Lussier v. Lifeworks Wellness Ctr.
| Decision Date | 05 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 8:21-cv-2386-CEH-TGW |
| Parties | MICHELE LUSSIER, Plaintiff, v. DEFENDANT LIFEWORKS WELLNESS CENTER, LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This cause comes before the Court upon Defendant Lifeworks Wellness Center, LLC's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 14) and Plaintiff Michele Lussier's Response in Opposition (Doc. 15). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant-in-part and deny-in-part the Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiff began working as a Public Relations and Marketing Manager for Defendant, a health center, in 2007. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 8 9. She was subsequently diagnosed with pancreatic cancer, for which she underwent major surgery on July 2, 2019. Id. at ¶ 10.
Plaintiff provided notice to Defendant about the surgery and stayed in daily contact with her supervisor, Tamora German, and the medical director, Dr. David Minkoff, while she was out. Doc. 14-1. She continued to work remotely during her seven-day hospitalization. Id.; Doc. 1 ¶ 13. Following Plaintiff's discharge, German gave her permission to work part-time and told her “Take as long as you need, I just want you back well.” Id.; Doc. 14-1.
On July 10, 2019, Plaintiff returned to work on a part-time schedule. Doc. 1 ¶ 14. Plaintiff then learned she would no longer be supervising the two employees whose work she had previously overseen. Id. at ¶ 15. She was also informed that she would no longer have remote access to her email and would be required to copy German on every email she sent. Id. at ¶ 16. Further, she alleges she was told to make up the 88 hours of work for which she had been given paid leave while she was in the hospital. Id. at ¶ 17. Plaintiff explained that making up these hours would be difficult because she was still recovering from her surgery. Id. at ¶ 18. She was then informed that Defendant would withhold her weekly bonus until she paid back the money she had received while on her paid leave. Id.
Plaintiff returned to working full-time on July 26, 2019. Id. at ¶ 20. She alleges that although she was able to perform all the essential functions of her job, she noticed that more of her responsibilities were being taken away from her. Id. at ¶¶ 21, 27. When she inquired, she was told she did not need to worry. Id. at ¶ 21. Around the same time, Plaintiff learned, and informed German, that she would need to undergo chemotherapy. Id. at ¶ 22.
On July 31, 2019, German granted Plaintiff's request for permission to leave early because she was feeling weak (Doc. 14-1). Defendant terminated Plaintiff the following day. Id.; Doc. 1 ¶ 23. Defendant did not provide any reason for the termination aside from the comment that it was “just not working out.” Id. at ¶ 24.
Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on August 6, 2019 (Doc. 41-1). In her EEOC charge, she alleged that Defendant discriminated against her because of her medical condition by terminating her after her request to leave early. Id. The EEOC provided Plaintiff with a Notice of Right to Sue (Doc. 1 ¶ 30).
Plaintiff then initiated the instant action, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 33-44. Specifically, she alleges that Defendant discriminated against her because of her medical condition or perceived disability, id. at ¶¶ 33-35, 39-41, and that it retaliated against her for seeking accommodations for her disability, id. at ¶¶ 36-38, 42-44.
Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted as to the retaliation claim, or to exhaust her administrative remedies as to any claim (Doc. 14). Plaintiff opposes the motion (Doc. 15).
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a pleading must include a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroftv. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). Labels, conclusions, and formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action are insufficient. Id. at 678 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Mere naked assertions are also insufficient. Id. A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, which, if accepted as true, would “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (internal citation omitted). The Court is not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion stated as a “factual allegation” in the complaint. Id. Overall, the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted).
In its motion to dismiss, Defendant first argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because her current allegations exceed the scope of the EEOC charge, and she therefore failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. See Doc. 14. Specifically, Defendant asserts that the EEOC charge did not contain the new acts of discrimination that Plaintiff now alleges (id. at 8-10), and it expressly omitted any allegations of retaliation (id. at 5-7). Further, Defendant argues that the allegations of retaliation are not supported by specific, non-conclusory facts as required under the Iqbal/Twombly pleading standard. Id. at 7-8.
In response, Plaintiff disputes Defendant's characterization of her current claims as involving “new acts” of discrimination, arguing that her current allegations merely expand upon and clarify the allegations in the EEOC charge (Doc. 15 at 9-11). She also contends that the allegations in the EEOC charge were sufficiently related to her current retaliation claim, resulting in an EEOC investigation that exhausted her administrative remedies as to both types of claim. Id. at 2-7. Finally, Plaintiff argues that she made out a prima facie case of retaliation within her EEOC charge and the instant Complaint. Id. at 7-9.
As a threshold matter, the Court will analyze the corresponding state and federal law claims together in this Order. Plaintiff has asserted one claim of discrimination under state law (Count I), and one claim of discrimination under federal law (Count III). Doc. 1 ¶ 33-35, 39-41). She has also asserted one claim of retaliation under state law (Count II) and one claim of retaliation under federal law (Count IV). Id. at ¶ 36-38, 42-44. The state claims derive from the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”), while the federal claims derive from the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Claims brought under the FCRA are analyzed using the same framework as claims brought under the ADA. See, e.g., Sicilia v. United Parcel Service, 279 Fed.Appx. 936, 939 n.6 (11th Cir. 2008) (); Holly v. Clairson Industries, LLC, 492 F.3d 1247, 1255 (11th Cir. 2007) (“disability-discrimination claims under the FCRA are analyzed using the same framework as ADA claims”); State v. Jackson, 650 So.2d 24, 27 (Fla. 1995) (“a long standing rule of statutory construction in Florida recognizes that if a state law is patterned after federal law on the same subject, the Florida law will be accorded the same construction as given to the federal act in the federal courts”). As such, this Court will analyze the two discrimination claims (Counts I and III) together, and the two retaliation claims (Counts II and IV) together.
The Court concludes that Plaintiff has exhausted her administrative remedies as to all four counts. However, Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded her claims of retaliation. As such, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is due to be denied-in-part and granted-in-part.
Before bringing suit under the ADA, plaintiffs are required to exhaust their administrative remedies by filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Batson v. Salvation Army, 897 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir. 2018). The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to allow the EEOC to “have the first opportunity to investigate the alleged discriminatory practices[.]” Gregory v. Ga. Dep't of Human Resources, 355 F.3d 1277, 1279 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations and quotations omitted).[3] For this reason, a plaintiff is not permitted to allege new acts of discrimination that were not raised in the EEOC charge. Id. at 1280.
On the other hand, the scope of an EEOC charge “should not be strictly interpreted,” see Batson, 897 F.3d at 1327 (citations omitted), and courts are “extremely reluctant to allow procedural technicalities to bar discrimination claims.” Kelly v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 557 Fed.Appx. 896, 899 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Ray v. Freeman, 626 F.2d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1980)[4]). Accordingly, any claim that “can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination” in the EEOC is permissible, including claims that “amplify, clarify, or more clearly focus the allegations in the EEOC charge.” Gregory, 355 F.3d at 1280 (quotations omitted). “[T]he proper inquiry is whether the plaintiff's complaint is like or related to, or grew out of, the allegations contained in the EEOC charge.” Batson, 897 F.3d at 1328 (quotations omitted).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust...
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