Lupia v. Medicredit, Inc.

• Decision Date: 13 April 2020
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 19-cv-01209-REB-KMT
• Citation: 445 F.Supp.3d 1271
• Parties: Elizabeth LUPIA, Plaintiff, v. MEDICREDIT, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

445 F.Supp.3d 1271

Elizabeth LUPIA, Plaintiff,

v.MEDICREDIT, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 19-cv-01209-REB-KMT

United States District Court, D. Colorado.

Signed April 13, 2020

Amorette C. Rinkleib, Russell S. Thompson, IV, Thompson Consumer Law Group PLLC, Mesa, AZ, for Plaintiff.

Jacob Foster Hollars, Spencer Fane LLP, Denver, CO, for Defendant.

ORDER RE: CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Blackburn, J.

The matters before me are (1) Defendant Medicredit, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment [#20],¹ filed February 18, 2020;(2) Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [#22], filed February 21, 2020; and (3) Plaintiff's Motion for Leave To File Surreply or, in the Alternative, for Leave To Supplement Her Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [#28], filed April 1, 2020. As expatiated below, I grant defendant's motion in part and deny it in part and grant plaintiff's summary judgment motion in part and deny it in part. I deny plaintiff's motion to file a surreply as moot.

I. JURISDICTION

I have jurisdiction over this matter under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) ; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A dispute is "genuine" if the issue could be resolved in favor of either party. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; Farthing v. City of Shawnee , 39 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 1994). A fact is "material" if it might reasonably affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ; Farthing , 39 F.3d at 1134.

A party who does not have the burden of proof at trial must show the absence of a genuine fact issue. Concrete Works of Colorado, Inc. v. City & County of Denver , 36 F.3d 1513, 1517 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied , 514 U.S. 1004, 115 S.Ct. 1315, 131 L.Ed.2d 196 (1995). By contrast, a movant who bears the burden of proof must submit evidence to establish every essential element of its claim or affirmative defense. See In re Ribozyme Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Securities Litigation , 209 F.Supp.2d 1106, 1111 (D. Colo. 2002).² In either case, once the motion has been properly supported, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show, by tendering depositions, affidavits, and other competent evidence, that summary judgment is not proper. Concrete Works , 36 F.3d at 1518. All the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Simms v. Oklahoma ex rel. Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services , 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 528 U.S. 815, 120 S.Ct. 53, 145 L.Ed.2d 46 (1999).

III. ANALYSIS

This case arises under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692. On April 5, 2017, plaintiff Elizabeth Lupia sought medical services from St. Francis Medical Center ("SFMC" or "the hospital") in Colorado Springs, Colorado. Ms. Lupia acknowledges she knew SFMC was not an in-network provider for her health insurer, Liberty Health Share ("LHS" or "the insurer").³ On admission to SFMC, Ms. Lupia signed a Hospital Services Agreement, by which she acknowledged, inter alia ,

I understand that there is no guarantee of reimbursement or payment from any insurance company or other payor. I acknowledge full financial responsibility for, and agree to pay, all charges of the Hospital and of physicians rendering services not otherwise paid by my health insurance of other payor. Estimated patient responsibility is due at the time of service or following the medical screening exam. Any remaining charges are due and payable upon receipt of the bill.

(Def. Motion App. , Exh. B ¶ 6 at 1.)

After Ms. Lupia was seen at SFMC, the hospital submitted a bill for services rendered to her for $21,893.61. In July 2017, LHS tendered a check to SFMC in the amount of $7,154.36. On the back of that check, above the indorsement line, is printed the following:

PAYMENT IS TENDERED ON BEHALF OF THE COST SHARING MINISTRY MEMBER IN FULL SETTLEMENT OF ALL CHARGES FOR FACILITY MEDICAL BILLS SUBMITTED ON THE STATED ACCOUNT.

(Id. , Exh. C at 2.) Also included was an explanation of benefits, which states, in relevant part,

Any medical expense from the program is tendered in full and final satisfaction of charges for medical services and treatment rendered, and deposit by recipient shall constitute and evidence accord and satisfaction of any discrepancy between expenses hereby paid and amounts charged for such services and treatment.

(Id. , Exh. C. at 3.) Just below this statement, the document stated "Member Responsibility: $0.00." (Id. )

SFMC applied this payment to Ms. Lupia's outstanding account, and in September 2017, sent Ms. Lupia a bill for the balance on the original amount, that is, $14,739.25. Believing she owed nothing further, Ms. Lupia refused to pay this bill. Disagreeing with Ms. Lupia's assessment of her liability, on April 19, 2018, SFMC assigned the account to defendant Medicredit, Inc., for collection. This lawsuit arises from those collection efforts.

On April 25, 2018, Medicredit sent Ms. Lupia a notice informing her the debt had been assigned to Medicredit for collection, outlining her options for resolution of the account, and advising that if she failed to dispute the validity of the debt within 30 days, Medicredit would assume the debt was valid. (Id. , Exh. G at 1.) In response, Ms. Lupia sent Medicredit a letter in which she disputed the validity of the debt "or any portion thereof." She stated her position that SFMC's deposit of the check constituted acceptance of the amount tendered by LHS as full payment of the debt and demanded all further telephone communication cease.⁴ However, she expressly invited further "written confirmation of [Medicredit's] actions to correct/rectify this matter," and said she "look[ed] forward to [Medicredit's] written response." That letter, dated May 1, was postmarked on May 2 (Id. , Exh. I.)

The letter was stamped "received" by Medicredit on May 7. However, due to the way in which the company processes non-certified mail such as Ms. Lupia's letter, it was not actually logged into Medicredit's system until May 10.⁵ Medicredit therefore placed a call to Ms. Lupia regarding the debt on May 8. Ms. Lupia did not answer that call, and Medicredit left a voice mail.

Once Ms. Lupia's letter was logged, Medicredit sent her a letter, dated May 16, 2018, acknowledging receipt of her dispute and advising that the company was "investigating the matter." The letter indicated "This communication is from a debt collector," referenced Ms. Lupia's account number, stated the "Balance Due on File" of $14,739.25, and invited Ms. Lupia to "contact our office" "[i]f [she had] any questions or concerns regarding the matter." Nevertheless, the letter also affirmed "[t]here is no additional information or action needed from you at this time." (Id. , Exh. J.)

These two contacts – the May 8 phone call and the May 16 letter – form the basis of all four counts brought in this lawsuit. For the reasons that follow, I find and conclude that Ms. Lupia is entitled to summary judgment on her claims under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g(b) and 1692c(c) insofar as those claims are premised on the May 8 phone call. As to all other claims raised herein, however, Medicredit is entitled to summary judgment.

A. STANDING

I begin by addressing Medicredit's suggestion that Ms. Lupia lacks standing to bring any claim related to the May 8 phone call because she suffered no actual damages. Until recently, the issue appeared well-settled. The Tenth Circuit has long recognized that the FDCPA creates statutory legal rights to be free from certain abusive debt collection practices, Johnson v. Riddle , 305 F.3d 1107, 1117 (10th Cir. 2002), and affirmed that a plaintiff whose rights under the Act are violated has suffered injury-in-fact and otherwise meets the requirements of constitutional standing, Robey v. Shapiro, Marianos & Cejda, L.L.C. , 434 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 2006).

However, in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016), the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff does not "automatically satisf[y] the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants [her] a statutory right and purports to authorize [her] to sue to vindicate that right." Spokeo , 136 S.Ct. at 1549. To recover for such intangible harms, a plaintiff must show "a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation." Id. See also Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 496, 129 S.Ct. 1142, 1151, 173 L.Ed.2d 1 (2009) ("[D]eprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation – a procedural right in vacuo – is insufficient to create Article III standing."). "A ‘concrete’ injury must be ‘de facto’; that is, it must actually exist;" it must be " ‘real,’ " not "abstract." Spokeo , 136 S.Ct. at 1548. When a procedural right protects a concrete interest, a violation of that right may create a sufficient "risk of real harm" to the underlying interest to "satisfy the requirement of concreteness." Id. at 1549. Courts thus understand Spokeo "to instruct that an alleged procedural violation ... manifest[s] concrete injury" if the violation actually harms or presents a material risk of harm to the underlying concrete interest. Strubel v. Comenity Bank , 842 F.3d 181, 190 (2nd Cir. 2016).

To assess whether an intangible harm constitutes an injury in fact, Spokeo directs courts to consider two factors. First, due deference should be given to the judgment of Congress in having "identif[ied] and elevat[ed]" an intangible harm as worthy of statutory protection. "Congress is...