Lupone v. Lupone
| Decision Date | 17 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | NNHCV126035148 |
| Court | Connecticut Superior Court |
| Parties | Lurrae Lupone et al. v. Larry Lupone et al |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
This memorandum decides three interrelated applications relating to a series of arbitration awards entered in 2012 and 2013 as part of a multi-year arbitration involving a decades-old financial dispute between two siblings, Lurrae Lupone and Larry Lupone. The particular awards at issue are contained in two written decisions, namely: (1) Arbitrator's Decision on Refinance Matter, dated November 30, 2012 (the 11/30/12 Decision); and (2) Arbitrator's Decision on Damages dated December 16, 2013 (the 12/16/13 Decision). In Docket Nos. NNH-126035148 and NNH-135034753, Lurrae Lupone asks the court to vacate, modify or correct these two arbitration awards; in Docket No. NNH-146051388, Larry Lupone asks the court to confirm the same awards.[1] For the reasons that follow, the applications to vacate, modify or correct are denied, and the application to confirm is granted.
The Lupone siblings have been fighting over various business dealings for many years. In late 2005, with four different lawsuits pending, they entered into a written Mediation and Arbitration Agreement (Agreement), which obligated them to mediate " all issues between them." The Agreement provides that the parties would proceed to arbitration in the event that the mediation proved unsuccessful, and binds Lurrae and Larry to arbitrate all unresolved issues. The Agreement states unequivocally that the arbitration submission will be unrestricted: " The agreement to arbitrate all remaining unresolved issues between Larry Lupone and Lurrae Lupone is agreed to be an unrestricted submission to arbitration." Agreement at 3. The Agreement further provides that the arbitrator would be retired United States Magistrate Judge F. Owen Eagan (" Judge Eagan" or the arbitrator), id., unless a replacement arbitrator became necessary, see p. 14 below. The Agreement also contains the parties' " request [for a] reasoned decision from Judge Eagan, " Agreement at 3, and states more than once that the arbitrator's decision shall be final and binding id. at 3, 4.[2]
The arbitration proceeded in fits and starts over a period of approximately seven years. The parties were represented by counsel throughout. The court will summarize the course of proceedings here; a more particularized review of key events will be provided as those details become relevant to the discussion.
The dispute between the Lupone siblings encompasses numerous ventures and business entanglements, and the participants engaged in ongoing efforts during the course of the arbitration identifying the issues requiring determination and resolving a multitude of scheduling and procedural challenges. With a handful of exceptions, the court file contains no record of the planning-related communications that must have taken place between and among the attorneys and Judge Eagan during the long history of the arbitration. We know with certainty that a preliminary conference was held at Judge Eagan's office in West Hartford on August 23 2006. Lurrae was represented at the time by Attorney Lawrence Grossman of Zeisler & Zeisler, see n.12 below and Attorney Jack Keyes took over her representation at some point in time. Larry was represented by Attorney William Gallagher of New Haven and Attorney Mark Balaban of Middletown. After the preliminary conference, Judge Eagan circulated to the attorneys his typewritten notes regarding the proposed " discovery and procedure order which we fashioned [at the 8/23/06 meeting] on the [Lupone] case." These notes reflect deadlines for the exchange of appraisals, expert depositions and reports, and other information. According to Judge Eagan's notes, a deadline also was established for the lawyers to agree upon the issues to be arbitrated and the burden of proof as to each issue. In what can only be seen in retrospect as a display of wild optimism on the part of all participants, the notes indicate that the arbitration " will take approximately one week and should be scheduled for five (5) continuous days during the month of April 2007." Numerous other administrative items are also addressed in Judge Eagan's notes of the conference held on August 23, 2006.[3]
The arbitration process took much longer than originally anticipated. Issues multiplied as efforts at settlement spawned additional disputes, and busy lawyers required extensions of deadlines and hearing dates. See, e.g., Letter from Atty. Gallagher to Judge Eagan, dated 2/13/07; Scheduling Order dated April 16, 2007; Letter from Atty. Gallagher to Judge Eagan, dated 9/6/08 (enclosing agreed-upon revised schedule with respect to one issue). A unified arbitration soon became a series of proceedings, each addressing different (or overlapping) issues requiring determination. The parties have not provided a detailed record of arbitration-related events (briefs, stipulations and agreements, administrative correspondence, hearing dates, exhibits, transcripts, etc.), and therefore many aspects of what took place between the beginning of 2007 and the end of 2013 are not known to the court, but certain milestone events are evident from the record. The parties apparently realized early-on that a single unified hearing was not feasible, and agreed that the arbitration should proceed in stages. By February 2008, the parties had " stipulated to the issues to be arbitrated and the sequence in which the issues should be presented for arbitration." The issues and the schedule continued to shift and transform as the years passed. Despite the delays and complications, however, the record before the court reflects an attitude of ongoing commitment to the process on the part of all participants during the relevant time period.
Between February 2008 and December 2012, Judge Eagan issued no fewer than five written decisions. See Arbitrator's Decision on the 1031 Exchange Matter, dated February 12, 2008; Arbitrator's Decision on the Sivetta Matter, dated November 6, 2009; Arbitrator's Decision on Management Fees, dated July 6, 2010; Arbitrator's Decision on Motion for Judgment, dated October 22, 2011; and Arbitrator's Decision on Refinance Matter, dated 11/30/12. Hearings evidently were held on diverse dates prior to issuance of any decisions requiring evidence.[4] The last of these decisions resulted in an award of compensatory damages of $85, 947.20 in favor of Larry. See 11/30/12 Decision, at 14, 18.[5] Judge Eagan also awarded Larry punitive damages in an amount to be determined after the submission of evidence on that issue. Id.
Three additional written rulings were issued by the arbitrator in 2013. In a ruling dated January 11, 2013, Judge Eagan denied Lurrae's motion to reconsider, set aside and reargue the damages award. On April 8, 2013, Judge Eagan denied another post-award motion filed by Lurrae, this one seeking a recalculation of the damages award. Finally, on December 16, 2013, Judge Eagan (1) granted Larry's motion to recalculate damages, thereby increasing the compensatory award by $30, 994.67, from $85, 947.20 to $116, 942.87, and (2) awarded Larry punitive damages in the amount of $57, 085.34.
Three applications are presently before the court. Lurrae seeks to correct, modify or vacate the 11/30/12 Decision and the 12/16/13 Decision in Docket Nos. NNH-126035148 and NNH-135034753; Larry seeks to confirm those awards in Docket No. NNH-146051388. The three cases have been handled in a consolidated fashion by counsel and the court, and all three are decided in this single decision. The parties have filed written briefs, appendices, and replies. A short hearing was held before Hon. William Hadden, Jr. on October 7, 2014. Judge Hadden later became unable to render a decision due to his medical condition, and the case was transferred to the undersigned judge, to be decided, by agreement, on the existing record.
As noted, the parties expressly agreed in 2005 that all unresolved disputes between them would be decided by Judge Eagan based upon an " unrestricted submission to arbitration." See pp. 1-2 above. Lurrae now argues that the nature of the submission was actually restricted in nature, because the parties requested a " reasoned" decision from the arbitrator, id. and/or because the Agreement contains a provision that the agreements[6] to arbitrate " shall be interpreted and governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut." Neither point has merit. A submission is restricted if it contains express language limiting the authority of the arbitrator by restricting the breadth of the issues, reserving explicit rights, or conditioning the award on court review. LaFrance v. Lodmell, 322 Conn. 828, 850-52, 144 A.3d 373 (2016); Alderman and Alderman v. Pollack, 100 Conn.App. 80, 917 A.2d 60, 64 (2007). " In the absence of any such qualifications, an agreement is unrestricted." LaFrance v. Lodmell, supra, 322 Conn. at 851 (quotation marks and citations omitted). The submission to arbitration in the present case was unrestricted.
The parties' " request" for a " reasoned decision" in no way constrained the decision-making authority of the arbitrator. Lurrae cites no authority suggesting otherwise. The request merely indicates the parties' preference for a decision accompanied by a brief explanation, rather than a simple unelaborated decree stating the result without any explanation or discussion whatsoever.[7] It is very clear from the case law that an arbitration agreement requesting (or even requiring) a reasoned decision...
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