Lust v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 31 January 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. CIVA04CV2583-PSF-CBS.,CIVA04CV2583-PSF-CBS. |
| Citation | 412 F.Supp.2d 1185 |
| Parties | Ruth LUST, Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, an Illinois corporation, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
A. Mark Isley, Clifford L. Beem, Clifford Beem & Associates, P.C., Denver, CO, for Plaintiff.
Sheryl Lynn Anderson, Wells, Anderson & Race LLC, Denver, CO, for Defendant.
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter comes before the Court on defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt.# 13), filed March 28, 2005. Plaintiff filed her response to the motion on April 22, 2005 (Dkt.# 18). Defendant filed its reply on May 6, 2005 (Dkt # 20). On January 23, 2006, a Final Pretrial Order was entered in this case and it was set for a trial to the Court for April 24, 2006. The matter is ripe for determination. The Court has determined that a hearing on the motion will not materially advance its understanding.
The dispute between the parties centers upon plaintiff's automobile insurance coverage. The following facts are uncontested. On September 5, 2002, Plaintiff Ruth Lust was involved in a two-car accident on Highway 36 in Estes Park, Colorado. A vehicle driven by Benjamin McCleary pulled out in front of Ms. Lust, causing their two vehicles to collide and Ms. Lust to sustain serious injuries. At the time of the accident, Ms. Lust was insured under an automobile insurance policy issued by Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company's ("State Farm"), Policy No. 625 8626-E28-06D ("the insurance policy"). The insurance policy provided the minimum required Personal Injury Protection ("PIP") of $50,000 in medical and $50,000 in rehabilitation benefits (Defendant's Motion at 3; Plaintiff's Response at 3-4).
Plaintiff commenced this action in Larimer County District Court on August 31, 2004. On or about November 11, 2004, plaintiff filed an amended complaint in Larimer County District Court. On December 15, 2004, State Farm timely removed the case to this Court. On February 24, 2005, plaintiff filed an unopposed motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, which was granted on February 28, 2005.
In addition, to the above facts, plaintiff alleges that her injuries are so severe that her medical and rehabilitation costs have exceeded $100,000 PIP limits in her policy. Second Amended Complaint, ¶ 8. Plaintiff alleges that she made a claim for PIP benefits in excess of the policy limits, which was denied. Id., ¶¶ 9, 15. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint seeks reformation of the insurance policy "without dollar or time limitations" based on her allegation that State Farm failed to make an adequate offer of "enhanced" PIP benefits as allegedly required by C.R.S. § 10-4-710(2)(a), which was in effect at the time she purchased her policy.1 Id., ¶¶ 10, 12. The complaint also sought treble damages, interest and attorneys' fees pursuant to C.R.S. § 10-4-708(1.7) and (1.8). Id., ¶¶ 17, 18. However, in response to Defendant's Motion, plaintiff has "confessed" her claims under C.R.S. § 10-4-708 (Plaintiff's Response at 3) and therefore those claims are dismissed. Thus only her claim for reformation of the policy limits remains before the Court.
State Farm contends that the undisputed facts show that it did offer plaintiff enhanced PIP benefits, in accordance with C.R.S. § 10-4-710(2)(a). It asserts that such benefits were made available to her in several policy renewal notices and accompanying "News and Notes" pamphlets which were mailed to plaintiff before the date of the accident.
Specifically, State Farm has submitted an affidavit by Mr. Richard Weitzel, its Greeley Operations Center Systems Coordinator, who attests that he is familiar with the policy-related material mailed to plaintiff (Weitzel Affidavit, Exhibit C to Defendant's Motion, ¶ 3). Mr. Weitzel states that on or about October 21, 2001, defendant mailed plaintiff an Auto Renewal Notice and a newsletter titled "News and Notes," copies of which are attached as Exhibits G and H, respectively, to defendant's motion (Id. at ¶ 6.) The Auto Renewal Notice, pertaining to the policy period of November 28, 2001 through May 28, 2002 contains the following language:
HIGHER PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE LIMITS ARE AVAILABLE-You can purchase higher Personal Injury Protection coverage limits with no deductible.
Coverage P4 semi-annual Premium = $88.38
Coverage P8 semi-annual Premium = $85.86
See the enclosed News and Notes article for an explanation of these coverages.
Exhibit G to Defendant's Motion. The accompanying "News and Notes" pamphlet contained an explanation of these enhanced coverages, beyond the cost and availability. Specifically, the "News and Notes" contained the following language:
Enhanced PIP coverage limits are available
Colorado auto insurance law requires that you purchase at least the basic level of personal injury protection (PIP or nofault) coverage. This coverage is called "P1." P1 coverage provides mandatory basic coverage limits for medical and rehabilitation expenses, loss of gross income, essential services, and death resulting from injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident.
Policyholders have the option to choose higher levels of PIP coverage (called "enhanced PIP benefits")-two of which are P8 and P4 coverages-for an additional premium.
Exhibit H to Defendant's Motion. It goes on to explain P8 and P4 coverages.
Mr. Weitzel also attests that a similar renewal notice and newsletter were sent to plaintiff on or about April 23, 1998 (Weitzel Affidavit, ¶ 7). He further states that on or about April 22, 1999, defendant sent plaintiff an Auto Renewal Notice which included a pamphlet about no-fault coverage, a portion of which discusses the different PIP options (Id. at ¶ 8 and Exhibit J to Defendant's Motion). Mr. Weitzel attests that all of these notices were mailed to plaintiff in accordance with defendant's regular business practices. The copies of the renewal notices each have plaintiff's name and address printed on them. Mr. Weitzel also attested that on August 28, 2002, plaintiff requested a change in the coverage of her policy, which was made by State Farm, and therefore the policy number was changed to No. 625 8626-E28-06E. (Id. at ¶ 5).
Plaintiff essentially presents two arguments in opposition to defendant's motion. First, she denies any knowledge of the enhanced PIP benefits available to her stating that she "does not remember receiving or reading the notices regarding enhanced PIP coverage." Plaintiff's Response at 3. Second, she argues, even assuming she received and read the policy renewal notices and accompanying "News and Notes" pamphlets, these documents "were not sufficiently clear" to constitute offers of enhanced benefits under C.R.S. § 10-4-710(2)(a). Id. at 8.
In support of her opposition plaintiff submits her affidavit in which she states that she does "not know if I actually received those particular renewal notices and `News & Notes,' but if I did and the enhanced PIP information was actually in those documents, I never read about it." (Lust Affidavit, Exhibit A to Plaintiff's Response, ¶ 3). She further states that when she received an insurance premium bill, she "was not in the habit of reading other notes in the bill or other papers that were enclosed with my insurance premium bill." (Id. at ¶ 4). She also claims that "[i]f I ever read any of that information, I must not have understood what it was about because I never knew that I could have bought greater PIP coverage until after the car accident of September 2002." (Id. at ¶ 5). Finally, plaintiff states that she has no recollection of any agent from State Farm explaining to her that she could buy greater PIP coverage under her car insurance. (Id. at ¶ 6).
The purpose of a summary judgment motion is to assess whether a trial is necessary. White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360 (10th Cir.1995). In other words, there "must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Panis v. Mission Hills Bank, N.A., 60 F.3d 1486, 1490 (10th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1160, 116 S.Ct. 1045, 134 L.Ed.2d 192 (1996). A court grants summary judgment for the moving party only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact in the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits. F.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "Once the moving party meets this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial on a material matter." Concrete Works of Colorado, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1004, 115 S.Ct. 1315, 131 L.Ed.2d 196 (1995) citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). When applying this standard, a court must view the factual record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir.1990).
The nonmoving party may not rest solely on the allegations in the pleadings, but must instead designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." F.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. "[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is `genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). But, "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id.
Under the common law mailbox rule, when a document "is properly addressed and deposited in the United States mails, with postage duly prepaid thereon, there is a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Warren v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 05-cv-01891-EWN-MEH.
...Ins. Co., 158 Fed.Appx. 119, 121-22 (10th Cir.2005) (noting the trial court's use of the Parfrey test); Lust v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 412 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1191-92 (D.Colo.2006). I need not decide the matter here, as I find that even under Parfrey, Defendant's offer passes muster. P......
-
Solano v. American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida
...1168-70 (citing Parfrey); Padhiar, 479 F.3d at 733-35 (same); Munger, 174 P.3d at 834 (same). But see Lust v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 412 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1191-92 (D.Colo.2006) (holding that plaintiff's reliance on Parfrey test "is unavailing"); May v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co., 2006 ......
-
Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Taggart & Assocs., Inc., Civil Action No. 15-cv-02801-KLM
...not impose a requirement that an insurer confirm that its insureds understand UM/UIM coverage. See also Lust v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1190 (D. Colo. 2006) (stating that whether plaintiff failed "to read or recall what was mailed" did not "have any bearing on ......
-
Munger v. Farmers Ins. Exchange
...cases that have reached differing conclusions regarding Parfrey's applicability to the issue), with Lust v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 412 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1192 (D.Colo.2006)(Parfrey does not apply to offers of enhanced PIP coverage). We conclude that the Parfrey analysis applies to det......