Lutcher Moore Lumber Company v. William Knight

• Decision Date: 11 April 1910
• Docket Number: No. 101,101
• Parties: LUTCHER & MOORE LUMBER COMPANY and H. J. Lutcher, Petitioners, v. WILLIAM H. KNIGHT et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

217 U.S. 257

30 S.Ct. 505

54 L.Ed. 757

LUTCHER & MOORE LUMBER COMPANY and H. J. Lutcher, Petitioners,

v WILLIAM H. KNIGHT et al.

No. 101.

Argued January 24, 1910.

Decided April 11, 1910.

Messrs. Arsene P. Pujo, George E. Holland, Pujo, Moss & Sugar, and Holland & Holland for petitioners.

Messrs. M. J. Cunningham and M. J. Cunningham, Jr., for respondents.

Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the court:

On January 28, 1882, Dan R. Knight and John A. Lovett sold to William J. Knight several tracts of land situated in the state of Louisiana. The price stated in the act of sale was $15,000, $500 cash and the balance, $14,500, on credit, evidenced by a note of the purchaser. On February 5, 1887, W. J. Knight sold to Viola P. Knight, wife of Dan R. Knight, a one-half interest, and on February 7, 1887, he sold to J. C. Knight a one-fourth interest in the same lands. The remaining one-fourth interest was parted with by an act of sale dated April 13, 1889, wherein W. J. Knight joined with Viola P. Knight and John C. Knight in selling the entire land to Henry J. Lutcher and G. Bedell Moore. On April 3, 1901, Moore sold his undivided one-half interest to the Lutcher & Moore Lumber Company. All these acts of sale were duly recorded in the proper land conveyance records.

In March, 1903, William. H. Knight, his brother and two sisters, one a married woman, whose husband joined in the suit as a merely technical party, commenced this action in the state district court of Vernon parish, Louisiana, against Henry J. Lutcher and the Lutcher & Moore Lumber Company, asking to be adjudged the owners of and to be entitled to the possession of an undivided half interest in the lands bought by William J. Knight in 1882 from D. R. Knight and John A. Lovett. The right of ownership was based upon the averment that the petitioners were children of William J. Knight; that the property bought by him was acquired during the marriage between their father and mother; that it formed a part of the community existing between them, and constituted an acquet of the community at the time of the death of the mother in August, 1885. The right of the father to sell, in 1887 and 1889, the onehalf interest belonging to their mother, as the result of her community estate, was denied, and it was charged that the defendants, who were in possession in virtue of the attempted sale made by the father, were mere trespassers. It was besides averred that William J. Knight, the father, married a second time, in June, 1886.

Because of diversity of citizenship the cause was removed into the circuit court of the United States for the western district of Louisiana. In that court the defendants answered. In addition to averring that the petition disclosed no cause of action, and denying generally all the allegations of the petition not expressly admitted, it was averred: That William J. Knight had never intermarried with the mother of the petitioners; that even if there had been such a marriage and a community resulting from it, the property sued for was not an acquet of such community, because it was the separate property of W. J. Knight, as no cash price was ever paid by him for the property and no note given, as recited in the notarial act of sale, and, although the transaction was put in the form of a sale, it was only ostensibly so, having been merely intended to be a donation to him of the property. It was, how- ever, moreover alleged that the property never formed part of a community existing between Knight and his alleged first wife, even if there was such community, because the property was conveyed to him under a secret agreement, for the benefit of his vendors, and that all the subsequent transfers were in pursuance of such agreement. It was further alleged that the sales to the defendants were executed in good faith, for valuable considerations, without notice or knowledge of the claims of plaintiffs, Knight being then married, and there being no evidence of record of a previous marriage or of the death of the alleged previous wife. In a further paragraph of the answer it was claimed 'that the pretended sale made July 28, 1882, to said William J. Knight, was a simulation and a fiction,' and that the seeming grantors made said pretended sale for the sole purpose of screening said property from the pursuit of their creditors; 'that the property never became community property, but always belonged to said Knight and Lovett, as William J. Knight and his alleged wife and all parties well knew, until the sale made April 13, 1889, by W. J. Knight, John C. Knight and Viola P. Knight to Henry J. Lutcher and G. Bedell Moore.' The respective interests of the defendants in the land were next averred, their vendors were called in warranty, and it was prayed that, in the event of eviction, defendants might recover of their warrantors the proportionate amount of the purchase price which they had received. An amendment to the answer was subsequently filed October 27, 1903, amplifying the claim that the sale in 1882 to William J. Knight was not bona fide, but was for the benefit of the grantors, and included both movable and immovable property belonging to said vendors, and averring that the $500 recited cash consideration was paid, but with money of the grantors, and that a note was executed, but with no intention to pay the same or to demand payment thereof, and that it was in fact redelivered to Knight without his making payment, and it was averred that the pretended sale constituted only a paper title to the property, 'and same never in fact nor in law became the property of the community between him and his so-called wife; and no interest whatever in said property vested in said community, and the said plaintiffs herein are without right or equity to any right, title, or interest in the said lands.' The prescriptions of one, two, four, five, and ten years were also pleaded.

As expressly stated in the argument, both by counsel for the petitioners in error and by counsel for the respondents, and as appears from recitals contained in a petition for rehearing printed in the record, to which we shall hereafter more particularly refer, the defendants, who had removed this action to the circuit court in December, 1903, filed in that court their bill of complaint, in which they made the plaintiffs in this action defendants. The bill, after substantially reiterating the averments which we previously recited, and which were contained in the answer filed in this cause, prayed that the further prosecution of the action be perpetually enjoined. The right to prevent the further prosecution of the action at law was based on the assertion that the law action 'clouded your orators' title to the land in suit; that your orators' defenses are equitable, and that the pendency of said suit and the cloud cast on your orators' title works irreparable injury and damage to you orators, and that they have no adequate remedy at law.'

The following demurrer was interposed to the bill of complaint:

'First. Plaintiffs are estopped from attacking their own title.

'Second. The deed under which the defendants claim has been adjudged a good and valid title.

'Third. The complaint comes too late, the defendants having filed a suit in law, and the plaintiffs have answered to their demands, in which they set up a defense which, if sustained, will be adequate in law.

'Fourth. That the allegations of plaintiffs' of their answer in suit No. 276 in the circuit court of the United States for the western district of Louisiana, at law, and that the allegations therein contained and set forth set up a plea of estopped in pais, and constitute a complete and adequate remedy at law.

'Fifth. That the bill of complaint discloses no right or cause of action.

'Finally. Defendants especially demur to the right of plaintiffs to bring their bill in equity, as neither the law nor the jurisprudence of this state authorizes or provides suits in equity, and especially is this so as to real estate situated in the state. Hence, defendants move that the injunction herein asked for be denied. That this branch of the case be dismissed to plaintiffs' cost, and suit No. 276 be proceeded with according to law.' After argument, and on February 16, 1904, a decree was entered in favor of the respondents, in which it was recited that 'the court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the suit at cost of complainants.' This action, which had in the meanwhile been pending in the circuit court, upon the issues made up as heretofore stated, was tried, and resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of the defendants. Error having been prosecuted from the circuit court of appeals, in that court, on April 4, 1905, the judgment was reversed and the cause remanded. The court did not pass upon the merits, because it found that the citizenship of the Lutcher & Moore Lumber Company, the corporation defendant, was not adequately averred in the petition for removal, and therefore the proper basis for jurisdiction in the court below had not been laid (69 C. C. A. 248, 136 Fed. 404), and a petition for rehearing was refused (71 C. C. A. 684, 139 Fed. 1007).

In the circuit court, after the receipt of the mandate of the circuit court of appeals, plaintiffs objecting and excepting, the defendants, in accordance with leave granted,...