Lundy v. Yost

Decision Date04 January 2011
Docket NumberNo. 08-4190,08-4190
PartiesREGINALD DAVID LUNDY, Appellant v. JOHN YOST
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

REGINALD DAVID LUNDY, Appellant
v.
JOHN YOST

No. 08-4190

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Filed: January 4, 2011


NOT PRECEDENTIAL

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
D.C. Civil Action No. 07-cv-4180
(Honorable Jerome B. Simandle)

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 4, 2010

Before: SCIRICA, FUENTES and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.

Reginald Lundy appeals the District Court's denial of his motion to vacate an order of civil contempt under which he is incarcerated. The order of civil contempt

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resulted from Lundy's continued refusal to cease violating a court order that he desist from filing false and harassing documents purporting to establish judgments and lien claims against the court, United States attorneys, defense attorneys, and other personnel affiliated with the court. The order was entered in an underlying criminal proceeding in which he was convicted of conspiracy to produce and pass, and of possessing and passing, fraudulent financial documents represented as issued by agencies of the United States, and sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment. But Lundy's criminal sentence, set to run consecutively to confinement under the civil contempt order, has yet to begin because Lundy continues to engage in contemptuous conduct and so has been imprisoned under the order of civil contempt since June 7, 2004. We will affirm.

I.

The facts of the underlying criminal case and contemptuous conduct are well-known to the parties and well-documented in various district court opinions, see, e.g., United States v. Harris, 332 F. Supp. 2d 692, 694 & 694 n.1 (D.N.J. 2004), and in a related case involving Lundy's co-conspirator and co-contemnor's appeal, see United States v. Harris, 582 F.3d 512 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming denial of motion to vacate order of civil contempt). Defendants in the underlying case purport to be members of an organization called the Al-Moroccan Empire or Moors, and claim to believe they are sovereigns of an empire that predates the United States, to which the United States owes rent money for the use of land, and because of which the United States cannot subject defendants to its criminal laws. Harris, 332 F. Supp. 2d at 694. Defendants printed

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money orders, purporting to draw from accounts at the United States Department of Transportation or Department of the Treasury, which defendants used to pay outstanding loans and other expenses. On May 6, 2003, Lundy was charged with conspiracy to produce and pass false and fictitious money orders, and with possessing or passing, with the intent to defraud, fictitious securities or other financial instruments represented as authorized by the United States Department of Transportation and the United States Department of the Treasury, in violation of, respectively, 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. § 514(a).

After the indictment, Lundy and other of the defendants began to harass the court and prosecutors by sending, among other things, fraudulent financial security arrangements, contracts, and lien claims. On August 27, 2003, the court entered an order enjoining Lundy and other co-defendants from "sending any written communications to this Court, to any judicial officer or employee of this Court, to the United States Attorney, to any Assistant United States Attorney, to any employee or officer of the United States Department of Justice, or to any attorney appearing in this case, whether in an official or allegedly 'private' capacity... [w]hich attempts to create a lien or financial interest; or... [w]hich purports to state a contract with such recipient regarding any civil or commercial matter," and from "creating affidavits of debt or UCC Financing Statements... based upon the above-described security agreements or contracts or liens however entitled." Lundy continued to send bogus financial documents and the Court issued an order of contempt on June 7, 2004, finding Lundy in civil contempt of the

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August 27, 2003, injunction. Under the contempt order, Lundy was to be confined until he purged his contempt by, among other things, ceasing to send such documents to the court and others associated with the case, and by renouncing any future intent to recommence.

Lundy was jointly tried and, on July 2, 2004, convicted with codefendants William Oscar Harris, Reginald Wooten, Arthur Outterbridge, and Robert McCurdy. On October 29, 2004, Lundy was sentenced to a total term of 120 months imprisonment, set to run consecutively to his confinement under the civil contempt order of June 7, 2004. (District Court *3.) Lundy and his co-defendants appealed, and the Third Circuit affirmed the judgments of sentence, see United States v. Harris, 271 F. App'x 188, 190 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding "each of the issues raised by appellants is without merit"), and denied Lundy's petition for rehearing en banc. Despite the conclusion of Lundy's criminal case, because Lundy has continued to mail fraudulent financial demands, contracts, and claims, he remains imprisoned under the contempt order, tolling the running of his criminal sentence.

Lundy filed a motion to vacate the court's contempt order on August 31, 2007. Lundy argued that the enactment of a federal criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1521, 1

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criminalizing the filing or attempted filing in any public record of false lien claims against "any officer or employee of the United States or of any agency in any branch of the United States Government"—certain of the conduct for which Lundy is being held in contempt—removed any justification for the contempt order because if the "statute itself does not deter Mr. Lundy's mailings, then prosecution under section 1521 would more effectively and more appropriately target Mr. Lundy's conduct than would the Contempt Order." In reply, the government argued that Lundy's persistent and "knowing defiance of the Court's orders should not be rewarded through the dissolution of the Contempt Order simply because [Lundy's] contumacious behavior is persistent." Furthermore, the government contended that the conclusion of Lundy's criminal case had not eliminated the need for the contempt order, which was entered for "general law enforcement purposes," and not for "evidentiary, trial-related or other purposes tied to the pendency of the proceeding."

The District Court's findings of fact included that Lundy (1) possessed the competency to understand the nature of and bring himself into compliance with the order of contempt; (2) had not purged himself of his contempt by ceasing to send false and

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fraudulent financial demands, contracts and claims, and had indicated he did not intend to cease; (3) had not been deterred by 18 U.S.C. § 1521 from mailing financially threatening documents; and (4) had been able to subvert whatever measures the Bureau of Prisons had in place to prevent such abuses of the mail system.

The District Court reasoned "the Contempt Order adjudged [Lundy] to be in civil contempt, and imposed the coercive sanction of imprisonment not to punish [Lundy's] past noncompliance with the Court's orders, but to compel future compliance." Although such orders "ordinarily abate when the proceedings out of which they arise are terminated," United States v. Slaughter, 900 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir. 1990), the District Court concluded the sustained application of the contempt order was...

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