Lundy v. George Brown & Co.

• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM.
• Citation: Lundy v. George Brown & Co., 93 N.J.L. 469, 108 A. 252 (N.J. 1919)
• Decision Date: 17 November 1919
• Docket Number: 35
• Parties: MARY LUNDY, WIDOW OF PATRICK LUNDY, DECEASED, RESPONDENT, v. GEORGE BROWN & COMPANY, A CORPORATION, APPELLANT

108 A. 252

LUNDY

v. GEORGE BROWN & CO.

No. 35.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Nov. 17, 1919.

Appeal from Supreme Court.

Proceeding by Mary Lundy, under the Workmen's Compensation Act (P. L. 1911, p. 134), to obtain compensation for the death of her husband, Patrick Lundy, deceased, opposed by George Brown & Co., the employer. There was an award of compensation, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court (106 Atl. 362), and the employer appeals. Affirmed.

M. Casewell Heine, of Newark, for appellant.

Edward M. & Runyon Colie, of Newark, for respondent.

PER CURIAM. This was an action in the Essex common pleas under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and resulted in a finding and judgment in favor of petitioner and against the respondent. On certiorari from the Supreme Court the judgment of the common pleas was affirmed, and the appellant, who was the prosecutor in certiorari, now appeals to this court.

In our judgment the case was rightly decided in the common pleas, and in the Supreme Court on appeal. Four grounds of appeal are stated in this court, when only one should have been, namely, that the Supreme Court erred in giving judgment for the defendant respondent, instead of for the prosecutor appellant. See State v. Verona (No. 24, June term, 1919) 108 Atl. 250. The fourth ground of appeal really comprehends the other three, and is that the Supreme Court erred in holding that there was evidence to support the finding of the common pleas that the death of respondent's decedent proximately resulted from an injury received in the course of and arising out of his employment. That was the question decided by the Supreme Court, which tribunal, after examination, observed that they thought there was evidence which fully justified the finding of the court below; that the medical testimony was in sharp conflict on the question whether the decedent died as a result of the injury or from an entirely independent cause; and they thought that an inference might be properly drawn from the evidence that the nature of the decedent's injury was of such seriousness as to greatly impoverish his system and predispose it to an infection of tuberculosis, of which there was not the slightest indication before the injury, and that it was difficult to escape the conclusion that the cause of death was an incident resulting from the accident.

On behalf of the appellant prosecutor it is urged that lay testimony is incompetent to establish the cause of death from symptoms and conditions resulting from injuries. But that question need not be decided, as the record discloses that there...