Lupinacci v. Pizighelli

• Decision Date: 31 March 2008
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:06-CV-1308 (JCH).
• Parties: Fernando LUPINACCI, Plaintiff v. Martin PIZIGHELLI, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

588 F.Supp.2d 242

Fernando LUPINACCI, Plaintiff v. Martin PIZIGHELLI, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:06-CV-1308 (JCH).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

March 31, 2008.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Thomas J. Weihing, Daly, Weihing & Bochanis, Bridgeport, CT, for Plaintiff.

Barbara Brazzel-Massaro, City of Bridgeport, Office of the City Attorney, Bridgeport, CT, for Defendants.

RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [Doc. No. 29]

JANET C. HALL, District Judge.

Plaintiff Fernando Lupinacci brings this Section 1983 action against the City of Bridgeport, and several Bridgeport police officers, for events arising out of his arrest on July 25, 2004. Lupinacci alleges that defendants Martin Pizighelli and Ryan Frechette, along with several other officers, wrongfully and violently arrested him in violation of his constitutional rights. The defendants have moved for summary judgment. See Doc. No. 29. For the reasons that follow, the court GRANTS the motion IN PART and DENIES the motion IN PART.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In a motion for summary judgment, the burden is on the moving party to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); White v. ABCO Engineering Corp., 221 F.3d 293, 300 (2d Cir.2000). Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, and present such evidence as would allow a jury to find in his favor in order to defeat the motion. Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir.2000).

In assessing the record, the trial court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Graham, 230 F.3d at 38. "This remedy that precludes a trial is properly granted only when no rational finder of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party." Carlton v. Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir.2000). "When reasonable persons, applying the proper legal standards, could differ in their responses to the question" raised on the basis of the evidence presented, the question must be left to the jury. Sologub v. City of New York, 202 F.3d 175, 178 (2d Cir.2000).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The circumstances surrounding Lupinacci's arrest are hotly contested. However, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the facts are as follows.

On July 25, 2004, at around 7:15 pm, there was a disturbance in the City of Bridgeport in the area of Madison and Garfield Avenues. The disturbance resulted from celebrations surrounding a victory by the Brazilian soccer team in an international competition. Several individuals were arrested, and the disturbance quieted down. However, Bridgeport Police Sgt. Raymond Masek thought it would be prudent to maintain a police presence in the area to prevent future disturbances, and so he ordered a number of officers to the scene, including Pizighelli, Frechette, Officer Brian Pisanelli, K-9 Officer Morales, and Officer Pascone. By 9:00 pm, there were approximately thirty officers in the general area, some on foot and some in patrol cars.

At approximately 9:00 pm, Lupinacci and some relatives went to get ice cream at a store at the corner of Garfield and Madison. Lupinacci Aff. at 11114-5. As they sat outside the store eating ice cream, someone nearby yelled, "fight." Id. at 116. Officers Pizighelli, Morales, Frechette, and Pascone responded to the scene immediately. Lupinacci also got up and walked towards where he saw three individuals yelling at each other. Id. 116.

According to Lupinacci, two of the officers then forcibly subdued two of the individuals who were arguing, as a crowd of people (including Lupinacci) observed their actions. Id. ¶ 7. The third individual was also arrested. Id. ¶ 8. Pizighelli then told the small crowd to go home, and the crowd complied, including Lupinacci. Id. For reasons that are not entirely clear, however, Pizighelli began following the crowd and yelled profanities at them. Id. Lupinacci turned around and told Pizighelli that there was no reason for that type of language. Id. Pizighelli responded with a "fuck you," at which point Lupinacci asked the officer for his badge number. Id. Pizighelli then tackled Lupinacci to the ground and arrested him, with the assistance of a second officer. Id.

According to Lupinacci, at no time during these events did he invade Pizighelli's personal space, nor did he at any time yell or scream. Id. ¶ 11. He also maintains that he never physically resisted his arrest. Id. ¶ 10.

Lupinacci was charged with three crimes: breach of peace, inciting to riot, and interfering with a police officer. These charges were subsequently nolled in state court. Id. ¶ 9. The state court prosecutor told Lupinacci that he was simply an innocent bystander; Lupinacci did not have to do any community service or pay any fine. Lupinacci Dep. at 36.

At the time of Lupinacci's arrest, Sgt. Masek was a supervisor in the Bridgeport Police Department, and he was responsible for overseeing approximately 12-15 officers, including many of the officers involved in the July 25 incident. Sgt. Masek was not directly present at the scene when Lupinacci was arrested, as he was responding to a domestic violence incident in a nearby area. Masek Dep. at 16. He did drive to the scene a bit later that night, sometime between 9:30 and 10:30, but at the time he drove by there were no more officers there, and everyone had dispersed. Id. at 32.

On July 25, 2004, Lupinacci filed a Complaint in state court, naming as defendants officers Pizighelli, Frechette, and Pisanelli, Sgt. Masek, the City of Bridgeport, and the City of Bridgeport Police Department. See Doc. No. 1, Exh. 1, at 1-2. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Lupinacci asserted two claims: first, that he was falsely arrested in violation of the federal constitution, and second, that his arrest violated the federal constitution because it was done with excessive force. Compl. at 1-2.¹ Additionally, Lupinacci brought a claim against the City of Bridgeport under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 7-465, in which he sought damages from the municipality for actions caused by municipal employees. Id. at 4. Lupinacci also appears to have asserted a claim for false arrest under state law.² Id. at 2.

All of the defendants filed what they termed a "Motion for Summary Judgment." However, the defendants' Motion made no mention of Lupinacci's claim under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 7-465, and thus the defendants' motion is better understood as a motion for partial summary judgment.

III. ANALYSIS

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. In a Section 1983 action for false arrest, the main question is whether or not the arresting officer had probable cause. See Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 151-52 (2d Cir.2006). Under both Connecticut and federal law, probable cause exists when an officer has knowledge of sufficient facts and circumstances to warrant a reasonable officer in believing that the arrestee has committed or is committing a crime. Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 156 (2d Cir.2007) (citing federal and Connecticut cases).³ While the probable cause standard is not as strong as the familiar "preponderance of the evidence" standard, it is more than a mere suspicion. Id. Additionally, the test is an objective one that only asks whether the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest the suspect for any crime. Jaegly, 439 F.3d at 153-54. A reviewing court must generally examine the facts, in light of state criminal law, to see if there was probable cause for arrest. See id. at 152-53.

The Fourth Amendment also prohibits officers from using excessive force when arresting criminal suspects. The test for determining excessive force requires the court to balance the extent of the force used against the countervailing government interests at stake. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). This is an objective reasonableness test, "judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Id.

Because this a Section 1983 action, however, the claims against the individual officers implicate the further doctrine of qualified immunity. Thus, even if the individual officers committed constitutional violations, they are still entitled to judgment in their favor if they did not violate clearly established rights, about which a reasonable officer would have known. Jones v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir.2006). In the false arrest context, this means that the arresting officer will escape liability if a reasonable police officer, acting in the same circumstances and with the same knowledge as possessed by the section 1983 defendant, could have reasonably believed that probable cause existed. Zellner v. Summerlin, 494 F.3d 344, 369 (2d Cir.2007); Lee v. Sandberg, 136 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir.1997). And in the excessive force context, qualified immunity adds the "further dimension" that police officers will be protected when there is a lack of clarity as to the proper application of legal doctrine to the facts at hand. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001); see also Cowan v. Breen, 352 F.3d 756, 761 (2d Cir.2003).

A. Officer Pizighelli

Turning first to the false arrest claim, Pizighelli argues that his arrest was justified because there was probable cause to believe that Lupinacci had committed three crimes: breach of the peace, see Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53a-181, interfering with an officer, see id. § 53a-167a, and inciting to riot, see id. § 53a-178.

Under Connecticut law, an individual is guilty of...