Lusietto v. Kingan, Gen. No. 68--46

• Decision Date: 18 March 1969
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 68--46
• Citation: 107 Ill.App.2d 239,246 N.E.2d 24
• Parties: James LUSIETTO, Administrator of the Estate of Shirley Lusietto, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James KINGAN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 24

246 N.E.2d 24

107 Ill.App.2d 239

James LUSIETTO, Administrator of the Estate of Shirley Lusietto, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James KINGAN, Defendant-Appellant.

Gen. No. 68--46.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

March 18, 1969.

William G. Clark, Chicago, by Jas. Collins, Kankakee, John O'Toole, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee.

Kevin D. Kelly, LaSalle, Walter Durley Boyle and Linn C. Goldsmith, Hennepin, for defendant-appellant.

PER CURIAM.

The administrator plaintiff recovered a judgment on a jury's verdict for $10,000 for the wrongful death of plaintiff's intestate who was killed while operating an automobile on a portion of State Highway 89 in Putnam County which was under the jurisdiction of the defendant in his capacity as Maintenance Supervisor for certain state highways in District No. 3 of the State Highway Division.

The complaint alleged that the defendant failed to maintain the highway properly and permitted a large and dangerous hole to form and exist in the highway for a long period of time; that the defendant failed to repair the hole when he knew or should have known of such condition; that the defendant failed to warn plaintiff's intestate of the condition of the highway by way of warning signs, etc. whereupon the car driven by plaintiff's intestate struck the hole which caused it to leave the road, thereby causing the death of plaintiff's intestate.

The testimony varied as to the size of the hole, the length of time it had been in existence and as to its location. However, from the jury verdict, it is obvious that the jury believed that the hole was there and that it caused the accident in question.

The defendant was employed by the State of Illinois occupying the position of Maintenance Supervisor for certain state highways in District No. 3 of the State Highway Division. The area under his jurisdiction contained two hundred and forty miles of highways in five counties. That part of State Highway 89 at the place of the occurrence was under his supervision. The defendant had about thirty men under him. On the Monday following the occurrence of the accident he went to the scene and supervised the men in making repairs. He knew that the section of highway in the area where plaintiff's intestate was killed was in need of repairs for quite a long time before the accident. There were a lot of holes in the road. There were no barricades at the place of the accident.

Defendant has appealed contending that a suit against a state highway employee alleging nonfeasance in the maintenance of a state highway is in fact a suit against the State of Illinois which suit is prohibited by the Illinois Constitution, S.H.A. (Article IV, Section 26); and that, in any event, the evidence adduced by the plaintiff showed neither that the nonfeasance of the defendant constituted negligence in the performance of his duties nor that such nonfeasance was the proximate cause of the death of plaintiff's intestate.

We believe that the law is clear that a state highway employee may be sued and held individually liable for certain negligent acts committed by him in the course of his employment. Creamer v. Rude, 37 Ill.App.2d 148, 185 N.E.2d 345. In order for a negligent act to give rise to liability, however, it is a well established common law rule that a legal duty must exist in favor of the person injured and imposed on the person whose conduct produces the injury. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 365 Ill. 303, 6 N.E.2d 189. In the Creamer case above cited and in the cases of Hering v. Hilton, 12 Ill.2d 559, 147 N.E.2d 311, and Pree v. Hymbaugh, 23 Ill.App.2d 211, 162 N.E.2d 297 relied on by the plaintiff, the defendants in each case were operating motor vehicles on the public highways in a negligent manner. What the opinions said in those cases, in effect, was that the fact of governmental employment could not be used as a shield. The duty imposed on those defendants was held to be the same duty imposed on all other persons operating motor vehicles on the public highways. We believe this to be sound law.

In the instant case, however, the plaintiff is asking that we predicate the defendant's liability solely on the basis that he is a government employee. That is to say, that as a Maintenance Supervisor of the State Highway Division, he owed a duty to the plaintiff to maintain that portion of the highway where the accident occurred and to have either filled the particular hole that caused the injury or to have posted or barricaded it in some way. With this contention, we cannot agree.

We believe that the plaintiff and the trial court in this case have misconstrued the matter by attempting to impose the State's duty to maintain the highways upon the defendant. In fact, the defendant's duty to supervise the maintenance of a certain portion of the State's highways assigned to him by the State Highway Division is a condition of his employment. A violation of which may give rise to such lawful sanctions as his employer may choose to exercise against him. However, unless a violation of a condition of his employment is simultaneously and independently of such condition also a violation of some duty owed to an individual, such violation will not give rise to legal liability to an individual. Our Supreme Court in Nagle v. Wakey, 161 Ill. 387, 393, 43 N.E. 1079 recognized this distinction between the duty which a Commissioner of Highways owes to an individual and that which he owes to the public in general, holding that for a violation of the former he may be sued by an individual but not so for a violation of a duty he owes to the public in general. In the Nagle case the duty of the Commissioners of Highways to repair and maintain roads and bridges was considered to be a public duty for the violation of which an individual could not maintain an action against the Highway Commissioners. Also, in keeping with this distinction, the Court said in Gage v. Springer, 211 Ill. 200 at page 204, 71 N.E. 860, at page 862:

'The failure of a public officer to perform a public duty can constitute an individual wrong only when some person can show that in the public duty was involved also a duty to himself as an individual, and that he has suffered a special and peculiar injury by reason of its non-performance.'

Applying this distinction to the present case, we are of the opinion that the defendant's duty to maintain the highway in question was a duty owed to the public generally and not to an individual. Whereas, in keeping with the same distinction, the situations involved in Creamer v. Rude, supra, Hering v. Hilton, supra, and Pree v. Hymbaugh, supra, were situations which involved duties owed to the plaintiffs therein.

Additionally, the defendant's duties were not ministerial, they were governmental in character and required the exercise of discretion and judgment. With regard to holes in the highway, the defendant must exercise discretion and judgment as to which holes to fill and which holes not to fill. Of the holes to be filled, which holes are to be filled first. He must perform all of this within the limitations of available manpower, equipment and finances. It is a well established principle of the common law that an immunity exists in favor of public officials when they are exercising their official discretion on matters which are discretionary in nature and not ministerial. People for Use of Munson v. Bartels, 138 Ill. 322, 27 N.E. 1091; McCormick v. Burt, 95 Ill. 263; Gilbert v. Bone, 64 Ill. 518; Kelly v. Ogilvie, 64 Ill.App.2d 144, 212 N.E.2d 279. Quite apart from the doctrine of governmental immunity, the case law in this state has developed the doctrine of public officials immunity. This doctrine is distinguished from and founded on a different rationale from the principle of governmental immunity. See note 1966 Illinois Law Forum 981 at 995. In Nagle v. Wakey, supra, our Supreme Court held that the duty to keep highways in repair was a duty which required the exercise of judgment and discretion and that in performing this duty the commissioners were clothed with discretion as to the practicability of...