Lupak v. Karalekas

• Decision Date: 14 June 1960
• Citation: 162 A.2d 180,147 Conn. 432
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Walter LUPAK v. George KARALEKAS. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 180

162 A.2d 180

147 Conn. 432

Walter LUPAK v. George KARALEKAS.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

June 14, 1960.

Samuel Engelman, Bridgeport, for appellant (defendant).

Louis M. Altman, Stamford, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before BALDWIN, C. J., and KING, MURPHY, MELLITZ and SHEA, JJ.

KING, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff was seated in his car, awaiting a change in the traffic light, when the car was struck in the rear by one operated by the defendant. While the defendant filed what amounted to a general denial and a special defense alleging contributory negligence, he later orally admitted liability. The trial therefore was limited to a hearing in damages. The jury returned a verdict of $30,000. The defendant appealed from the judgment, the sole assignment of error being the denial of his motion to set aside the verdict on the ground that it was excessive.

The considerations involved in an appeal such as this, and the governing rules, have been frequently stated. Of the recent cases, Desmarais v. Pinto, 147 Conn. 109, 110, 157 A.2d 596, and Pischitto v. Waldron, 147 Conn. 171, 175, 158 A.2d 168, may be mentioned. It would have been helpful if the court had written a memorandum of decision explaining its refusal to set aside the verdict, as was done, for instance, in Putney v. Lehigh Truck Equipment Corporation, 145 Conn. 731, 732, 141 A.2d 482, and Pischitto v. Waldron, supra, 147 Conn. 174, 158 A.2d 171. Even without such memorandum, however, the court's denial of the motion is entitled to considerable weight. Although we have not the reassurance which a carefully prepared memorandum would have furnished, we should assume that the court properly performed its function in passing upon the motion.

The defendant admits in its brief that the jury might have found special damages of close of $3,000; the plaintiff claimed that they were slightly over $3,200. Either figure leaves about $27,000 for general damages. The following claims of the defendant may merit discussion.

The jury were entitled to believe the medical testimony most favorable to the plaintiff. It was that of Dr. Louis Berg. The defendant attempts to have this court determine, as a medical proposition, that the testimony of Dr. Berg was incredible because he stated that the plaintiff suffered a postconcussion syndrome when the plaintiff himself had given no history of his head having struck anything. There was testimony by Dr. Berg that a concussion could have resulted from a contrecoup, caused by having the head snapped back and forth by the force of the impact. Owing to the interruption of the defendant's witness, Dr. Edwin H. Mulford, by the plaintiff's attorney and by the court in the course of cross-examination it is not entirely clear that Dr. Mulford agreed that a concussion by contrecoup was possible. We know of no rule of law, however, nor have we been referred to any, that medical testimony concerning a plaintiff must be disregarded by this court as incredible unless he is able to obtain substantiation for it from one or more of the defendant's medical witnesses. See Pischitto v. Waldron, supra, 147 Conn. 177, 158 A.2d 172; Triano v....