Luse v. Elliott

Decision Date05 April 1927
Docket NumberNo. 38024.,38024.
Citation204 Iowa 378,213 N.W. 410
PartiesLUSE ET AL. v. ELLIOTT.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from District Court, Johnson County; R. G. Popham, Judge.

Action at law for the possession of real estate. The facts are stated in the opinion. From a judgment on a verdict for plaintiff, the defendant appeals. Affirmed.Wilson & Evans, of Iowa City, for appellant.

Walter M. Davis, of Iowa City, for appellees.

VERMILION, J.

The controlling facts are not in dispute. The appellee R. K. Luse, prior to the transactions here involved, was the owner of a farm of 240 acres. The appellant was a tenant on the farm, under a written lease, for a term of four years from March 1, 1924. The lease provided:

“In event the lessor should sell said farm on or before the 1st day of September of any year, during the existence of this lease, and notify the lessee in writing that the said farm had been sold, then this lease may be terminated on the 1st day of March next succeeding the giving of said notice of sale.”

On August 29, 1925, Luse entered into a parol contract with the appellee Michael for the sale to him of 160 acres of the land for a consideration of $30,000. On August 31, 1925, Michael gave Luse his check for $100 as a part of the purchase price. The parol contract was subsequently, on October 8, 1925, reduced to writing and signed by R. K. Luse and Michael. In pursuance of the contract, conveyance of the 160 acres was made by Luse and wife to Michael.

On August 31, 1925, R. K. Luse and Mable M. Luse, his wife, entered into a written contract whereby the former agreed to sell to the latter the remaining 80 acres of the farm. This contract provided as follows:

“In consideration of above, Mable M. Luse agrees to pay to R. K. Luse the sum of $25 and also to sign all papers in regard to the sale of the following property to H. C. Michael.”

On March 6, 1926, R. K. Luse conveyed the 80 acres of land to his wife for a stated consideration of “one dollar and other valuable considerations.”

The appellant was duly notified by R. K. Luse, by notice dated August 31, 1925, that he had contracted to sell the land covered by the lease and that he elected to terminate the lease on March 1, 1926.

It is conceded that the provision of the lease for its termination on the sale of the premises is valid. It is also conceded that the right to terminate the lease only arose upon the sale of the entire farm, and that such sale was not required to be to a single purchaser, but might be of separate tracts to different purchasers.

The errors asigned relate to the refusal of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant at the close of the evidence, to the refusal of the court to give certain instructions requested by the defendant, and to alleged errors in the instructions given.

[1][2] I. Complaint is made of an instruction that said if the parties orally agreed upon the terms of the sale on or before September 1, 1925, the sale would be considered as made on or prior to that date, although the agreement was not reduced to writing until later. If it should be conceded that the contract for the sale of the leased premises must, as contended by appellant, be one enforceable under the statute of frauds (see 35 Corpus Juris, 1056), the evidence showed without dispute that at the time of the oral agreement between Luse and Michael a part of the purchase price was paid. This took the contract out of the statute of frauds. Moreover, in another instruction the court said that if Michael agreed to purchase 160 acres of the farm on August 31, 1925, and then gave Luse his check for $100 as a part of the purchase price, this constituted a sale as between the parties for the purposes of the case. The completion of a sale by conveyance on or before September 1, 1925, was not required in order for the lessor to be entitled to terminate the lease. Glenn v. Inouye, 62 Cal. App. 259, 216 P. 418;Druxinman v. Smith, 113 Wash. 124, 193 P. 224;Yontz v. McDowell, 197 Ky. 770, 247 S. W. 948;Hyman v. Federal Doll Mfg. Co. (Sup.) 185 N. Y. S. 678;Gunsenhiser v. Binder, 206 Mass. 434, 92 N. E. 705.

Stewart v. Pier, 58 Iowa, 15, 11 N. W. 711, is not in conflict with this doctrine. The lease there involved provided that, if it was terminated by a sale of the premises within three years, the tenant was entitled to be paid for certain improvements, but, if so terminated after three years, no such payment was to be made. Under the terms of the sale made, possession was not to be given until after the expiration of three years. We said the stipulation in the lease contemplated such a sale as would terminate the right of both landlord and tenant to the possession of the property, and:

“As long as plaintiff [the landlord] held such right, defendant could occupy the property. Therefore a contract of sale which did not deprive plaintiff of the right of possession, and did not disturb the defendant's right to the occupancy of the property, was not a sale contemplated in the lease.”

There is here no claim of a right to terminate the lease before the lessor's right to possession of the premises would be terminated by a completed sale, or until March 1st. Appellant was secure in his possession until the completion of a year of farm tenancy. We think there was no prejudicial error in the instruction complained of.

[3][4] II. The court submitted to the jury the question of the good faith of the transaction, and instructed that if Luse did in fact sell a portion of his farm to his wife prior to September 1, 1925, such sale would have the same effect as a sale made to any other person, and would not be invalid because she was his wife, or because one of the motives of the sale might have been to terminate the lease, but that,...

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