Lundy v. George Brown & Co.

• Decision Date: 18 March 1919
• Citation: 106 A. 362
• Parties: LUNDY v. GEORGE BROWN & CO.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

106 A. 362

LUNDY

v. GEORGE BROWN & CO.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

March 18, 1919.

Certiorari to Court of Common Pleas, Essex County.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act (P. L. 1911, p. 134, as amended by P. L. 1913, p. 309), by Mary Lundy to obtain compensation for the death of Patrick Lundy, her husband, opposed by George Brown & Co., employer. There was an award in favor of petitioner, and the employer brings certiorari. Affirmed.

Argued November term, 1918, before BERGEN, KALISCH, and BLACK, JJ.

M. Casewell Heine, of Newark, for prosecutor.

Edward M. & Runyon Colie, of Newark, for defendant.

KALISCH, J. The single question presented here is whether there was any evidence in the case on review justifying the court below to make a finding that the death of petitioner's decedent was the result of injuries received by him in an accident admitted to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment.

The prosecutor's contention is that there was no such evidence.

The petitioner's husband was injured on December 19, 1916. He died on February 21, 1918, about 14 months after the accident. On December 18, 1917, Patrick Lundy, the petitioner's decedent, had filed his petition for compensation to which the prosecutor, on February 6, 1918, filed its answer. Before the day set for the hearing, Lundy died. On May 15, 1918, Mary Lundy, his widow, filed her petition setting forth that the estate of Patrick Lundy was entitled to compensation from September 17, 1917, to February 21, 1918, the date of his death for his disability during that period as the result of said accident. The petitioner further prayed for compensation for the death of her husband as a result of the accident, according to the fixed schedule of compensation in such cases, and for an allowance of $100 for funeral expenses. To this petition the prosecutor filed its answer, on May 15, 1918, in which it denied that the death of petitioner's decedent was caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Subsequently, by consent in writing of the prosecutor's attorney, an order was entered that the petitioner be admitted as a party petitioner; she having been appointed administratrix of the estate of her husband on August 5, 1918.

The prosecutor's sole contention in the court below was, and now reiterated here is, as follows:

"Mr. Heine: My contention is that the death was due to a rheumatic cardiac disease, which had a secondary or contributing cause in rheumatism. That the cause of death was from a disease in no way connected with the traumatism received as a result in any way from the accident. That is the question, whether the death resulted in any way from the accident."

On that branch of the inquiry, the court below found that as a result of the accident the petitioner's decedent "sustained serious injuries, among other things a fracture of most of the ribs on the left side of his body, and that as the result of said injuries received in said accident he died on February 21, 1918."

It is this finding which counsel of prosecutor contends is not supported by any evidence.

Of course, if the testimony or circumstances adduced do not fairly give rise to a...