Lutcher & Moore Lumber Co. v. Beaumont, S. L. & W. Ry. Co.
Citation | 33 S.W.2d 1077 |
Decision Date | 14 October 1930 |
Docket Number | No. 9468.,9468. |
Parties | LUTCHER & MOORE LUMBER CO. v. BEAUMONT, S. L. & W. RY. CO.<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL> et al. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Texas |
Appeal from District Court, Harris County; Ben F. Wilson, Judge.
Suit by the Lutcher & Moore Lumber Company against the Beaumont, Sour Lake & Western Railway Company and another. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Fulbright, Crooker & Freeman, Carl G. Stearns, and James J. Shaw, all of Houston, for appellant.
Andrews Streetman, Logue & Mobley, W. M. Streetman, and Robert H. Kelley, all of Houston, for appellees.
This statement, interlined as to only two details about which there is no dispute, has been taken from appellant's brief, with the concession by the appellees that it is substantially correct:
In this court, through a number of presentments, appellant in substance contends that the undisputed evidence shows, not only that the rates charged and collected from it by the appellees in the transactions here involved (that is, 14½ cents per 100 pounds on all shipments that moved prior to March 5, 1921, and 15 cents per 100 pounds on all that moved subsequent thereto) were in excess of the rates in fact established by the authority of the state of Texas for the transportation of such property over the appellees' lines in intrastate commerce, but also that such lower state rates were never set aside, annulled, or otherwise rendered ineffective, by any order, rule, or law, made or enacted either by the state or the federal government; that prior to December 28 of 1917, the Railroad Commission of Texas by its special authority No. 37 established a special commodity rate of 6 cents per 100 pounds for the transportation of lumber in carloads over appellees' lines between Orange and Galveston, and adopted its order No. 5198 whereby appellees were required to observe "all commodity rates currently in effect between Galveston, Texas, and Orange, Texas," as "maxima on shipments of the same commodity transported between Houston, Texas, and Orange, Texas"; that on December 28, 1917, pursuant to the Federal Possession and Control Act (39 Stat. 645 [10 USCA § 1361]), the President of the United States through the Director General of Railroads assumed control of the appellees' lines, along with all other railways within the continental United States, and on the next day, conformably to the proclamation so doing, issued General Order No. 1, which, among other things, provided: thus adopting and continuing in effect the 6-cent rate from Orange to Houston, so previously fixed by the Railroad Commission of Texas; that on May 25 of 1918 the Director General, by his General Order No. 28, directed a general increase in all intra and inter-state rates, effective June 25 of that year, thereby increasing the lumber rates 25 per cent., and raising this 6-cent rate thereon from Orange to Houston to 7½ cents, which thereafter, up until December 31 of 1919, remained the maximum rate to be charged on carload lots of lumber between those two points; that on December 31, 1919, the Director General published a tariff, "Texas Lines Tariff No. 36, A. C. Fonda's I. C. C. No. 73," containing rates on lumber and setting forth a general mileage scale thereof for its transportation between points on the appellees' lines, which, for the "over 55 miles" distance from Orange to Houston, named a rate of 11 cents per 100 pounds, this being the same as the rate named in the general mileage scale of rates prescribed by the Texas Railroad Commission as increased 25 per cent. by the Director General's order No. 28; that, while this tariff No. 36 published a special commodity rate of 7½ cents per 100 pounds on lumber in carloads from Orange to Galveston, and while the provision making this rate the maximum from Orange to Houston was not at any time specifically or expressly repealed or revoked by any order or action of the Interstate Commerce Commission, or the Director General of Railroads, although published in other tariffs of the Railroad Administration, including the general tariffs, it was omitted from this No. 36, or any other tariff specifically purporting to apply on lumber, wherefore the Texas Railroad Commission's order requiring the Orange to Galveston rate on lumber to be applied as the maximum from Orange to Houston was never repealed or revoked through any act of the Director General, but remained in full force and effect throughout federal control; that, if the contrary be assumed, however (that is, that this Texas Commissions' maximum-rate provision was repealed by implication, or put into a state of "innocuous desuetude," as a result of the Director General's tariff No. 36 on December 31 of 1919, leaving his general mileage-scale rate of 11 cents per 100 pounds the only one then extant on lumber between the two points involved, nevertheless it still uncontrovertedly appears that the 11-cent rate), if it became effective on December 19, 1919, continued so until the end of federal control on March 1, of 1920, whereupon, ex proprio vigore, the Texas Commission's original order prescribing the Orange-Galveston rate to be observed as the maximum one from Orange to Houston revived and again bound the appellees to the same extent it did before federal control, since it "was not repealed or amended by the Railroad Commission of Texas, or by any other authority of the State of Texas, from the date thereof until after all the shipments here involved had moved," wherefore such rate became as of that date, the rule of decision, Civil Statutes of 1914; Missouri-Kansas & T. Ry. v. R. R. Commission (Tex. Civ. App.) 3 S.W.(2d) 489; Producers', etc., v. Ry. (Tex. Com. App.) 13 S.W.(2d) 679; West Texas Compress Co. v. Ry. (Tex. Com. App.) 15 S.W.(2d) 558.
After then further urging that neither section 208(a) of the Transportation Act of 1920 (41 Stat. 464), nor any other act or order of the federal government, should be given the effect of superseding this maximum-rate order of the State Railroad Commission, citing in that connection Lancaster v. Smith (Tex. Com. App.) 262 S. W. 74, and Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Boone, 270 U. S. 466, 46 S. Ct. 341, 70 L. Ed. 688, appellant's brief thus concludes its argument for reversal of the judgment:
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...of construction, will control over any conflicting general provisions that may be therein contained. Lutcher & Moore Lumber Co. v. Beaumont, S. L. & W. R. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 33 S.W.2d 1077, affirmed Tex.Civ.App., 49 S.W.2d 726; Leopard v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., Tex.Civ.App., 220 S.W.2d 25......