Lupatin v. Shine

• Decision Date: 02 January 1934
• Citation: 117 Conn. 698,169 A. 916
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: LUPATIN v. SHINE et al.

169 A. 916

117 Conn. 698

LUPATIN v. SHINE et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

January 2, 1934

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Alfred C. Baldwin Judge.

Action by John T. Lupatin against Elmer Shine and others to recover damages for injuries to plaintiff's person and property resulting from negligence. Verdict and judgment were for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.

No error.

Plaintiff's negligence materially contributing to produce injury prevents recovery.

Charles S. Hamilton and Edward S. Snyder, both of New Haven for appellant.

Maxwell H. Goldstein, of New Haven, William H. Tribou, of Hartford, T. Holmes Bracken, of New Haven, and Edward I. Taylor, of Hartford, for appellees.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, HINMAN, BANKS, and AVERY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages suffered when the automobile which he was operating came into collision with a coal truck owned by the defendant Shine which was backing or had backed into the street from a private driveway on premises where coal had been delivered. It was the claim of the plaintiff that the defendant Fred Shine, who was operating the truck, was at the time in the employment of the defendant the Domestic Coal Company. From a verdict for the defendants, the plaintiff has appealed assigning as error the failure to give certain requests to charge, certain portions of the charge as given, and certain rulings on evidence. The requests to charge were substantially and adequately included in the charge as given so far as they were relevant to the issues in the case and correct statements of law. Section 1639 of the General Statutes provides that no operator of a motor vehicle entering upon a public highway from a private way shall have the right of way. The plaintiff did not allege that the defendant driver was negligent in failing to yield the right of way to him, and the trial court went as far as was necessary in instructing the jury that the defendant driver did not have the right of way, without charging them that failure to yield the right of way might render the defendants liable to the plaintiff. The trial court was correct in instructing the jury that, if negligence of the plaintiff materially contributed to produce the accident, the plaintiff could not recover; negligence could not materially contribute to the accident without being a substantial factor in its...