Luphahla v. Marion County Sheriff's Dept.
| Decision Date | 02 July 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A02-0609-CV-752.,49A02-0609-CV-752. |
| Citation | 868 N.E.2d 1155 |
| Parties | Leanethi LUPHAHLA, Appellant-Plaintiff. v. MARION COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, Appellee-Defendant. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Swaray E. Conteh, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Lakshmi Hasanadka, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellee.
Plaintiff-Appellant Leanethi Luphahla appeals the trial court's grant of Defendant-Appellee Marion County Sheriff's Department's (Sheriff's Department) motion for judgment on the evidence.
We affirm.
Luphahla raises one issue for our review, which we restate as: whether the trial court erred by granting the Sheriff's Department's motion for judgment on the evidence.
On December 25, 2002, Luphahla was involved in an accident on Michigan Road in Indianapolis. She filed her complaint alleging that Marion County Sheriff Deputy David Loyal caused the accident by coming into her lane of travel, hitting her car and causing her injury. The Sheriff's Department filed its answer, affirmative defenses and counterclaim, in which it claimed that Luphahla crossed into oncoming traffic and hit Deputy Loyal's vehicle causing him injury.1 The cause went to trial. Following Luphahla's presentation of her case-in-chief, the Sheriff's Department moved for a judgment on the evidence. The trial court granted the Sheriff's Department's motion for judgment on the evidence, as well as the Sheriff's Department's motion to dismiss its counterclaim. Luphahla then filed a motion to correct error, which the trial court denied. This appeal ensued.
Luphahla contends that the trial court erred by granting the Sheriff's Department's motion for judgment on the evidence. She argues that the trial court failed to consider the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to her in making its decision to grant the Sheriff's Department's motion.
The decision to grant or deny a motion for judgment on the evidence is a matter within the broad discretion of the trial court, and, therefore, the trial court's determination will be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion. Stowers v. Clinton Central School Corp., 855 N.E.2d 739, 747 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied (2007). When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for judgment on the evidence, this Court uses the same standard as the trial court. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Noble, 854 N.E.2d 925, 931 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied (2007). Judgment on the evidence is proper where all or some of the issues in a case are not supported by sufficient evidence. See Ind. Trial Rule 50(A). We examine only the evidence most favorable to the non-movant, as well as the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. State Farm, 854 N.E.2d at 931. A motion for judgment on the evidence should be granted only when there is no substantial evidence supporting an essential issue in the case. Id. Judgment on the evidence is improper if there is evidence that would allow reasonable people to differ as to the result. Id.
Luphahla's case sounds in negligence. To establish a claim of negligence, a party must show (1) a duty, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) injury resulting from the breach. Bowman ex rel. Bowman v. McNary, 853 N.E.2d 984, 990 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006). Neither party argues that Deputy Loyal did not have some type of duty to Luphahla and other motorists on the road that day; rather, the disagreement exists with regard to the breach of that duty and the cause of Luphahla's injuries. Luphahla's case-in-chief consisted solely of Luphahla's testimony and documentary evidence, such as medical bills and photos. Luphahla testified that as she was approaching the traffic light, it was red. The light turned to green as she reached the intersection, and she remembers nothing after that point. Luphahla also testified as to her injuries, which included a broken pelvis and fractured ribs.
With this evidence, Luphahla failed to show that Deputy Loyal breached his duty and that this breach caused her injuries. She merely presented evidence that she was involved in an accident and that she sustained injuries as a result of the accident. The trial court noted this lack of evidence in granting the Sheriff's Department's motion for judgment on the evidence. The court stated, "... it's a difficult case for [Luphahla] since she has no recollection of the accident or how it occurred." Tr. at 82. A plaintiff's burden may not be fulfilled by evidence based merely upon supposition or speculation. Topp v. Leffers, 838 N.E.2d 1027, 1033 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied, 855 N.E.2d 998 (2006). Evidence which establishes only a mere possibility of cause or which lacks reasonable certainty or probability is not sufficient evidence by itself to support a verdict. Id. Luphahla had the burden to prove her case; however, she testified unequivocally that she could not remember anything after the traffic light turned green. She could not and did not testify that Deputy Loyal caused the accident and breached his duty in any manner. Luphahla is thus speculating that Deputy Loyal caused the accident. Because there is no substantial evidence supporting the essential issues of breach of duty and causation in this case, the trial court's grant of the Sheriff's Department's motion for judgment on the evidence was proper. See State Farm, 854 N.E.2d at 931.
Having determined that the trial court properly ruled on the Sheriff's Department's motion, we feel compelled to address an argument raised by Luphahla. In her brief, Luphahla suggests that she was required to prove Deputy Loyal's presence at the scene of the accident, that she did in fact do that, and, for that reason, the trial court erred in granting the Sheriff's Department's motion. Luphahla posits that even if she, personally, could not place Deputy Loyal at the scene, there existed evidence showing that he was involved in a collision with her. In her brief, Luphahla states, "... the record is replete with admissions by [Deputy Loyal] that he [ ] was involved in a collision with Luphahla." Appellant's Brief at 12. Particularly, she asserts that Deputy Loyal's counsel made admissions in both pleadings and his opening statement that place Deputy Loyal at the scene of the accident, thereby fulfilling her burden to prove negligence on the part of Deputy Loyal. We will review each in turn.
Luphahla claims that, in his counterclaim and third party complaint, Deputy Loyal admits to the date and time of the accident and asserts that Luphahla caused the accident. In his counterclaim and third party complaint, Deputy Loyal does admit to the accident occurring at the date and time Luphahla has alleged. In addition, he claims that it was Luphahla who caused the accident. Inexplicably, Luphahla equates Deputy Loyal's admission to his presence at the scene of the accident and/or involvement in the accident with...
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...statement is not evidence; rather, it acquaints the court with the facts counsel intends to prove. Luphahla v. Marion County Sheriff's Dep't, 868 N.E.2d 1155, 1158-59 (Ind.Ct.App.2007). However, a clear and unequivocal admission of fact, or a formal stipulation that concedes any element of ......
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