Snyders' grandson learned of the sale. He apparently thought the sale price too low and informed his grandparents of this fact. The next day the Snyders and their grandson met with the Snyders' attorney. Immediately after this meeting, the Snyders attempted to convey an easement to their grandson in order to cloud the title and so stop the sale. After the easement was filed, numerous letters and accusations were exchanged between the parties. Eventually, a meeting was held in which Ron Blewett agreed to rescind the sales agreement. Also during this time, the Snyders' attorney sent the Lunders a letter The Lunders filed suit for the 8% commission alleging breach of contract. The Snyders moved for summary judgment claiming that the listing agreement was with United National Real Estate and not the Lunders. In opposition to the motion, the Lunders filed an affidavit stating that United National was an assumed name of First Horizon Corp., and that First Horizon had filed an affidavit of assumed name in Lewis County which the Lunders also recorded in Clearwater County. In this affidavit, the Lunders stated that they were affiliates and representatives of First Horizon. At one point the affidavit also alleged that the Snyders were aware that the Lunders were agents of United National Real Estate. Based upon the disputed issues of fact, the Snyders' motion for summary judgment was denied.

stating that the Snyders were terminating the listing agreement.

The Lunders then moved to amend their complaint to add First Horizon Corp., d/b/a United National Real Estate as an additional party plaintiff. This motion was granted. Subsequently, the Snyders filed a motion to amend their answer to include counterclaims for breach of contract, breach of warranty of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, and punitive damages. The district judge granted the motion to amend. The Snyders then reached a settlement with First Horizon which was dismissed with prejudice. Following the dismissal, the Snyders renewed their motion for summary judgment, again asserting that the Lunders individually had no right to a commission based upon the wording of the listing agreement. In opposition to the renewed motion, the Lunders filed another affidavit in which they stated that they also did business under the name United National and had filed an affidavit of assumed name. The district judge granted the Snyders' motion for summary judgment, but gave the Lunders ten days to file affidavits creating a genuine issue of material fact. The Lunders then filed a supplemental affidavit stating that they operated their real estate business on their own behalf and not as agents of First Horizon. The affidavit further stated that Delbert had entered into the listing agreement on his own behalf. The district judge then denied the Snyders' summary judgment motion.

A jury trial was held. The Snyders moved for a directed verdict at the end of the Lunders' case in chief and that motion was denied. The jury returned a special verdict in favor of the Lunders for $5,760, the portion of the commission they would have received from the sale after deductions for the shares due First Horizon and Robert Blewett as the buyer's broker. The jury found against the Snyders on all claims for relief in their counterclaim. The Snyders then moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (judgment n.o.v.) which was denied. A motion to reconsider was likewise denied. The Lunders then moved for attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3). The court awarded attorney fees in the amount of $21,779.85. The Snyders timely appealed.

On appeal, the Snyders argue that the district judge erred in not granting their motions for summary judgment, directed verdict, and judgment n.o.v. The Snyders also challenge the district judge's refusal to give the jury instructions submitted by the Snyders and claim the district judge abused his discretion in allowing Leanne Woslum and Delbert to testify as experts, and by allowing testimony as to what Ellis had said about the sale. Finally, the Snyders challenge the district judge's award of attorney fees.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). On review, this Court uses the same standard as the trial court and "liberally construes the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor." Friel v. Boise City Housing Auth., 126 Idaho 484, 485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994) (citations omitted).

The Snyders argue that the district judge erred in not granting summary judgment The Snyders argue that the use of the word "representative" in the listing agreement creates an agency relationship and that the term "United National" unambiguously refers to First Horizon Corp. The Snyders further claim that even if the listing agreement was ambiguous, the original affidavit filed by Delbert established that United National referred to First Horizon and that the Lunders were acting solely as the agents of First Horizon.

because, based on the wording of the listing agreement and Delbert's original affidavit, there was no question that the Lunders were acting only as the agents of First Horizon, d/b/a, United National Real Estate. Thus, the Snyders argue, once First Horizon settled, the district judge should have dismissed the action. The Snyders further contend that the district judge should not have considered the supplemental affidavit filed by Delbert because it directly conflicted with the original affidavit. The Lunders, in contrast, claim there was a genuine issue as to who the parties to the listing agreement were, and so the district judge properly denied the motion for summary judgment.

"The interpretation of a contract's meaning is a question of law when the contract is clear and unambiguous. Where a contract is determined to be ambiguous, the interpretation of the document is a question of fact which focuses upon the intent of the parties." Ada County Assessor v. Taylor, 124 Idaho 550, 553, 861 P.2d 1215, 1218 (1993). "If a contract is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation, it is ambiguous...." Rutter v. McLaughlin, 101 Idaho 292, 293, 612 P.2d 135, 136 (1980) (citations omitted). The agreement states that "United National representative is employed...." The agreement does not define either of the terms "representative" or "United National". The Snyders contend that the original affidavit filed by Delbert admits that the term United National refers only to First Horizon and that an agency relationship existed between the Lunders and First...

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